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Abstract
The manufacturing sector is the world’s largest energy consumer, responsible for more
than one third of the total final energy consumption of the global economy, and is com-
prised of many small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMM). Governments, large cor-
porations and third-party agencies have dedicated tremendous resources to regulatory
policies and incentive mechanisms to encourage SMMs to invest in Energy Efficiency
(EE) improvements. However, significant EE improvement opportunities at SMMs re-
main unimplemented. In order to fully capitalize these potentials, it is thus essential
to develop a better understanding of the investment decisions faced by SMMs. Previ-
ous research has mainly considered EE investment decisions by an isolated single firm.
However, for SMMs, it is also important to account for the potential influence that sup-
ply chain interactions with large, powerful buyers and competing suppliers may have
on such investment decisions. In the three studies of this research, we examine the
impact of mechanisms governed by regulators, buyers and third-party agencies on the
EE investment decisions of SMMs, taking into consideration supply chain interactions
with both their buyers and competing suppliers.
In the first study, we investigate when it is beneficial for a buyer to offer EE instru-
ments, including assessment assistance and procurement commitment, and how these
interact with third-party assessment assistance to impact the supplier’s EE investment
level. We find that assessment assistance helps reduce the EE gap but procurement
commitment is required to eliminate it. However, the buyer offers procurement com-
mitment only when the alternate supplier is sufficiently expensive. Not surprisingly,
third-party assessment assistance is important for unlocking EE improvement when the
assessment cost is high. Nevertheless, when the costs of both the assessment and the al-
ternate supplier are moderate, the addition of third-party assistance can actually harm
EE investment by deterring the buyer from offering her own instruments. Energy mar-
ket characteristics influence these outcomes in several ways. We find that an increase in
the volatility or cross period correlation of energy prices reduces the buyer’s incentive
to offer both assessment assistance and procurement commitment, leading to lower EE
investment. However, an increase in the expected energy price generally increases the
iii
buyer’s incentive to offer both instruments, expanding the regions where the EE gap is
reduced or even eliminated.
In the second study, we examine the impact of carbon pricing on social welfare,
taking into consideration the negative externality of energy and the positive externality
generated by domestic manufacturing. We show that in the absence of external juris-
diction competition, the first-best social welfare is achieved by setting the carbon price
at the negative externality of energy. These results continue to hold in the presence of
external jurisdiction competition, but only when the external costs of energy are suffi-
ciently low. Setting a carbon price at the negative externality of energy when it is high
is no longer optimal and the first-best outcome social welfare is not achieved. When so-
cial welfare losses happen, neither of the two common remedies, carbon price relief and
EE investment subsidy, can singlehandedly restore the losses. We show that a balanced
combination of both remedies is required to achieve the first-best social welfare level.
In the third study, we shift the focus to settings where a buyer is not aware of the
supplier’s EE improvement opportunities. For example, western buyers like Wal-mart
or Target are typically not well informed about the EE improvement potentials of their
Chinese suppliers and need engagement from third-party agencies to learn the informa-
tion. We analyze the conditions under which a third-party agency should work only
with a supplier or also engage the buyer to achieve the higher EE investment from the
supplier, as well as the impact of the third-party agency’s tactic on the supplier’s prof-
itability. We find that buyer engagement can either help or hinder the supplier’s EE
investment level, depending on the cost of the buyer’s alternative supply source. We
also find that the potential benefit of engaging the buyer on the supplier’s EE invest-
ment is reduced as the alternate supply source becomes more expensive. Regarding the
impact on the supplier’s profitability, we show that buyer engagement always reduces
the supplier’s profit as the engaged buyer squeezes all the associated EE cost savings.
We further analyze the impact of energy market uncertainty on these directional re-
sults. In particular, an increase in the volatility or cross period correlation of energy
prices reduces the chance that third-party agency’s engagement with the buyer posi-
tively influences the supplier’s EE investment level. However, when an improvement in
EE investment does occur, its magnitude is larger for higher volatility or cross period
correlation of energy prices. A higher volatility or cross period correlation of energy
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prices also reduces the detrimental impact of buyer engagement on the supplier’s profit.
Our findings provide insights for policy makers interested in increasing EE investment
and reducing the energy efficiency gap that plagues many supply chains.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Climate change continues to gain momentum as an important problem for the global
economy. Firms have responded by placing greater emphasis on sustainable and en-
vironmental strategies, such as cutting emissions of greenhouse gas and reducing their
carbon footprint. Among the considered strategies, including switching to renewable
energy, adopting carbon-neutral transportation fuels, or capturing and storing carbon
dioxide underground, improving EE has emerged as a particularly effective solution, due
to its combined environmental and economic benefits. The Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory (LBNL) defines improving EE as using less energy to provide the same ser-
vice, as opposed to energy conservation, which solely focuses on saving energy, even
at the expense of reducing or going without a service. LBNL recommends EE as the
cheapest and fastest way to reduce Green House Gas emissions. In terms of economic
value, the Energy 2030 initiative by the Alliance to Save Energy estimates that doubling
energy productivity by 2030 could save the U.S. $327 billions annually in energy cost
(http://www.ase.org/policy/energy2030). From a business standpoint, investing in EE
is a relatively easy way to reduce the budget risks associated with volatile and rising
energy costs (White 2010, Jackson 2010).
The manufacturing sector is the world’s largest energy consumer, responsible for
more than one third of the total final energy consumption of the global economy (Say-
gin et al. 2010), and is comprised of many SMMs. For example, in the U.S., SMMs
account for nearly 90% of all facilities, and about half of the total manufacturing energy
consumed (Trombley 2014). Governments, large corporations and third-party agencies
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have dedicated tremendous resources to regulatory policies and incentive mechanisms
to encourage SMMs to invest in EE improvements. However, it is well documented that
significant EE opportunities remain unrealized in every industry (Kleindorfer 2010). In
order to fully capitalize these potentials, it is essential to develop a better understanding
of the challenges faced by SMMs in making their EE investment decisions. The goal
of this research is to provide managerial insights for environmental regulators, large
corporations and third-party agencies to make informed decisions in designing effective
regulatory policies and incentive mechanisms for increasing EE investments at SMMs.
In a series of three studies, we examine the impact of mechanisms governed by regula-
tors, buyers and third-party agencies on the EE investment decisions of SMMs, taking
into consideration supply chain interactions with both their buyers and competing sup-
pliers. Our main contribution is to the literature that studies firms’ EE investment
decisions where the majority of research focus on an isolated single firm.
In the first study, we investigate the impact of EE assessment assistance and procure-
ment commitment offered by the buyer and/or non-profit and government funded pro-
grams (collectively referred to here as third-party agencies) on the investment decisions
of a small capital-constrained manufacturing supplier. These are the most commonly
used incentive instruments to address SMMs’ reluctance to perform EE assessment and
their lack of business security, the two important barriers that prevent SMMs from
making EE investments. Unlocking the potential for EE improvement at SMMs usu-
ally begins with an initial assessment (energy audit) conducted by EE experts. This
assessment provides a baseline understanding of energy use and identifies potential in-
vestments that could be made to improve EE. Unfortunately, SMMs “often focus on the
day-to-day tasks of the core business, leaving limited time and resources to investigate
EE opportunities” (International Energy Agency Report 2015). Many SMMs are also
reluctant to perform EE audits due to the concern that “the (subsequent) investment
could not lead to the expected savings” (Tomasi and Morea 2012). Without an initial
assessment, EE investment opportunities remain dormant at many SMMs. To tackle
this barrier, assessment assistance providing free or low cost energy audits at SMMs has
been established by third-party agencies. Notable programs in the U.S. include national
Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) funded by the Department of Energy and local
technical assistance programs (e.g. Minnesota Technical Assistance Program). Price
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and Lu (2011) provide a detailed survey of similar programs globally. Although these
programs have achieved remarkable success in identifying profitable EE investments,
many remain unimplemented at SMMs. According to the IAC database, more than
half of their EE improvement recommendations are not implemented. This is often due
to uncertainty in the paybacks of EE improvements, which are realized through future
savings in energy costs and depend on continued business with the supplier’s key cus-
tomers. Inhofe and Fannon (2005) point out that when high energy prices overshadow
the gains from EE improvements, a buyer might switch to a cheaper competitor, making
the delayed benefits of EE investments unattainable. This uncertainty dampens SMMs’
incentive to invest.
To reduce this uncertainty, some large buyers (e.g., Wal-mart and Starbucks), offer
long-term procurement commitment that provides business security to selected suppliers
and encourages longer term investments in EE and other environmental improvements.
As Andrew Ruben, Wal-mart’s then executive vice president of private brand operations,
explained, environmental improvements “might require an investment that takes two
and a half or three years to pay off. Offering a two-year commitment gives a supplier
enough incentive to make the investment” (Plambeck and Denend 2011). Apart from
procurement commitment, large buyers have also introduced their own EE assessment
assistance programs, independent of those offered by third parties (e.g. Wal-mart’s
“Supplier Energy Efficiency Program” or Ikea’s “Suppliers Go Renewable”). In these
programs, buyers initiate and subsidize the costs of EE assessment at suppliers’ facilities.
This helps them better understand suppliers’ EE opportunities and adjust procurement
strategies accordingly (Plambeck and Denend 2011).
We investigate under what circumstances it is beneficial for a buyer to offer EE
instruments, and whether they are helpful in increasing the supplier’s EE investments.
From the perspective of policy makers, it is also crucial to examine the interaction be-
tween potential buyer-offered instruments and third-party assistance. To that end, we
develop a stylized analytical framework that captures the EE investment decision of a
focal supplier competing with an alternate supplier for the business of a large, cost-
sensitive buyer in a two-period time frame. Through a series of game theoretic models,
we find that assessment assistance helps reduce the supplier’s EE gap but procurement
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commitment is required to eliminate it. However, the buyer offers procurement com-
mitment only when the alternate supplier is sufficiently expensive. Not surprisingly,
third-party assessment assistance is important for unlocking EE improvement when the
assessment cost is high. Nevertheless, when the costs of both the assessment and the al-
ternate supplier are moderate, the addition of third-party assistance can actually harm
EE investment by deterring the buyer from offering her own instruments. In our nu-
merical study using data from Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC), we observe this
detrimental impact of adding third party assistance in more than 50% of the instances,
leading to an associated 75% reduction in EE investments relative to the economically
optimal level.
In the second study, we examine the impact of carbon pricing on social welfare,
taking into consideration the negative externality of energy and the positive externality
generated by domestic manufacturing. Carbon emissions incur many external environ-
mental and social costs, including harm to human health, climate change and global
warming (Allcott and Greenstone 2012). Carbon pricing is widely acknowledged as a
cost-effective mechanism to address these external costs, which are generally not in-
ternalized by emitters. Since fossil fuels contribute almost 80% of the global energy
and are the largest source of carbon emissions (World Energy Resources 2013; Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change 2014), carbon pricing could also be an effective
mechanism to encourage investment in EE improvements. A carbon pricing policy
increases energy production costs, which are typically passed down to energy users,
making them to internalize the negative externality and thus better aligns their private
and the socially optimal levels of EE. There is, however, a potentially adverse impact
of carbon pricing. Higher energy prices due to carbon pricing raises operating costs,
placing tremendous pressure on business, especially on SMMs who often have difficulty
passing energy cost increase to their larger buyers (Inhofe and Fannon 2005; New South
Wales (Australia) Business Chamber Report 2011). For example, U.K.’s carbon tax
(under the U.K. Climate Change Levy) adds roughly 15% to the energy bill of a typi-
cal U.K. business (Martin et al. 2014). Similar cost increases had been tied to carbon
pricing policies in the E.U. (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 2010) and
Australia (New South Wales (Australia) Business Chamber Report 2011). As a result,
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a concern of instituting a carbon pricing policy is that it could reduce the cost com-
petitiveness of local SMMs against manufacturers from external jurisdictions without
such policies. The lower cost competitiveness of local SMMs, as pointed out in our
first study, potentially dampens their buyers’ incentive to offer long-term procurement
commitment, leading to EE investment inefficiencies in the supply chain. This loss of
competitiveness may also threaten the very survival of SMMs, potentially leading to
important social implications, including lost jobs and a weakened, less attractive local
economy. The Edmonton Chamber of Commerce reported that business insolvencies
in Alberta (Edmonton, Canada) have increased by over 30% since 2014, (partly) due
to the jurisdiction’s carbon tax. According to a 2014 article by the Sydney Morning
Herald,1 a small manufacturing business owner in Australia claimed that the carbon
tax has increased his costs in the range of 15%, forcing him to consider relocating his
business to another jurisdiction not subject to a carbon tax.
The environmental economic literature (e.g., Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Allcott and
Greenstone 2012) has established that setting a carbon price at the negative externality
of energy (e.g. applying a Pigouvian tax) is sufficient to achieve the optimal social
welfare from an EE improvement perspective. However, research in this literature of-
ten overlooks supply chain interactions and the potential competition from external
jurisdictions which, as discussed above, could lead to losses of the positive externality
generated by domestic manufacturing and potentially reduce social welfare. As more
jurisdictions develop interest in applying a carbon pricing policy to regulate emissions
and encourage EE investments,2 it is important to understand how these two factors
would influence the impact of carbon pricing on social welfare, accounting for both the
negative externality of energy and the positive externality generated by domestic man-
ufacturing. Our purpose in this study is thus two-fold. First, we derive the conditions
under which it is optimal to set a carbon price at the negative externality of energy when
accounting for supply chain interactions, as well as supplier competition from external
jurisdictions. Second, we study the effectiveness of supplemental remedies when it is
not optimal to set the carbon price at the negative externality of energy. We focus on
the two most common supplemental policies that specifically target SMMs, carbon price
1http://goo.gl/d9NAVc
2According to a recent report by the World Bank (2015), 40 national jurisdictions and over 20 cities,
states, and regions around the globe have adopted or are planning implementation of carbon prices
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relief and EE investment subsidy (International Energy Agency Report 2012). Carbon
price relief, either in the form of a rebate distributed back to payers from the collected
revenues or a reduction of the extra energy costs induced by the carbon price, eases the
cost pressure, helping local SMMs remain competitive. In contrast, EE subsidies reduce
EE investment cost, making it easier for SMMs to take on this expense to improve their
energy-related operating costs.
Building on the framework developed in the first study, we show that in the absence
of external jurisdiction competition, the buyer always prefers a long-term contract and
thus, a carbon price set at the negative externality of energy is sufficient to achieve
the optimal social welfare. The dynamics, however, change in the presence of external
jurisdiction competition. As carbon price increases, the buyer switches from offering
the domestic supplier a long- to a short-term contract and when the (carbon) price
reaches a sufficiently high threshold, the buyer abandons the focal supplier to source
from the external supplier in both periods. Using these insights, we show that setting
a carbon price at the negative externality of energy is optimal only when the buyer
continues offering a long-term contract to the domestic supplier when the carbon price
is introduced. This happens when the negative externality of energy is not too high.
When the negative externality of energy is high, setting a carbon price at the negative
externality of energy results in social welfare losses which can be alleviated but not fully
restored by adopting either an additional carbon price relief or an EE investment sub-
sidy. When applied separately, the former remedy results in under-investment whereas
the latter may potentially lead to over-investment in EE improvements. Rather, a bal-
anced combination of both remedies is required to fully restore social welfare losses. We
also quantify our results using realistic data calibrated from the Industrial Assessment
Centers database and the Department of Energy website. Our numerical results suggest
that in the presence of external jurisdiction competition, blindly setting a carbon price
equal to the negative externality of energy without any supplementary remedies could
lead to significant losses in social welfare. Furthermore, we observe that a carbon price
relief results in negligible social welfare losses and is more effective than an investment
subsidy when each remedy is applied separately.
In the third study, we shift the focus to settings where a buyer is not aware of the
supplier’s EE improvement opportunities. This applies in cases where large buyers,
7
including retailers and big brand companies, typically interact with huge supply net-
works and so might not be able to identify and support EE investment opportunities
at individual supplier sites, especially when there are large geographical distances. For
example, western buyers like Wal-mart or Target are typically not well informed about
the EE improvement potentials of their Chinese suppliers and need engagement from
third-party agencies to learn this information. In these settings, third-party agencies
traditionally work directly (and only) with SMMs in helping conduct energy assessment
and identifying profitable EE investment opportunities. EE experts have recently called
for the engagement of these third-parties with large buyers in helping their suppliers
realize EE investment opportunities. Once aware of suppliers’ EE investment oppor-
tunities (through third-party agencies), large buyers are in a position to potentially
alleviate the investment barriers faced by their smaller suppliers (Schuchard and Gross
2009, Goldberg et al. 2012). For example, as mentioned earlier, some large buyers offer
long-term contract that provides business security to selected suppliers and encourages
longer term investments in environmental improvements. On the other hand, there are
concerns that knowledge of suppliers’ EE investment opportunities may help the more
powerful buyers squeeze out any associated cost savings, dampening the suppliers’ in-
centive to invest (Goldberg et al. 2012, Plambeck 2012, Wu et al. 2014). It remains
unclear how the third-party agency’s tactics to either work directly with a supplier or
also engage with its buyer affect the supplier’s EE investment decisions and profitability.
We find that our results developed in the first study that third-party agency’s en-
gagement with the buyer can have either a beneficial or detrimental impact on the
supplier’s EE investment decision are also applicable to this new setting where a buyer
is not aware of the supplier’s EE improvement opportunities. In particular, buyer en-
gagement increases the supplier’s EE investment level when the alternative source is
more expensive than a threshold such that the engaged buyer chooses to offer the sup-
plier a long-term contract. When the alternate supply source is sufficiently cheap, the
engaged buyer offers a short-term contract, which reduces the supplier’s investment
level. More importantly, we find that the potential benefit of engaging the buyer on
the supplier’s EE investment is reduced as the alternate supply source becomes more
expensive. Regarding the impact on the supplier’s profitability, we show that buyer
engagement always reduces the supplier’s profit as the engaged buyer squeezes all the
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associated EE cost savings. We further analyze the impact of energy market uncer-
tainty on these directional results. In particular, an increase in the volatility or cross
period correlation of energy prices reduces the chance that third-party agency’s engage-
ment with the buyer positively influences the supplier’s EE investment level. However,
when an improvement in EE investment does occur, its magnitude is larger for higher
volatility or cross period correlation of energy prices. A higher volatility or cross period
correlation of energy prices also reduces the detrimental impact of buyer engagement
on the supplier’s profit.
The dissertation continues in Chapter 2 with a literature review. This is followed
by the three studies described above, contained in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In Chapter 6
we summarize the main findings, and discuss limitations and ideas for future research.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The growing importance of EE implementation to operations and supply chain manage-
ment has recently caught the attention of Operations Management (OM) researchers.
Within this literature, Aflaki et al. (2013) identify savings intensity, green image and
project complexity as the three main value drivers of EE projects, and propose a frame-
work for identifying and implementing these projects. Anderson and Newell (2004)
and Muthulingam et al. (2013) empirically investigate the impact of project character-
istics and managers’ behavioral biases on small and medium-sized firms’ decisions to
implement EE projects recommended under the Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC)
program of the US Department of Energy (DoE). Drawing upon the IAC database,
Anderson and Newell (2004) find that projects with a payback period greater than one
to two years are less likely to be adopted, possibly due to capital constraints, agency
problems or managerial errors. Using the same data set, Muthulingam et al. (2013) find
that managers’ behavioral biases have significant impact on which EE project a firm
chooses to adopt. In particular, projects appearing earlier in the list of recommenda-
tions and requiring less managerial effort are more likely to be adopted. Our research
also contributes to the sustainable operations literature that studies the decision of a
single firm to adopt sustainable technologies (see, for example, Krass et al. 2013, Wang
et al. 2013, Hu et al. 2015, Raz and Ovchinnikov 2015, Kök et al. 2016 and Drake et al.
2016). Our focus on the investment decisions of a supplier interacting with its buyer
and third-party agencies enriches this literature, where the extant work focuses mostly
on a single firm’s isolated EE decisions.
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Since EE investments provide a cost reduction opportunity at the supplier that can
also benefit the buyer (Wu et al. 2014), our research contributes to the literature on
supplier development. This literature, including Bernstein and Kök (2009), Wang et al.
(2010), Li (2013), Kim and Netessine (2013) and Tang et al. (2014), investigates the
impact of different types of buyer-provided incentives for improving quality and other
performance measures within the supplier base. These papers focus on continuous pro-
cess improvement decisions that are central to the practice of Lean Production and Six
Sigma, but differ from decisions involving a radical change in technology or equipment.
In contrast, EE improvements usually require one-shot up-front investments with future
rewards (through savings in energy expenses) that are earned over time (Kapur et al.
2011). This motivates our use of a two-period model to capture the decision dynamics
throughout our three studies. Most of these papers use a single-period model with the
exception of Bernstein and Kök (2009), who consider a multi-period model in which
the suppliers accumulate cost-reduction investments in each period. In our setting, we
assume the supplier makes one investment decision at the beginning of the time horizon.
Our incorporation of the need for an initial EE assessment and the possibility of third
party assistance along with buyer-offered instruments is another distinguishing feature
of our first study in Chapter 3 with this literature.
Our second study in Chapter 4 is related to research in Environmental Economics on
the impact of emission regulation and its potential adverse effect on business competi-
tiveness. For example, Smale et al. (2006) empirically investigate the impact of emission
trading on firm competitiveness in five energy-intensive industries within the U.K., in-
cluding cement, newsprint, steel, aluminium and petroleum. Focusing on the power
generation industry, Fan et al. (2010) and Heutel (2011) show that emission regulation
can adversely lead to lower investments in cleaner technologies, which is consistent with
our findings. Demailly and Quirion (2006) and Fischer et al. (2009) compare the effec-
tiveness of different supplementary policies in addressing the carbon leakage issue. Our
work differs from these papers in that they focus exclusively on the perspective of a
social planner whereas we also incorporate the viewpoint of individual firms and their
operational decisions. This allows us to analyze how policy decisions made by a social
planner impact the buyer’s optimal contracting and pricing decisions, as well as their
subsequent effect on the supplier’s EE investments.
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There is also a growing literature in OM that studies how emission regulations
influence firms’ operational decisions. For example, Krass et al. (2013) and Drake et al.
(2016) study how an emission pricing policy affects a firm’s choice to invest in a capacity
portfolio consisting of clean and dirty technologies. These papers study the decisions of
an isolated firm while we focus on the supply chain interactions between firms. Other
researchers consider supply chain interactions but focus on different decisions than our
work. For example, Benjaafar et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2013) and Benjaafar and Chen
(2014) investigate the impacts of emission costs on the buyer and supplier’s inventory
decisions and the associated emission levels along the supply chain.
The effectiveness of anti-leakage policies has recently gained traction in the Sustain-
able OM literature. We refer the reader to Hoen et al. (2015) for a detailed review of this
literature, including Drake (2017), Islegen et al. (2015) and Sunar and Plambeck (2016).
Our work differs from these papers in both the setting and focus. These papers consider
emission (and energy) intensive industries and so the focal company is the direct payer
of emission costs. On the other hand, the majority of SMMs, our focal entities, are not
directly subject to these costs, but instead are affected by increases in energy prices
passed on to them by utilities. As such, the anti-leakage policies considered in these
papers, such as grandfathering or output-based allocation that provide emitters with
emission allowances, are not applicable to SMMs. We instead investigate the impact of
an EE investment subsidy which specifically incentivizes EE improvements at SMMs.
Our focus on the optimal decisions of both the welfare maximizing social planner and
the profit maximizing firms in a supply chain context is another distinguishing feature
of our work.
Finally, our third study in Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on the influence
of external organizations and agencies on firms’ activities to reduce their environmental
impacts. Most papers in the literature (e.g. Foulon et al. 2002, Dhanorkar et al. 2017)
focus on the interactions, including audits, inspections and/or assistance, between the
external agencies and (only) the targeted firms. At the industry level, Kraft et al.
(2013) investigate the conditions under which a non-govermental organization should
target the industry versus the regulatory body in order to influence firms to replace
hazardous substances. Our work differs from these papers in that we also consider the
third-party agency’s potential engagement with both the targeted supplier and its buyer.
Chapter 3
Impact of Assessment Assistance
and Procurement Commitment
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate when it is beneficial for a buyer to offer EE instruments,
including assessment assistance and procurement commitment, and how these interact
with third-party assessment assistance to impact the supplier’s EE investment level.
Recall from the Introduction that assessment assistance and procurement commitment
are the two commonly incentives to counter the reluctance to conduct the initial EE
assessment and the lack of business security, the two important barriers preventing
SMMs from investing in EE improvements. We focus on the following research questions.
1. When is it beneficial for a buyer to offer EE instruments (assessment assistance
and/or procurement commitment) to its supplier? Under what conditions do these
instruments reduce the EE gap at an SMM?
2. How does the addition of third-party support (i.e., providing free EE assessment)
influence the buyer’s offerings, and consequently, the supplier’s EE investment?
3. How do characteristics of the energy market (prices, volatility, correlation across
time) further affect these outcomes?
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To answer these questions, we develop a stylized model that captures the EE invest-
ment decision of a focal supplier competing with an alternate supplier for the business
of a large buyer in a two-period time frame. Our setting is motivated by U.S. suppliers
participating in Wal-mart’s SEEP.3 An example of such a supplier is Dana Undies, a
small family-owned manufacturer of children’s clothes in Georgia (U.S.) with less than
200 employees and a 65, 000-square-foot facility. Most of Dana Undies’ competitors
are from Eastern Asian countries, including China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia (Lu
2014). In these regions, local governments established policies to maintain stable local
energy prices, shielding businesses from global energy fluctuations (Kojima 2009). In
contrast, Dana Undies was exposed to fluctuating energy prices in the U.S. and “was
facing challenges competing on prices with competitors and pointed to energy costs for
much of the problem”, as asserted in Wal-mart’s Written Testimony (2007). Wal-mart’s
assessment assistance through SEEP helped Dana Undies overcome the assessment hur-
dle and identify EE improvements that significantly reduced its energy expenses.
In line with this example, we focus on manufacturing settings where energy costs are
important to an SMM’s price competitiveness and so the economics of EE improvements
is key to the investment decision. In particular, we assume the production cost of the
focal supplier depends on a volatile energy price realized at production time. In contrast,
the alternate supplier operates in a region which benefits from stable energy prices due
to government intervention, making its production cost more predictable. The focal
supplier can explore potential EE improvements to reduce its energy usage (and thus,
production cost), beginning with an EE assessment. After the assessment results are
known, the supplier selects the level of EE investment, and incurs the associated upfront
payment. The supplier’s investment reward depends on whether the buyer offers a short-
or long- term contract over the payback horizon. Under a short-term contract, the buyer
is free to switch to the alternative supplier if the rise in future energy prices overtakes
any gains from EE investment, leaving the focal supplier vulnerable to not realizing the
full benefit of its EE investment.
3Wal-mart initially offered the program exclusively to their U.S. suppliers. In 2014, they extended a
similar program to Chinese suppliers.
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3.2 Model Description
We consider a two-tiered supply chain consisting of a large buyer (she) that has ne-
gotiation power and a capital-constrained supplier (he) who considers investing in EE
improvements at his production facility. The buyer wishes to procure a mature product
with constant demand over a two-period time horizon, which she sells at market price p.
Assuming a constant demand allows us to isolate the impact of energy price uncertainty,
which affects both the availability and magnitude of the supplier’s EE cost savings. We
normalize the buyer’s demand to one without loss of generality.
The supplier’s production cost is divided into a time-dependent energy-related cost
component as well as a non-energy cost component that is normalized to zero. We
assume the energy-related cost in each period, c˜t, t = 1, 2, follows a Normal distribution
with mean µ and standard deviation σ, where µ  σ such that the probability of a
negative energy cost is negligible. Let f(·) and F (·) denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of
c˜t, respectively. We further assume energy costs are correlated across time periods,
captured through a bivariate Normal distribution with positive correlation coefficient
ρ ≥ 0. This is consistent with energy price processes examined in prior empirical studies
(e.g. Skorodumov 2008). These assumptions imply that the conditional expectation of
energy cost in period 2, for a realized cost c1 in period 1, is E2[c˜2|c1] = µ(1− ρ) + ρc1.
The supplier can explore potential EE improvements to reduce his energy usage by
conducting an EE assessment at a fixed cost A. We assume that prior to the assessment,
there exists a range of potential energy savings that could be achieved for different
investment levels, although the exact saving is not yet known. Once the assessment
is complete, the exact saving for each possible investment level I ∈ [0, Im] is revealed,
where Im reflects the most advanced EE technologies available. We capture the pre-
assessment uncertainty in the energy savings potential by the saving function g(I) =
α˜
√
I, where the random variable α˜ represents the investment’s effectiveness. Before the
assessment, only the distribution of α˜ is known. After the assessment, the true value
of α˜, which we denote by α, is revealed and the reduction in energy cost for a given
investment level I is given by ctα
√
I, t = 1, 2. We assume α˜ is uniformly distributed over
[αL, αH ], implying that all technologies are equally likely. Furthermore, αH
√
Im < 1,
implying that the maximum EE investment does not completely eliminate all energy
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usage.
If an assessment is performed, the supplier can select a level of EE investment,
I ∈ [0, Im], which he then funds with an external loan. The supplier repays the loan in
equal installments βI at the end of each period, where β ≥ 12 . We assume loan financing
since the supplier is an SMM with limited capital resources. The single investment
assumption reflects the fact that EE financing is often difficult to secure (Palmer et al.
2012) and so a subsequent EE investment might not be possible until the first one is paid
off. The supplier’s investment choice I has a long-term impact on his cost structure,
captured by both the recurrent payment βI, and the uncertain energy cost savings
c˜tg(I) in period t = 1, 2. His total cost in period t is captured by c˜t(1− α
√
I) + βI.
Observe c˜1,
manufacture
product
Announce price
(subject to
agreed price
schedule, if any)
Decide whether to
accept price (if did
not accept AA)
Announce contract
length and whether
to offer AA (with
price schedule)
Decide whether to accept
AA (with price schedule)
and if not, whether to do
an assessment
Observe
assessment
results (if any)
Announce
new price (if
short-term)
Decide whether to
accept new price (if
short-term)
Buyer
Supplier
Update EE
Information
Period t=1 Period t=2Period t=0
Observe c˜2,
manufacture
product
Choose I (if
enabled by
assessment)
Observe
assessment
results (if AA is
accepted)
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
Figure 4.2 illustrates the key interactions between the buyer and supplier, which
form a Stackelberg game with the buyer as leader and both parties acting to maximize
their expected profits.4 In the pre-assessment phase (period 0), the buyer announces
the contract length, either the standard single-period or a longer two-period contract if
using Procurement Commitment (PC), and decides whether to offer Assessment Assis-
tance (AA). Under PC (i.e., a long-term contract), the buyer commits to sourcing her
entire demand (normalized to size 1) from the supplier at the same price in both peri-
ods. Without PC (i.e., a short-term contract), the buyer may switch to the alternate
supplier in period 2 after observing the energy cost c1. Under AA, the buyer incurs the
assessment cost A and offers the supplier a scheme to split the EE cost savings after
observing the assessment result α. In particular, the buyer commits to a price schedule
which depends on the realized α (i.e., w1(α) in the first period without PC or w(α) in
4When two strategies lead to the same expected profit, we assume both firms choose the option
providing higher EE investment.
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both periods with PC) together with AA.5 The supplier chooses his EE investment level
in period 1 if accepting AA. If AA is either not offered or rejected, the supplier can still
decide whether to conduct an assessment and keep the result as his private information.
In this case, the buyer sets her price accordingly to the announced contract length (w1
in the first period under a short- and w in both periods under a long-term contract)
after observing the supplier’s assessment decision. The supplier agrees to any offered
price that provides an expected profit no less than his reservation level. After accepting
the price in period 1, the supplier chooses an EE investment level I (if enabled by the
assessment).
If the buyer’s offer is rejected in either period, she purchases from an alternate
supplier at a cost ca, where p > ca ≥ µ.6 This cost ca includes the alternative supplier’s
energy and other production related costs, as well as any additional procurement related
costs. For ease of exposition, we assume a deterministic cost ca, applicable when the
alternate supplier is from a region that enjoys stable energy prices, due to government
regulation or other market forces, e.g. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc.
(Kojima 2009). In Appendix A.2.1, we provide insights into how our model would
change when considering price volatility as well as potential correlation between the
energy-related component of ca and the focal supplier’s energy cost.
All information is common knowledge in period 1 except for the assessment results
(i.e., the true value of α) which the supplier keeps as his private knowledge unless ac-
cepting the buyer’s AA. In period 2, we assume the buyer can observe the supplier’s
prior EE investment I (if any) and his energy usage (1 − α√I) from period 1, allow-
ing her to also discern α. This assumption reflects the fact that buyers often monitor
a supplier’s energy usage through an information sharing portal managed by a third-
party energy management company (e.g. the Foresight portal managed by the Midwest
Energy Cooperation) and suppliers report undertaken EE investments upon buyer re-
quests. It is also consistent with the remark by Jira and Toffel (2013), in their empirical
analysis of data from the Carbon Disclosure Project’s (CDP) Supply Chain Program,7
5This committed price schedule protects the supplier from the possibility that the buyer extracts all
the EE cost savings after learning the assessment result.
6This assumption ensures the buyer’s profitability and rationalizes the focal supplier’s EE investment
problem.
7CDP is a collaboration of multinational corporations requesting environmental information from
thousands of suppliers in 49 countries.
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that “suppliers are increasingly being asked to share information about their vulnerabil-
ity to climate change and their strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,” including
energy usage and undertaken EE investments. They find that suppliers are willing to
share such information for a number of reasons, including green house gas regulations
and the buyer’s commitment to sustainability. Since the costs of information sharing
(e.g. costs of maintaining the information sharing platform and/or reporting) are neg-
ligible and often paid by suppliers, we assume the buyer incurs no extra cost for the
information update.
Before defining our benchmark for measuring the possible EE gap across different
scenarios, it is worth acknowledging a few different definitions of the EE gap (and the
related energy paradox) found in extant literature. Gillingham and Palmer (2013) inter-
changeably use EE gap and EE paradox to refer to the phenomenon that “individuals
make decisions about energy efficiency that leads to a slower penetration of energy ef-
ficient products into the market than might be expected if consumers made all positive
net present value investments.” Gerarden et al. (2015), on the other hand, distinguish
between “energy paradox” as the issue of private optimality (i.e., “the apparent reality
that some EE technologies that would pay off for adopters are nevertheless not adopted”)
versus “EE gap” as a broader concept related to social optimality (i.e., “the apparent
reality that some energy-efficiency technologies that would be socially efficient are not
adopted”). In this study, we follow the EE gap definition by Allcott and Greenstone
(2012) as the “wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level
actually realized.”
Recall that the supplier’s total cost in each period is c˜t(1 − α
√
I) + βI, and so his
total expected cost across both periods is 2
[
µ(1− α√I) + βI
]
. It is straightforward
to show that the most cost effective EE investment level (i.e., the benchmark) for a
given value of α is then Ie∗(α) = min
(
Im,
[
µα
2β
]2)
, which also represents the channel’s
optimal investment level if the buyer and supplier were vertically integrated. Hereafter,
we focus on parameter ranges such that
[
µαH
2β
]2 ≤ Im, implying that for α ∈ [αL, αH ],
the interior solution is optimal and so
Ie
∗(α) =
[
µα
2β
]2
. (3.1)
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Focusing on the interior solution allows us to study the key dynamics while avoiding
trivial special cases. This is a reasonable assumption since it is often prohibitively
expensive to invest in the most advanced technologies (captured by Im) which have yet
to benefit from scale economies (Sorrell 2015).
3.3 Impact of Buyer-offered Instruments
In this section, we address our first research question, namely under what conditions
it is beneficial for the buyer to offer EE instruments (AA and PC) and whether these
instruments reduce the EE gap at an SMM. We begin by establishing the supplier’s EE
investment level when no external instruments are available. This serves as a baseline for
the later quantification of any improvements buyer-offered instruments and third-party
assistances may offer.
3.3.1 The Baseline EE Investment Level
We first analyze the outcomes when the supplier self-funds an assessment without any
external assistances. In this case, the assessment result (α) is the supplier’s private
information until the buyer observes an update of the supplier’s operations in period 2.
We derive the firms’ optimal decisions by backward induction, starting in period 2 with
the supplier’s decision to accept or reject the buyer’s offered price w2. For an observed
energy cost c1, the supplier’s profit when accepting w2 is w2−E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I)− βI.
For ease of exposition, we assume the supplier has a zero reservation profit across
the planning horizon. However, his reservation profit becomes −βI in period 2 if he
commits to the investment I in period 1. This is because the installment amount βI is
a payable sunk cost whether or not production takes place. It follows that the supplier
will accept w2 if w2 ≥ E2[c˜2|c1](1 − α
√
I). Knowing this, as well as I and α (through
the updated observation of the supplier’s operations), the buyer sets w2 to maximize
her profit given by
pi2(w2, α, c1) =
p− w2, if w2 ≥ E2[c˜2|c1](1− α
√
I)
p− ca, otherwise.
(3.2)
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When E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I) > ca, the buyer is better off switching to the alternate supplier
and so will offer w2 = ca which will be rejected by the focal supplier. When ca ≥
E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I), the dynamics reflect an ultimatum game with the buyer as the leader
with the power to divide the supply chain savings from using the cheaper focal supplier,
i.e., ca −E2[c˜2|c1](1− α
√
I). Since there is no information asymmetry in period 2 (and
both players are perfectly rational), the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is for the
supplier to accept the buyer’s minimum offer w2 = E2[c˜2|c1](1− α
√
I). Combining the
two cases yields w∗2(c1, α) = min(E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I), ca). This price allows the buyer to
extract all EE savings in period 2, leaving the supplier with his reservation profit −βI.
This model structure is similar to that analyzed by Swinney and Netessine (2009), who
consider a related Stackelberg setting where the buyer holds negotiation power.
Now considering period 1, recall that the buyer does not yet know the exact value
of α and so she chooses w1 to maximize E0[pi1(w1, α)] with
pi1(w1, α) =
p− w1 + E1 [p− w
∗
2(c1, α)] , if ψ∗1(w1, α) ≥ 0
2(p− ca), otherwise,
(3.3)
where
ψ∗1(w1, α) = max0≤I≤Im
w1 − µ(1− α
√
I)− 2βI, (3.4)
is the supplier’s optimal expected profit from period 1 onward if he accepts w1. In (3.4),
w1 denotes the revenue offered from the buyer while µ(1− α
√
I) captures the expected
total energy costs, including any savings from the EE investment. The last term rep-
resents the total cost of EE investments, consisting of the payable loan installment in
period 1 (−βI) and the supplier’s expected earning in period 2 (−βI) when the profit is
entirely extracted by the buyer. Let Ie1(α) denote the optimal solution to (3.4), which
can be easily derived as
Ie1(α) =
[
µα
4β
]2
. (3.5)
Note that Ie1(α) also reflects the optimal EE investment level when the supplier takes a
short-term view, assuming the buyer always switches in the second period. Substituting
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(3.5) into (3.4), we have ψ∗1(w1, α) = w1 − µ + (µα)
2
8β . The supplier accepts w1 only if
ψ∗1(w1, α) ≥ 0, which occurs when
w1 ≥ µ− (µα)
2
8β . (3.6)
We make the following observations that facilitate our further analysis. On one hand,
the supplier always rejects any w1 lower than ¯
w1 = µ− (µαH)
2
8β . Thus, offering w1 < ¯
w1
results in the buyer sub-optimally earning 2(p− ca) since she relinquishes any potential
EE cost savings. On the other hand, the supplier will accept any w1 that is at least
w¯1 = µ − (µαL)
2
8β . This implies that offering w1 > w¯1 is also sub-optimal for the buyer
as she unnecessarily yields extra profits to the supplier. It follows from the above two
arguments that w∗1 ∈ [¯w1, w¯1]. Within this range of w1, the condition in (3.6) implies
that there exists an EE effectiveness threshold αs(w1) ∈ [αL, αH ] where αs(w1) =√
8β(µ−w1)
µ , such that the supplier accepts w1 only if the realized α satisfies α ≥ αs(w1).
This results in the following characterization of the buyer’s optimization problem.
pi∗1 = max
¯
w1≤w1≤w¯1
αs(w1)∫
αL
2(p− ca)f(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
αs(w1)
[
2p− w1 − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜.
By lowering her offered price w1 (i.e., increasing αs(w1)), the buyer benefits from a
cheaper procurement cost but bears a higher risk of being rejected and having to source
from the costlier alternate supplier. The buyer balances this tradeoff in choosing the
optimal w∗1, which is equivalent to identifying the optimal threshold α∗s. As we show in
the proofs provided in Appendix A.1, ∂pi1∂αs has at most two real roots, where α2 denotes
the larger one (if any). Lemma 3.1 uses this terminology to characterize the buyer’s
and supplier’s optimal decisions.
Lemma 3.1 When no external instruments are available and if an EE assessment is
performed by the supplier, the buyer offers w∗1 = µ− (µα
∗
s)2
8β , where
α∗s =
αL, if
∂pi1
∂αs
< 0, ∀α ∈ [αL, αH ] or pi1(αL) > pi1(α2)
α2, otherwise,
(3.7)
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and αL ≤ α∗s ≤ 23αH . If α < α∗s, the supplier rejects the offer and sets I∗(α) = 0.
Otherwise, he accepts w∗1 and sets I∗(α) = Ie1(α), where Ie1(α) is defined in (3.5), the
buyer then offers w∗2(c1, α) = min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα24β
)
, ca
)
in period 2.
By substituting w∗1 and I∗(α) into (3.4), the supplier’s optimal profit in period 1 when
conducting the EE assessment is given by
ψ∗1(w∗1, α) =
0, if α < αs(w
∗
1) = α∗s;
µ2(α2−α∗s2)
8β , if α ≥ αs(w∗1) = α∗s.
When the supplier accepts the offered price w∗1, he earns a portion of the EE investment
benefit in period 1, µ
2(α2−α∗s2)
8β , as information rent from privately knowing α. The
supplier’s expected profit across the planning horizon is then given by ψ0 = −A +
E0[ψ∗1(w∗1, α˜)] = −A+
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2−α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜.
When the supplier does not perform an EE assessment, the investment level is zero by
definition. It is easy to show that the buyer offers w∗1 = µ, w∗2(c1) = min (E2 [c˜2|c1] , ca)
and the supplier’s expected profit across the planning horizon is zero. Comparing the
supplier’s expected profits across the two cases suggests that the supplier self-funds
the assessment only when the assessment cost A is sufficiently low. Before formalizing
that result in Proposition 3.1, we introduce in Table 1 the notational convention for
the assessment cost threshold Ai, where the superscript i represents different scenarios.
We also use Ai3p to represent the corresponding counterpart of Ai when the third-party
assistance is available.
Superscript i Representing
S Supplier’s threshold when there is no external assistance
Sp Supplier’s threshold when there is Procurement Commitment
Ba Buyer’s threshold when offering only Assessment Assistance
Bp Buyer’s threshold when offering both Procurement Commitment and Assessment Assistance
B∗ Buyer’s threshold under her optimal strategy
Table 3.1: Notational convention for Ai.
Proposition 3.1 Without any external instruments, the supplier performs an EE as-
sessment iff the assessment cost A ≤ AS(ca) =
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2−α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜ where AS(ca)
increases in ca.
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As the cost of the alternate supplier increases, the buyer is willing to surrender a higher
information rent, thus increasing the supplier’s assessment threshold, i.e., AS(ca) in-
creases in ca.
The supplier’s (ψ∗0b) and buyer’s (pi
∗
0b) expected profits in period 0 are then given by
ψ∗0b =
−A+ αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2 − α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜
+ = (AS(ca)−A)+, (3.8)
pi∗0b =

2p−
[
α∗s∫
αL
2caf(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
α∗s
[
µ− (µα∗s)28β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα24β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜
]
, if A ≤ AS(ca);
2p− [µ+ E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca)] . otherwise
(3.9)
Combining the results of Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 allows us to characterize the
corresponding baseline EE gap, defined as ∆S(α) = Ie∗(α) − I∗(α), where Ie∗(α) is
given in (3.1).
∆S(α) =
∆
e1(α) .= 316
[
µα
β
]2
, if A ≤ AS(ca) and α ≥ α∗s;
∆0(α) .= 14
[
µα
β
]2
, otherwise.
(3.10)
Equation (3.10) shows that without any external instruments, EE investment occurs
only when the assessment cost is sufficiently low and the realized EE investment effec-
tiveness is sufficiently high. However, this EE investment still results in a sizeable EE
gap. We next investigate the impact of the buyer-offered instruments on reducing this
EE gap.
3.3.2 Impact of Assessment Assistance
Similar to the previous analysis, we derive the buyer’s decision whether to offer AA by
comparing her expected profits with and without the offer. When AA is offered and
subsequently accepted by the supplier, the dynamics in period 2 follow the previous case
where the assessment was performed by the supplier without external support. However,
the buyer now has to commit to a first-period price schedule w1(α) when offering AA
in order to satisfy the supplier’s participation constraint and convince him to accept
her offer in period 0. The supplier’s participation constraint represents the expected
profit he would earn if rejecting the buyer’s assistance and (possibly) self-performing an
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assessment, i.e., his expected profit in the baseline scenario given in (3.8).
Assuming that the supplier accepts the buyer’s AA offer, we characterize the firms’
optimal decisions by backward induction, starting from the supplier’s EE investment
decision in period 1 (since the decisions in period 2 are the same as in the baseline
scenario). For an agreed price schedule w1(α), the supplier’s optimization problem in
period 1 is given by ψ∗1(α) = max0≤I≤Im
w1(α) − µ(1 − α
√
I) − 2βI. It is straightforward
to show that the supplier’s optimal EE investment I∗(α) is given by I∗(α) = Ie1(α) =[
µα
4β
]2
and it follows that ψ∗1(α) = w1(α)− µ+ (µα)
2
8β . Anticipating this response by the
supplier, the buyer’s optimal price schedule w∗1(α) to offer along with AA is determined
by the solution to the following problem.
pi0 = max
w1(α)
−A+ E0
[
2p− w1(α)− E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− (µα)
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
(3.11)
s.t. E0 [ψ∗1(α)] = E0
[
w1(α)− µ+ (µα)
2
8β
]
≥ ψ∗0b .
The buyer’s and supplier’s optimal decisions are then characterized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.2 The buyer’s optimal solution to (3.11) is to offer w∗1(α) = µ − (µα)
2
8β +
ψ∗0b together with AA, which the supplier accepts. The supplier then sets I
∗(α) =
Ie1(α), where Ie1(α) is defined in (3.5). In period 2, the buyer offers w∗2(c1, α) =
min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα24β
)
, ca
)
.
By committing to the price schedule w∗1(α) that guarantees the supplier’s expected reser-
vation profit, the buyer is able to benefit from the EE cost savings under all realizations
of α. This is unlike the previous scenario where the supplier accepts the buyer’s offer
(and makes subsequent EE investments) only for sufficiently high α (i.e. α ≥ α∗s). It
follows from Lemma 3.2 that the buyer’s optimal expected profit across the planning
horizon when offering AA is given as
pi0 = 2p−
µ+ αH∫
αL
[
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)
− (µα˜)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜
−A− ψ∗0b .(3.12)
Comparing the two expressions in (3.9) and (3.12) yields the following result.
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Proposition 3.2 With no other instruments available, the buyer offers AA iff the as-
sessment cost A satisfies
A ≤ ABa(ca) =
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜+
E1 [min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca)] ,
where ABa(ca) > AS(ca) and ABa(ca) increases in ca.
Proposition 3.2 suggests that when it would be beneficial for the supplier to self-perform
the assessment (i.e., when A ≤ AS(ca)), it is optimal for the buyer to cover his partic-
ipation constraint and offer AA herself. In this case, the buyer enables EE investment
for all realizations of α, even when α < α∗s. She can therefore extract more benefits than
when the supplier self-performs the assessment. It may also be advantageous for the
buyer to offer assistance in cases where the supplier would not be willing to self-fund an
assessment (i.e., A > AS(ca)). In such cases, the supplier’s baseline expected profit is
zero and so the buyer can extract all the EE benefit by offering assistance herself. The
above results suggest that AA increases the buyer’s power to some extent, allowing her
to afford a more expensive assessment cost than the self-funding supplier. This implies
that buyer-offered AA widens the range of affordable assessment costs to identify EE
improvement opportunities. When the alternate supplier is more expensive, the buyer
is more inclined to stay with the focal supplier to benefit from his EE cost savings, and
thus her assessment threshold ABa(ca) increases in ca.
It follows from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 that the buyer’s optimal expected profit
across the planning horizon, taking into account his optimal AA decision, is given by
pi∗0 =

pia0 , if A ≤ AS(ca)
pib0, if AS(ca) < A ≤ ABa(ca)
pic0, if ABa(ca) < A,
(3.13)
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where
pia0 = 2p−
µ+ αH∫
αL
[
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)
− (µα˜)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜
−AS(ca),
pib0 = 2p−
µ+ αH∫
αL
[
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)
− (µα˜)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜
−A,
pic0 = 2p− [µ+ E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca)] .
The EE gap ∆Ba(α) in this case is
∆Ba(α) =
∆
e1(α), if A ≤ ABa(ca);
∆0(α), otherwise,
where ∆e1(α) and ∆0(α) are defined in (3.10). Although the EE gap is reduced when
the assessment cost is moderately high (AS(ca) < A ≤ ABa(ca)), it is not eliminated.
This is because the supplier still takes a short-term view of the investment benefits.
3.3.3 Impact of Procurement Commitment
We now investigate the sole impact of PC where the buyer commits to source her entire
demand from the focal supplier at a fixed price w across both periods. We follow the
same approach as in Section 3.3.1 to explore when it is beneficial for the supplier to
self-perform an assessment under this long-term contract. For brevity, we omit similar
analysis and focus on the results, starting with the firms’ optimal decisions after an
assessment is conducted by the supplier as defined in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3 Under PC and when an assessment is performed by the supplier, the buyer
offers w∗ = µ− (µα∗p)24β , where
α∗p =
αL, if
∂pi1pb
∂αp
< 0, ∀α ∈ [αL, αH ] or pi1pb(αL) > pi1pb(α2p)
α2p , otherwise,
(3.14)
pi1pb =
αp∫
αL
2(p− ca)f(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
αp
2
(
p− µ+ (µαcp)
2
4β
)
f(α˜)dα˜,
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and α2p is the larger real root (if any) to
∂pi1pb
∂αp
= 0. We have αL ≤ α∗p ≤ 23αH . If
α < α∗p, the supplier rejects the offer and sets I∗(α) = 0. Otherwise, he accepts w∗1 and
sets I∗(α) = Ie∗(α), where Ie∗(α) is defined in (3.1).
Similar to the baseline scenario (Section 3.3.1), the supplier accepts the buyer’s price
when his realized EE effectiveness parameter is sufficiently high (i.e. α ≥ α∗p). In this
case, the supplier chooses the most cost-effective investment level Ie∗(α) that maximizes
his total information rent (from privately knowing α) across both periods, unlike in the
baseline scenario where he can only earn information rent in period 1.
It follows that the supplier’s optimal total profit from period 1 onward for a given
α is
ψ∗1pb(w
∗, α) =
0, if α < α
∗
p
µ2(α2−α∗p2)
2β , otherwise.
His associated profit across the planning horizon is then given by ψ0pb =
αH∫
α∗p
µ2(α˜2−α∗p2)
2β f(α˜)dα˜−A.
Now considering the case where the supplier does not perform an EE assessment,
the EE investment is then zero by definition and it is easy to show that the buyer offers
w∗ = µ which is accepted by the supplier. In this case, the supplier’s expected profit
across the planning horizon is zero. The following proposition summarizes the supplier’s
optimal assessment decision.
Proposition 3.3 Under PC with no other instruments, the supplier performs an EE
assessment iff the assessment cost A ≤ ASp(ca) =
αH∫
α∗p
µ2(α˜2−α∗p2)
2β f(α˜)dα˜, where ASp(ca)
increases in ca.
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The supplier’s and the buyer’s optimal profits are respectively given by
ψ∗0pb =
−A+ αH∫
α∗p
µ2(α˜2 − α∗p2)
2β f(α˜)dα˜

+
= (ASp(ca)−A)+, (3.15)
pi∗0pb =

2p−
[
α∗p∫
αL
2caf(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
α∗p
[
2µ− (µα∗s)22β
]
f(α˜)dα˜
]
, if A ≤ ASp(ca);
2p− 2µ, otherwise
(3.16)
The EE gap in this scenario, ∆Sp(α), is eliminated when the investment is enabled (i.e.,
when A ≤ ASp(ca) and α ≥ α∗p), as we formalize below.
∆Sp(α) =
0, if A ≤ A
Sp(ca) and α ≥ α∗p
∆0(α), otherwise.
PC helps completely close the EE gap when A ≤ min(AS(ca), ASp(ca)) and α ≥
max(α∗s, α∗p), but does not improve the EE gap when A ≥ max(AS(ca), ASp(ca))
and α ≤ min(α∗s, α∗p). However, it is difficult to delineate the impact of PC when
min(AS(ca), ASp(ca)) < A ≤ max(AS(ca), ASp(ca)) and min(α∗s, α∗p) ≤ α < max(α∗s, α∗p)
since there are no closed-form solutions for α∗s and α∗p. To facilitate the comparison be-
tween AS(ca) and ASp(ca) (as well as between α∗s and α∗p) so that a full understanding
of PC’s impact can be developed, we make a technical assumption on the range of the
alternate supplier’s cost ca and resort to numerical study in Section 3.6 for the general
case. We begin by defining the following assumption
Assumption 3.1 ca ≥ caL = µ+ (µαH)
2
12β ,
which implies that the alternate supplier is relatively expensive, making the focal sup-
plier’s EE investment sufficiently attractive for the buyer. Applying this assumption
allows us to develop closed form expressions for α∗s and α∗p and derive the order between
AS(ca) and ASp(ca) as follows.
Corollary 3.1 Under Assumption 3.1, α∗s = α∗p = αL. It follows that AS(ca) = AS =
αH∫
αL
µ2(α˜2−αL2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜, ASp(ca) = ASp =
αH∫
αL
µ2(α˜2−αL2)
2β f(α˜)dα˜ and AS < ASp.
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When the alternate supplier is sufficiently expensive, the buyer’s optimal EE effective-
ness threshold is αL irrespective of whether PC is used. This threshold implies that the
supplier will always accept the contract in period 1 under all realization of α. Here,
PC empowers the supplier to retain information rent in both periods and earn a higher
profit over the long run. This implies two beneficial impacts of PC. First, it allows the
supplier to afford the assessment over a wider range of costs, i.e., ASp > AS . Second,
it encourages the supplier to increase his investment and completely close the EE gap
when an assessment is performed. We next investigate the impact of the buyer’s joint
use of AA and PC.
3.3.4 Joint Impact of Assessment Assistance and Procurement Com-
mitment
Similar to Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.4 characterizes the firms’ optimal decisions when the
buyer offers both AA and PC.
Lemma 3.4 Under PC, the buyer optimally offers the price schedule w∗(α) = µ −
(µα)2
4β +
ψ∗0pb
2 (where ψ
∗
0pb is defined in (3.15)) together with AA, which the supplier
accepts. The supplier then sets I∗(α) = Ie∗(α), where Ie∗(α) is defined in (3.1).
It follows from Lemma 3.4 that the buyer’s expected profit across the planning horizon
in this case is given by
pi0p = 2p−
2µ− αH∫
αL
µ2α˜2
2β f(α˜)dα˜
−A− ψ∗0pb . (3.17)
Without AA, the buyer’s profit depends on the supplier’s decision to self-conduct the
assessment and is given by (3.16). Comparing (3.16) and (3.17) yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Under PC, the buyer offers AA iff the assessment cost A ≤ ABp =
αH∫
αL
µ2α˜2
2β f(α˜)dα˜, where ABp > ABa(ca) and ABp > ASp(ca), where ABa(ca) and ASp(ca)
are respectively defined in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3.
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The EE gap in this case is
∆Bp(α) =
0, if A ≤ A
Bp ;
∆0(α), otherwise.
Similar to our results in Proposition 3.2 when there is no PC, the buyer’s AA also
widens the range of affordable assessment costs when offered together with PC, i.e.,
ABp > ASp(ca). Furthermore, PC induces the supplier to increase his investments as
discussed in the previous section. The resulting higher EE cost savings also benefit the
buyer, making AA more attractive to her, i.e., ABp > ABa(ca). These results highlight
the complementarity of AA and PC in that together they help 1) extend the range of
affordable assessment costs to identify potential EE improvements and 2) fully capitalize
these opportunities, i.e., the channel’s optimal EE investment level is achieved and the
EE gap is eliminated. It follows from Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 that the buyer’s optimal
expected profit in period 0 under PC is given by
pi∗0p =

pia0p = 2p−
[
2µ−
αH∫
αL
(µα)2
2β f(α˜)dα˜
]
−ASp(ca), if A ≤ ASp(ca)
pib0p = 2p−
[
2µ−
αH∫
αL
(µα)2
2β f(α˜)dα˜
]
−A, if ASp(ca) < A ≤ ABp(ca)
pic0p = 2p− 2µ, if ABp(ca) < A .
(3.18)
3.3.5 The Buyer’s Choice of EE Instruments
Our results so far outline how buyer-offered instruments can help reduce/eliminate the
EE gap. In addition, Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 show when it is optimal for the buyer to
offer AA under a short- (without PC) and a long-term contract (with PC), respectively.
We now analyze when the buyer should offer PC to maximize her own profit. Let
d = pi∗0 − pi∗0p denote the difference in the buyer’s expected profit without and with PC,
where pi∗0 and pi∗0p are respectively given in (3.13) and (3.18). When d > 0, it is optimal
for the buyer to use a short-term contract (no PC); otherwise, PC is optimal.
Recall that pi∗0 and pi∗0p depend on the order of the assessment cost A with respect to
both the buyer’s respective assessment thresholds (ABa(ca) and ABp) and the supplier’s
self-assessment thresholds (AS(ca) and ASp(ca)). Since closed-form solutions for α∗s and
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α∗p are necessary for the comparison between AS(ca) and ASp(ca), we develop our insights
under Assumption 3.1 and discuss in Section 3.6 the results when the assumption is not
satisfied. As follows from Corollary 3.1, AS(ca) and ASp(ca) do not depend on ca under
Assumption 3.1 and so we skip their arguments (ca) in our subsequent discussion. Note
that AS < ABa(ca) < ABp and ASp < ABp , as follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
However, the ordering between ABa(ca) and ASp is not consistent and so we consider
two cases as illustrated in Figure 3.2, which summarizes the expressions of pi∗0 and pi∗0p
in regions of A defined by the four aforementioned thresholds.
pia0pi∗0 =
pi∗0p =
A
AS ABa(ca)
ASp ABp
Case (i): ASp < ABa(ca)
pib0 pi
c
0
pia0p pi
b
0p pi
c
0p
pia0 A
AS
ASp ABp
Case (ii): ASp ≥ ABa(ca)
pib0 pi
c
0
pia0p pi
b
0p pi
c
0p
ABa(ca)
pi∗0 =
pi∗0p =
Figure 3.2: pi∗0 and pi∗0p expressions across regions of A
The expression of d can then be characterized as follows
d =

d1 = pia0 − pia0p , if A ≤ AS
d2 = pib0 − pia0p , if AS < A ≤ min(ABa(ca), ASp)
d3 =
d
3i = pib0 − pib0p , if ASp < ABa(ca)
d3ii = pic0 − piBa0p , otherwise.
,
if min(ABa(ca), ASp) < A
≤ max(ABa(ca), ASp)
d4 = pic0 − pib0p , if max(ABa(ca), ASp) < A ≤ ABp
d5 = pic0 − pic0p , if ABp < A,
Note that d3i and d3ii correspond to Case (i) and (ii) in Figure 3.2, respectively. Since
the buyer’s expected profit in each of these cases depends on the alternate supplier’s
cost ca, each dj (j = 1, 2, 3i, 3ii, 4, 5) is also a function of ca. It is easy to show that dj
(j = 1, 2, 3i, 3ii, 4) is strictly decreasing in ca and, for each dj , there exists a unique cja
such that dj > 0 for
¯
ca ≤ ca < cja and dj ≤ 0 for cja ≤ ca ≤ p. It is also straightforward
to show that d5 ≥ 0, ∀ca. Proposition 3.5 uses these relationships to characterize the
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buyer’s optimal choice of instruments.
Proposition 3.5 Under Assumption 3.1, the buyer offers
– PC and AA iff A ≤ AB∗(ca) and ca ≥ cBa (A);
– Only AA iff A ≤ AB∗(ca) and ca < cBa (A);
– No instruments, otherwise.
The AA threshold AB∗(ca) and the PC threshold cBa (A) are given by
AB
∗(ca) =
A
Ba(ca), if ca < c3a = max(c3ia , c3iia );
ABp + µ− E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca) , otherwise.
(3.19)
cBa (A) =

c1a, if A ≤ AS ,
c2a(A), if AS < A ≤ min
(
ABa(c3a), ASp
)
,
c3a, if min
(
ABa(c3a), ASp
)
< A ≤ max
(
ABa(c3a), ASp
)
;
(3.20)
where AB∗(ca) increases in ca and cBa (A) decreases in A.
A higher cost of the alternate supplier increases the buyer’s incentive to offer AA and
gain from the focal supplier’s EE investment (i.e., AB∗(ca) increases in ca). When
the buyer offers AA, a higher assessment cost A increases the buyer’s incentive to
use PC (i.e., cBa (A) decreases in A). To explain this interesting dynamic, recall that
the buyer’s total costs of offering AA are A + ψ∗0b = max(A,A
S) without PC and
A + ψ∗0pb = max(A,A
Sp) with PC.8 Since AS < ASp (as follows from Corollary 3.1), a
higher A reduces the difference in these costs and thus makes PC more attractive to the
buyer.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the results of Proposition 3.5 when max(c3ia , c3iia ) = c3ia , which
corresponds to Case (i) in Figure 3.2. Case (ii) has a similar structure and so we
skip its discussion. For high assessment costs (i.e., A > AB∗(ca)), the buyer does not
offer AA, resulting in no EE investment since it is also not attractive for the supplier
to self-perform the assessment. In this case, the buyer prefers a short-term contract
to retain the switching flexibility. When the assessment cost is sufficiently low (i.e.,
8The transformations follow from the definitions of AS in (3.8) and ASp in (3.15)
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Figure 3.3: The buyer’s optimal choice of EE instruments and the corresponding EE
gap in Case (i)
A ≤ AB∗(ca)), the buyer offers AA and evaluates the tradeoff between the switching
flexibility provided by a short-term contract and the potentially higher EE cost savings
offered by a long-term contract. When the alternate supplier is sufficiently expensive
(i.e., ca ≥ cBa (A)), the buyer offers PC which complements her AA to help the supplier
eliminate the EE gap. When the alternate supplier is cheap (i.e., ca < cBa (A)), the buyer
offers AA but not PC, leading to the EE gap being reduced, but not eliminated.
3.4 Impact of Third-party Assessment Assistance
In this section, we address our second research question by investigating how the ad-
dition of free third-party assistance affects the dynamics between the buyer and the
supplier, and whether this further reduces the EE gap. In the presence of third-party
assistance, the supplier can always request for a free assessment and retain α as his
private knowledge in period 1. This implies that the supplier’s reservation profits with-
out and with PC are respectively given by ψ∗0b3 = A
S(ca) and ψ∗0pb3 = A
Sp(ca), which
are strictly higher than their corresponding counterparts given in (3.8) and (3.15) when
third-party support is not available. Applying these changes to the previous analyses
allows us to characterize the buyer’s optimal decision to offer AA without and with PC
as follows.
Proposition 3.6 In the presence of third-party assistance, the buyer offers her own
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AA without PC (with PC) iff A ≤ ABa3p (ca)
(
A ≤ ABp3p (ca)
)
. The thresholds ABa3p (ca)
and ABp3p (ca) are given by
ABa3p (ca) =
α∗s∫
αL
[
2ca − µ− E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)
+ (µα˜)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜,
A
Bp
3p (ca) =
α∗p∫
αL
[
2(ca − µ) + (µα˜)
2
2β
]
f(α˜)dα˜,
where α∗s and α∗p are respectively characterized in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3.
Proposition 3.6 suggests that even in the presence of third-party assistance, it can
be advantageous for the buyer to offer her own AA when the assessment cost A is
sufficiently low. This is because AA still allows the buyer to earn the EE cost savings
under all realization of α, unlike under third-party assistance when EE cost savings are
enabled only with sufficiently high α. Also, since the supplier requires higher reservation
profits in this case, ABa3p (ca) and A
Bp
3p (ca) are strictly lower than their corresponding
counterparts ABa(ca) and ABp when third-party assistance is not available.
We again characterize the buyer’s optimal choice of instrument(s) under Assump-
tion 3.1 since closed-form solutions for α∗s and α∗p are not available. Recall that under
Assumption 3.1, α∗s = α∗p = αL and it follows that ABa3p (ca) = A
Bp
3p (ca) = 0, ∀ca ∈ [caL , p],
implying that the buyer never offers her own AA. Proposition 3.7 summarizes this in-
tuition and characterizes the buyer’s instrument selection in the presence of third-party
assistance.
Proposition 3.7 Under Assumption 3.1 and in the presence of third-party assistance,
the buyer never offers AA and offers PC iff ca ≥ cTa = c1a .
Figures 4 illustrates the buyer’s EE instrument selection and the change in the EE
gap when third-party assistance becomes available. For A > AB∗(ca), an assessment is
conducted only when third-party support is available and so the buyer can enjoy the
higher EE benefit resulting from PC without having to support the assessment herself.
It follows that the buyer may offer only PC in this range of A when the alternate supplier
is sufficiently expensive (i.e., ca ≥ cTa = c1a), which was not the case without third-party
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(a) Buyer’s optimal EE instruments (b) Comparison of the EE gap
Figure 3.4: Impact of third-party assistance on the buyer’s optimal choice of EE instru-
ments and the EE gap
support. Consequently, the addition of third-party assistance, not surprisingly, helps
reduce the EE gap in region I of Figure 3.4b and even eliminate it when ca is sufficiently
high in region II. For A ≤ AB∗(ca), the buyer originally offered AA without third-
party support but no longer does so when this support becomes available. Without the
complementary effect of her own AA, the buyer is less inclined to offer PC in this range of
A, i.e., cTa = c1a ≥ cBa . As such, in region III of Figure 3.4b where the cost of the alternate
supplier is moderate (i.e., cBa (A) ≤ ca < cTa ), the addition of third-party assistance
interestingly results in a higher EE gap. In Region IV , adding third-party AA does
not affect the EE gap since it does not change the buyer’s PC decision. Proposition 3.8
formalizes these insights on the impact of third-party assessment assistance.
Proposition 3.8 Under Assumption 3.1, the availability of third-party assessment as-
sistance will
– decrease the EE gap when A > AB∗(ca),
– increase the EE gap when A ≤ AB∗(ca) and cBa (A) ≤ ca < cTa ,
– not change the EE gap, otherwise.
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3.5 Impact of Energy Market Characteristics
We now address our third research question by examining how energy market conditions
(characterized by the expected energy cost µ, volatility σ and cross-period correlation ρ)
influence the buyer’s optimal strategy and the subsequent EE gap. To that end, we focus
on how an increase in each of the parameters ρ, σ and µ affects the buyer’s assessment
and procurement thresholds, i.e., AB∗(ca) and cBa (A) as defined in Proposition 3.5 (under
Assumption 3.1), starting with σ and ρ.
Proposition 3.9 Under Assumption 3.1, an increase in either energy price volatility
(σ) or cross-period correlation (ρ) will decrease the buyer’s assessment threshold AB∗(ca)
and increase the PC threshold cBa (A).
From the buyer’s perspective, a higher σ or ρ decreases the expected cost savings from
EE in period 2 and thus increases the relative value of the alternate supplier. This
reduces her incentive to offer both instruments, i.e., AB∗(ca) decreases and cBa (A) in-
creases. These results imply that when an increase in ρ or σ does not lead to a change
in the buyer’s strategy (i.e., when A and ca are sufficiently far away from their respec-
tive thresholds), the EE gap is unaffected. This occurs because the supplier approaches
the EE investment decision as if the buyer always switches to the alternate supplier in
period 2 (without PC) or always stays (with PC). However, at the boundary where the
buyer changes her optimal strategy in response to an increase in ρ or σ, the EE gap will
increase. We next characterize the impact of the expected energy cost µ in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.10 Under Assumption 3.1, an increase in expected energy cost µ will
decrease AB∗(ca) for ca < min(c3a, cˆBaa ) and for cBa ≤ ca < max(c3a, cˆBpa ) but increase it,
otherwise, where cˆBaa and cˆ
Bp
a are either from the set {caL , p} or the respective unique
solution to ∂A
Ba (cˆBaa )
∂µ = 0 and
∂
[
ABp+µ−E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1],cˆBpa
)]
∂µ = 0.
On one hand, a higher µ increases the cost of the focal supplier and decreases the
buyer’s incentive to offer AA. On the other hand, increasing µ enhances the cost sav-
ing benefits of the supplier’s EE investment, making AA more attractive. When the
alternate supplier is relatively cheap (i.e., ca ≤ cˆBaa without PC or ca ≤ cˆBpa with PC),
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the detrimental impact of increasing µ dominates, and the buyer’s assessment thresh-
old AB∗(ca) decreases. As AB
∗(ca) decreases in µ, the buyer may flip from offering to
not offering AA for a given A. Such a flip leads to a decrease in the supplier’s EE
investment. On the other hand, when AB∗(ca) increases due to an increase in µ (i.e.,
when min(c3a, cˆBaa ) ≤ ca < cBa or ca ≥ max(c3a, cˆBpa )), the supplier’s EE investment may
increase at the boundary region where the buyer changes her decision from not offering
to offering AA. The impact of increasing µ on the buyer’s PC threshold cBa is, however,
analytically difficult to derive, and so we resort to numerical study in the next section
to develop insights.
3.6 Computational Insights
Our goals in this section are to (i) investigate how our results would be affected when
Assumption 3.1 is not satisfied, (ii) develop insights into the impact of µ on the PC
thresholds ca where analytical results are not possible, and (iii) understand the joint
impact of buyer-offered and third-party instruments in realistic settings. To this end,
we conducted a numerical study using data from the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE)
and the Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) Database.
3.6.1 Data and Model Calibration
The IAC is a program funded by the U.S. Department of Energy that provides free
industrial assessments at manufacturers’ request to identify opportunities to improve
productivity, reduce waste, and save energy. We used data from the IAC database for
years 1981− 2015 to calibrate our model parameters. To focus on SMMs, we excluded
firms with more than 500 employees or sales revenues exceeding US$50 millions, as well
as firms in non-manufacturing industries. Following previous empirical research using
the IAC database (Anderson and Newell 2004, Muthulingam et al. 2013), we considered
energy management projects with payback periods between 0.025 and 9 years. For each
manufacturer, we scaled the payback periods and implementation costs to compute the
total estimated investments across two periods for all eligible recommended projects.
Since we are interested in capital intensive EE investments that are technology and
equipment based (which typically have costs in the tens of thousands), we excluded firms
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with less than $50, 000 and more than $500, 000 in total cost of investment opportunities.
The average annual energy cost of the sample is $653, 226, and so we set the benchmark
value at µˆ = $6.5 × 105 and consider µ ∈ [$4 × 105, $9 × 105], covering roughly 50%
of the sample. The average possible energy savings is roughly 13%, corresponding to
the average α value of 0.00045 with the benchmark µˆ = $6.5 × 105. Consequently, we
set αH = 0.0006 and αL = 0.0003. The industrial energy audit cost may be up to
$0.55 per square foot.9 Since the average plant area of manufacturers in the sample is
132, 411 square feet, this translates into an assessment cost as high as $66, 000 for an
average-sized supplier.
We used average annual industrial prices (normalized to 2014 dollars) for natural gas
(from 1997 to 2014) and electricity (from 1991 to 2014) across states from the DoE to
estimate σ and ρ. For each price distribution, we calculated the coefficient of variation
(cv = σµ), resulting in a range from 5% to 35%. Since we assume a Normal distribution
for energy price, we excluded values of cv higher than 30% to ensure no negative real-
izations and chose the average cv = 20% as our benchmark. This, combined with our
benchmark µˆ = $6.5 × 105, translated into a benchmark value σˆ = $1.625 × 105. The
Ljung-Box Q-test for 1-period lag autocorrelation yielded significant correlation coeffi-
cients ranging from 0.59 to 0.95 with a mean of 0.75, which is used for our benchmark
(i.e., ρˆ = 0.75). We considered ca in the range [$6.5 × 105, $10.125 × 105] (i.e., from
100% of the benchmark µˆ = $6.5× 105 to 112.5% of the highest µ value $9× 105), con-
sistent with the comparison of global production costs.10 We then set the benchmark
cˆa = $7.3125×105 (112.5% of the benchmark µˆ = $6.5×105). Finally, we fixed β = 1/2
and p = $20× 105. Table 3.2 summarizes our numerical calibration.
3.6.2 Results and Insights
For each µ value considered in Table 3.2, we investigated our results when Assumption 1
is not satisfied, i.e., when µ ≤ ca ≤ caL . We observed in all the investigated instances
that α∗s = α∗p = αL, implying that the analytical results developed in Propositions 3.5,
9http://www.edge-gogreen.com/audits-ratings/commercial-energy-audits/%20commercial-energy-
audit-pricing/ (accessed August 21, 2017)
10http://goo.gl/gG8QYm (accessed August 21, 2017)
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Parameter Definition Benchmark Range Increment
µ
Supplier’s expected energy
cost per period µˆ = $6.5× 10
5 [$4, $9]× 105 $50, 000
σ Energy cost volatility σˆ = 20% of µˆ [5%, 30%] of µ 2.5% of µ
ρ
Cross-period energy price
correlation ρˆ = 0.75 [0.59, 0.95] 0.045
ca
Cost of the alternate
supplier cˆa = $7.3125× 10
5 [$6.5, $10.125]× 105 $16, 250
p Buyer’s selling price $20× 105 N/A N/A
A Assessment cost N/A up to $6.6× 104 N/A
(αL, αH)
Supports for distribution
of EE assessment result (2, 5)× 10
−4 N/A N/A
Table 3.2: Parameter Settings.
3.7, 3.9 and 3.10 continue to apply even when Assumption 3.1 is not met. This obser-
vation suggests that in realistic settings, EE cost savings are substantially high and so
the buyer optimally offers a sufficiently high price to ensure the supplier’s acceptance
under all α realization.
Turning now to the impact of increasing µ on cBa (A), Table 3.3 summarizes how c1a
and c3a change when µ increases. For brevity, we report results for five values of µ in the
range listed in Table 3.2 with $100, 000 increment. The second row of Table 3.3 shows
that, c1a = p for all values of µ, implying that in the considered instances, the buyer does
not offer any instrument when third-party support is available. Also, while c3a increases
in µ, its relative value with respect to µ
(
i.e., c
3
a
µ
)
decreases. Since c2a(A) depends on
A, we do not report its values for brevity. We did, however, observe that for any given
value of A, c2a behaves in a similar fashion as c3a when µ increases. We now turn to the
Threshold µ = $4× 105 µ = $5× 105 µ = $6× 105 µ = $7× 105 µ = $8× 105
c1a $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p)
c3a
$4.7× 105
117.7% of µ
$5.4× 105
107.9% of µ
$6.2× 105
102.1% of µ
µ = $7× 105
100% of µ
µ = $8× 105
100% of µ
Table 3.3: Impact of increasing µ on the buyer’s PC thresholds
quantification of our theoretical results, focusing on whether the addition of third-party
AA decreases or increases the EE gap, i.e., which region in Figure 3.4b is more likely
to be active. To that end, we focus on the comparison between the parameters in each
instance and the boundaries of the regions in Figure 3.4b, defined by the threshold
values AB∗(ca), c1a and c3a (as well as c2a(A), which depends on A and so, we only
discuss its value when needed for clarity). Table 3.4 shows these threshold values when
39
all parameters are at their corresponding benchmark values and when one parameter
among ρ, σ and µ varies within the ranges listed in Table 3.2. For comparison purpose,
we also report the supplier’s assessment threshold in the baseline scenario (i.e., AS(ca)).
When studying the effect of increasing µ, we used a different value cˇa = $10.125× 105
instead of the benchmark cˆa = $7.3125× 105 to ensure that cˇa is higher than all the µ
values in the considered range.
Benchmark
Parameters
ρ : 0.59→ 0.95
(cˆa = 7.3125× 105)
σ(% of µ) : 5→ 30
(cˆa = 7.3125× 105)
µ : $4→ $9(×105)
(cˇa = 10.125× 105)
AS(ca) $22, 181 $22, 181 $22, 181 $8, 400→ $42, 525
AB
∗ (ca)
$77, 678 $83, 025→ $69, 787 $88, 722→ $62, 486 $33, 600→ $164, 090
c1a $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p) $20× 105(= p)
c3a
$6.51× 105 $6.5→ $6.66× 105 $6.5→ $6.91× 105 $4.70→ $9× 105
100.2% of µ 100→ 102.5(% of µ) 100→ 106.3(% of µ) 117.7→ 100(% of µ)
Table 3.4: Impact of Energy Market Parameters on the Buyer’s Threshold Levels
Starting with the results reported in the second left column of Table 3.4 when all
parameters are at their benchmark values, we see that in the baseline scenario with no
external instruments, the supplier performs an EE assessment only when A ≤ AS(ca) =
$22, 181. Since the typical assessment cost A may be up to $66, 000, there is a wide
range of A from $22, 181 to $66, 000 where the assessment would not be self-funded by
the supplier, leading to an average loss of $88, 725 (100% of investment potential) in EE
investments. Even if the supplier does perform the assessment, there is still an average
investment loss of $66, 544 (or 75% of potential). Once the possibility of buyer-offered
instruments is introduced, an assessment will be performed (with the buyer’s assistance)
as long as A ≤ AB∗(ca) = $77, 678, which captures the entire range of typical assessment
costs.
Note that the benchmark cˆa = $7.3125 × 105 is between c1a = $20 × 105(= p) and
c3a = $6.51 × 105. It follows from Proposition 3.5 that the buyer offers PC only when
this benchmark cost cˆa is higher than the threshold c2(A), which decreases in A. We
observed that at A = $32, 300, the threshold c2(A) = cˆa = $7.3125× 105. This implies
that when A ≥ $32, 300, cˆa ≥ c2(A) and the buyer offers both PC and AA, helping
completely close the EE gap. For AS = $22, 181 < A < $32, 300, cˆa < c2(A) and
the buyer offers only AA which enables EE investments that the supplier would not
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otherwise undertake on his own. This helps reduce but not eliminate the EE gap.
We also find that when all parameters are at their benchmark values, adding third-
party AA does not help to improve the EE gap (i.e., Regions III or IV of Figure 3.4b
are always active). In particular, for A ≥ $32, 300, the addition of third party AA
makes the buyer flip from using to not using PC (i.e., Region III of Figure 3.4b is
active), resulting in an average loss of $66, 544 (75% of potential). For A < $32, 300,
the addition of third party AA does not help reduce the EE gap (i.e., Region IV of
Figure 3.4b is active). The potentially harmful effect of third-party AA is consistently
observed throughout the remaining instances when one parameter among ρ, σ and µ
varies within the ranges listed in Table 3.2 (results reported in the three rightmost
columns in Table 3.4). In all instances, c1a = p, suggesting that the buyer offers no
instruments when third-party assistance is available (Region II of Figure 3.4b is never
active). We find in 98.4% of instances that the AB∗(ca) threshold value lies above the
highest assessment cost $66, 000, implying that third party support may help reduce
the EE gap (Region I of Figure 3.4b is active) in only 1.6% of instances. Surprisingly,
the availability of third-party assistance is harmful to the supplier’s EE investment (i.e.,
Region III is active) in more than 50% of instances, leading to an average loss of 75%
of the supplier’s potential investment compared to when only buyer-offered instruments
are available.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine how buyer and third-
party offered instruments interact to influence a supplier’s EE investment decisions
and potentially reduce the EE gap. We find that buyer-offered AA and PC complement
each other in extending the range of affordable assessment costs to identify profitable EE
improvements and fully capitalizing these opportunities (i.e., eliminating the EE gap).
However, it is beneficial for the buyer to offer both instruments only when the assessment
is sufficiently cheap and the alternate supplier is sufficiently expensive. When both the
assessment and the alternate supplier are sufficiently cheap, the buyer offers only AA
which reduces, but does not eliminate, the EE gap. These results suggest that there is
not a “one-size fits all” approach for a buyer to assist its suppliers in improving EE. It is
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more beneficial, from both the buyer’s and the EE gap reduction perspectives, to tailor
strategies by supplier characteristics, including cost competitiveness, EE assessment
cost and effectiveness of EE investments. This is in line with Wal-mart’s new focus on
“encouraging improvement in our most strategic factories across the business,” which
began from 2016.11
Our results also suggest that it is most effective for EE gap reduction when AA and
PC are both offered by the buyer. This is because of their complementary relationship
that balances the give-and-take of power in the supply chain and induces the supplier to
increase his EE investment level and eliminate the EE gap. This implies that it would
be more beneficial for third-party organizations to provide indirect assessment subsidies
through large buyers instead of the more common practice of providing free assessments
directly to suppliers. The Environmental Defense Fund’s recent collaboration with Wal-
mart to provide EE assessments at the retailer’s suppliers is one early example of such
an initiative (Plambeck and Denend 2011).
11http://goo.gl/zVZPhr (accessed August 21, 2017)
Chapter 4
Impact of Carbon Pricing
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the impact of carbon pricing on social welfare, taking into
consideration the negative externality of energy and the positive externality generated
by domestic manufacturing. Carbon pricing is widely acknowledged as a cost-effective
mechanism to address the environmental and social costs of carbon emissions, including
harm to human health, climate change and global warming (Allcott and Greenstone
2012). Since fossil fuels contribute almost 80% of the global energy and are the largest
source of carbon emissions (World Energy Resources 2013; Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2014), carbon pricing could also be an effective mechanism to encour-
age investment in EE improvements. A carbon price increases energy production costs,
which are typically passed down to energy users, causing them to internalize the nega-
tive externality and thus better align their private EE decision to the socially optimal
levels. The environmental economic literature (e.g., Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Allcott and
Greenstone 2012) has established that setting a carbon price at the negative externality
of energy (e.g. applying a Pigouvian tax) is sufficient to achieve the optimal social
welfare from an EE improvement perspective. However, research in this literature often
overlooks supply chain interactions and the potential competition from external juris-
dictions, which as discussed in Chapter 1, could lead to losses of the positive externality
generated by domestic manufacturing and potentially reduce social welfare.
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, we derive the conditions under which it
42
43
is optimal to set a carbon price at the negative externality of energy when accounting
for supply chain interactions, as well as supplier competition from external jurisdictions.
Second, we study the effectiveness of supplemental remedies when it is not optimal to
set the carbon price at the negative externality of energy. In particular, we answer the
following research questions.
1. Could setting a carbon price at the negative externality of energy achieve the
first-best social welfare when accounting for domestic supply chain interactions?
2. How do these results change when external jurisdiction competition is added to
the supply chain dynamics?
3. How do carbon price relief and/or EE investment subsidies influence social welfare
in case it is not optimal to set the carbon price at the negative externality of
energy?
We provide answers to these questions by building on the stylized model developed in
Chapter 3 and incorporating the policy decisions of a social planner wishing to maximize
the jurisdictional social welfare. This social welfare is comprised of both the negative
externality of energy and the positive externality from maintaining domestic manufac-
turing, as well as the economic profits of the domestic supply chain players. In the next
section, we briefly recap the key elements of the supply chain setting from Chapter 3
and describe the social planner’s problem in more detail.
4.2 Model Description
We consider a two tiered supply chain consisting of a large powerful buyer with negotia-
tion power (she) and a capital-constrained supplier (he). The cost-sensitive buyer needs
to procure a mature product with constant demand of size one over a two-period time
horizon, which she sells at an exogenous market price p. The supplier’s production cost
is divided into a time-dependent energy cost component as well as a non-energy cost
component that is normalized to zero. For simplicity, we assume the supplier initially
uses one unit of energy to produce one unit of demand. The unit cost of energy in each
period, c˜t, t = 1, 2, follows a Normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation
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σ, where µ σ such that the probability of a negative energy cost is negligible. Let f(·)
and F (·) denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of c˜t, respectively. We further assume energy costs
are correlated across time periods, captured through a bivariate Normal distribution
with positive correlation coefficient ρ ≥ 0, implying that the conditional expectation of
energy cost in period 2, for a realized cost c1 in period 1, is E2[c˜2|c1] = µ(1− ρ) + ρc1.
To reduce his energy costs, the supplier can invest in equipment and technology based
EE improvements at the beginning of period 1. Recall that in Chapter 3, an initial costly
assessment has to be conducted before the supplier can invest in EE improvements and
the assessment results could be shared with the buyer or remain the supplier’s private
knowledge, depending on the payer of the assessment cost. To focus on the impact
of carbon pricing on the firms’ decisions in this chapter, we focus on scenarios where
the initial EE assessment has already been carried out and the (assessment) results
are shared between the buyer and the supplier. In particular, the supplier decides on
an investment level I within the interval [0, Im], where Im reflects the most advanced
EE technologies available. An EE investment I results in a saving of α
√
I units of
energy required for one unit of demand, where 0 < α < 1/
√
Im. The supplier funds the
investment I with an external loan, which he repays in equal periodic installments βI
at the end of each period, where β ≥ 12 .
We assume the buyer and supplier belong to a same jurisdiction12 (hereafter, re-
ferred to as the focal jurisdiction) in which a social planner makes policy interventions
(including the carbon price level and additional supplemental policies) to regulate emis-
sions and encourage EE investments. We assume the generation and consumption of
one unit of energy incurs a unit externality cost  ≤ µ, consistent with extant research
in the environmental economics literature (e.g., Allcott and Greenstone 2012). To make
energy users internalize this cost, the social planner can impose a carbon emission cost,
either in the direct form of a fixed tax per unit of emission or in the indirect form of an
imposed limited number of tradeable emission permits (cap and trade policy). In the
latter case, carbon emission cost is captured by the price of the permit the emitter has
to obtain. The majority of SMMs do not pay this direct carbon cost but are instead
affected by increases in energy prices passed on to them by utilities who directly pay
12We discuss how our results would change in the scenario where the buyer is in a different jurisdiction
from the supplier in the conclusion
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the carbon emission costs. Therefore, we abstract away from the distinction between
a taxation and a cap-and-trade policy and use the increase in the unit energy price to
characterize the social planner’s carbon pricing decision, similar to extant research on
the impact of carbon pricing on small businesses (e.g., Weiss and Sarro 2009). Specifi-
cally, we denote by τ the carbon price level that increases the unit energy price facing
the supplier from ct to ct + τ in each period. It is often difficult to impose a carbon
price beyond the negative externality due to eco-social and political constraints (Jenkins
2014) and so we assume τ ∈ [0, ].
To capture supplier competition from external jurisdictions, we assume the buyer
has the option to source from an alternate supplier outside their jurisdiction (and not
subjected to the potential carbon price) at a total sourcing cost ca. This cost includes
the alternate supplier’s energy and other production costs, as well as any additional
procurement related costs. For ease of exposition, we consider a deterministic ca, which
is applicable when the alternate supplier is from a region that enjoys stable energy
prices, due to government regulation or other market forces (e.g. Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Venezuela, and parts of China as noted by Kojima 2009).13 We
assume ca ≥ µ, implying that prior to the introduction of carbon pricing, the focal
supplier is (on expectation) cost competitive relative to the alternate supplier. This
may no longer hold when a carbon price τ is applied, which increases the focal sup-
plier’s expected costs to µ+ τ . This cost increase could potentially be large enough to
cause the buyer to switch to the alternate supplier. Since many SMMs have a sizable
portion of business focused on a single large industrial buyer (Fishman 2008), such a
loss of business could threaten domestic suppliers’ very survival or force them to move
to another jurisdiction without carbon pricing. This would result in negative social
implications for the domestic jurisdiction including lost jobs, reduced innovation and a
weakened, less attractive local economy (Rothwell 2012). To capture these effects, we
assume the supplier generates a positive externality s for his jurisdiction in each period
t that he produces for the buyer. We focus on scenarios where s ≥ , implying that it is
socially beneficial to maintain production at the focal domestic supplier even without
EE improvements.
13Similar to the proof demonstrated in Appendix A.2.1, our structural results remain robust even
when considering price volatility and correlation between ca and the focal supplier’s energy cost.
46
The social planner’s objective is to maximize the expected social welfare W within
the domestic jurisdiction. The components of the jurisdictional social welfare are sum-
marized in Figure 4.1. The revenue obtained through carbon pricing is given by the
product of the carbon price τ and the total energy used by the domestic supplier. Sim-
ilarly, the negative externality of energy used by the domestic supplier are calculated
as the product of  and the supplier’s total energy usage. Apart from this negative ex-
ternality, the supplier contributes two other components, including his economic profit
and the positive externality of production if the buy sources from him. The jurisdic-
tional social welfare also consists of the buyer’s economic profit. Finally, we consider
the negative externality of energy used by the alternate supplier to allow for the social
planner’s concern about the global impact of carbon emissions, including climate change
and global warming. This component of social welfare is, however, discounted to reflect
the fact that many harms of carbon emissions, e.g. bad effects on human health and
constraints on the foreign policy objectives of energy-importing countries, only have a
local impact. For ease of exposition, we assume the focal jurisdiction incurs a negative
externality e in period t if the buyer sources from the alternative supplier. We do not
account for the end consumers’ utilities from using the product which would not be
affected by a carbon price since the buyer’s revenue p is exogenous and does not de-
pend on the carbon price.14 Note that the consumers’ potential utilities from buying a
domestically produced product (if any) are already included in the positive externality
of domestic manufacturing s. .
The dynamics between the social planner, buyer and supplier is captured in Fig-
ure 4.2. In period 0, the social planner sets the carbon price level τ . In response, the
buyer chooses whether to offer the focal domestic supplier a long-term contract (L), a
short-term contract (S), or no contract (A), i.e., choosing to source from the alternate
supplier in both periods. We consider a long-term contract, along with the more flexible
short-term contract, since it is one of the most commonly used incentives by buyers to
encourage suppliers’ EE investments (Plambeck and Denend 2011). Under a short-term
contract (S), the buyer offers a short-term price w1 in period 1 and maintains the flex-
ibility in period 2 to set a different price w2 or even switch to the alternate supplier
after observing the energy price c1. In contrast, under a long-term contract (L), the
14In the conclusion, we discuss how our results would be influenced if p depends on the carbon price
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Figure 4.1: The setting and components of social welfare
buyer commits to buying from the supplier in both periods at a price w. The supplier
considers what level of EE investment to take on under each scenario (accepting and
rejecting) and accepts the contract as long as his reservation profit is met. In each
period, production takes place after the energy price is observed. All information is
common knowledge and both firms act to maximize their expected profits, represented
by pi and ψ respectively, with pit and ψt denoting the corresponding total profit from
period t onward. .
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Figure 4.2: Sequence of events
In the next section, we analyze how setting the carbon price at the negative external-
ity of energy influences the buyer’s sourcing decision, the supplier’s EE investment and
the resulting social welfare in the absence of external jurisdiction competition, followed
by the analysis in Section 4.4 when external jurisdiction competition is introduced.
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4.3 Impact of Domestic Supply Chain Dynamics
In this section, we consider the scenario when the alternate supplier is not available
and the buyer can only source from the focal supplier. It is easy to show that she is
always better off offering a long-term contract. We first characterize the firms’ optimal
decisions and the resulting social welfare for a given carbon price τ and then examine
whether the first best EE investments and social welfare are achieved when τ is set at
the negative externality of energy  .
Under a given carbon price τ , we solve the buyer-supplier game by backward in-
duction starting with the supplier’s decision to accept or reject the (long-term) price
w offered by the buyer and his subsequent investment I. If the supplier accepts the
buyer’s offer, he then sets I to maximize his expected profit as
ψ∗1L(w, τ) = max0≤I≤Im
2
[
w − (µ+ τ)(1− α
√
I)− βI
]
. (4.1)
In (4.1), (µ+τ)(1−α√I) captures the supplier’s expected energy costs while βI denotes
the loan repayment in each period. It is easy to show that
I∗L(τ) = min
(
Im,
[(µ+ τ)α
2β
]2)
is the optimal solution to (4.1). Hereafter, we focus on parameter ranges such that[
(µ+)α
2β
]2 ≤ Im, implying that the interior solution is always optimal for τ ∈ [0, ], and
so I∗L(τ) =
[
(µ+τ)α
2β
]2
. As explained in Chapter 3, focusing on the interior solution allows
us to study the key dynamics while avoiding trivial special cases.
It follows that the supplier’s expected profit if accepting w is
ψ∗1L(w, τ) = 2
[
w − (µ+ τ) + [(µ+ τ)α]
2
4β
]
.
If the supplier instead rejects w, he does not produce, and thus would not invest in
any EE improvements and earn 0 profit. Therefore, the supplier accepts w only if
ψ∗1L(w, τ) ≥ 0 or equivalently, w ≥ w¯(τ) = (µ+τ)− (µ+τ)
2α2
4β . Anticipating the supplier’s
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response, the buyer sets w to maximize her expected profit
pi1
∗
L(τ) = max
w≥w¯(τ)
2(p− w).
Lemma 4.1 characterizes the focal buyer’s optimal long-term price and summarizes the
supplier’s optimal response for a given τ .
Lemma 4.1 Under a given carbon price τ and a long-term contract, the buyer optimally
offers w∗(τ) = (µ+ τ)− (µ+τ)2α24β . The supplier accepts the offer and invests in I∗L(τ) =[
(µ+τ)α
2β
]2
.
Since the buyer holds negotiation power, she can offer a price that squeezes all the
EE cost savings, leaving the supplier with zero reservation profit ψ∗1L(τ) = 0. Mean-
while, the buyer’s expected profit is pi1∗L(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+τ)2α24β
]
. It follows from
Lemma 4.1 that the supplier’s expected energy consumption across the two periods is
U∗L(τ) = 2
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
2β
]
. (4.2)
Using these results, the social welfare for a given carbon price τ is
WL(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + [(µ+ τ)α]
2
4β
]
+ 2s+ τU∗L(τ)− U∗L(τ). (4.3)
In (4.3), the first term captures the total profits of the buyer and domestic supplier
pi1∗L(τ) + ψ∗1L(τ), the second term represents the positive externality generated by do-
mestic manufacturing. The third and fourth terms denote the revenue obtained through
carbon pricing and the negative externality of energy used by the domestic supplier, re-
spectively. Since the buyer sources from the domestic supplier in both periods, there is
no negative externality generated by the alternate supplier.
When the carbon price is set at the negative externality of energy, τ = , the third
and fourth terms in (4.3) cancel each other and the negative externality of energy used
by the domestic supplier are fully compensated by the revenue obtained through carbon
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pricing. It follows that the social welfare now becomes
WL() = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + [(µ+ )α]
2
4β
]
+ 2s. (4.4)
When the alternate supplier is not available, the buyer always sources from the domes-
tic supplier in both periods and the social planner can force the supplier to completely
absorb the negative externality of energy without the danger of losing domestic man-
ufacturing. Consequently, setting τ =  achieves the optimal social welfare in this
scenario, consistent with established results in the economics literature (e.g., Jaffe and
Stavins 1994, Allcott and Greenstone 2012). Proposition 4.1 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 4.1 In the absence of external jurisdiction competition, setting the carbon
price at the negative externality of energy τ =  achieves the optimal social welfare
WL() = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + [(µ+ )α]
2
4β + s
]
. (4.5)
The resulting supplier’s EE investment in this scenario is I∗L() =
[
(µ+)α
2β
]2
.
Note that in this scenario, the firms’ optimal decisions are the same as when they are
vertically integrated and so the optimal expected social welfare WL() is also the first-
best level. In the next section, we investigate whether these results continue to hold in
the presence of external jurisdiction competition.
4.4 Impact of External Jurisdiction Competition
In the presence of competition from the alternate supplier who is not subject to the
carbon price, the buyer would also consider the other two sourcing options in addition
to offering a long-term contract to the domestic supplier (L), including a short-term
contract (S) and no contract (A), i.e., sourcing from the alternate supplier in both
periods. Following a similar approach to the previous section, we first characterize the
firms’ optimal decisions and the resulting social welfare level under a given carbon price
τ before examining whether setting τ =  is optimal for the social planner.
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4.4.1 Impact of Carbon Pricing on Social Welfare
In determining her optimal sourcing choice under a given carbon price τ , the buyer
compares the expected profits under each of the three sourcing options (L, S or A).
As established in the previous section, the buyer’s expected profit under a long-term
contract (L) is given by
pi1
∗
L(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+ τ)
2α2
4β
]
. (4.6)
It is straightforward that the buyer’s expected profit if sourcing from the alternate
supplier in both periods (A) is
pi∗1A(τ) = 2 (p− ca) . (4.7)
Characterizing the firms’ decisions and the buyer’s resulting expected profit under a
short-term contract (S) is more involved since there is the possibility that the buyer
switches to the alternate supplier in period 2 when the domestic supplier becomes too
expensive. Following an analysis similar to that in Section 3.3.2, the firms’ optimal
decisions under a short-term contract (S) can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 4.2 For a given carbon price τ , under a short-term contract, the buyer
optimally offers w∗1(τ) = µ + τ − (µ+τ)
2α2
8β in the first period. The supplier ac-
cepts w∗1(τ) and invests in I∗S(τ) =
[
(µ+τ)α
4β
]2
. The buyer optimally offers w∗2(τ) =
min
[
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+τ)α24β
)
, ca
]
in the second period, which the supplier accepts
iff
c1 ≤ c¯1(τ) = 4βca
ρ [4β − (µ+ τ)α2] −
µ(1− ρ) + τ
ρ
.
It follows that the buyer’s expected profit under a short-term contract is given by
pi∗1S (τ) = 2p− (µ+ τ) +
(µ+ τ)2α2
8β − Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)
, ca
)
. (4.8)
We can now compare the buyer’s expected profits under each sourcing option to deter-
mine her optimal strategy. When the buyer sources entirely from the alternate supplier,
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her expected profit pi∗1A(τ) does not depend on τ since the alternate supplier is not
subject to carbon pricing. On the other hand, when the buyer is engaged with the
focal supplier with either a short- or a long-term contract, her expected profits pi∗1S (τ)
and pi∗1L(τ) are both affected by τ in two opposite directions. First, an increase in τ
directly increases the focal supplier’s costs, thus reducing the buyer’s expected profits.
Second, a higher τ has an indirect impact that induces the supplier’s higher EE invest-
ment, giving the buyer more EE cost savings. Since the direct effect dominates under
both contracts, the buyer’s expected profit when engaged with the focal supplier always
decreases in τ . This implies that as τ increases, sourcing entirely from the alternate
supplier (A) becomes more attractive to the buyer than engaging with the supplier.
It follows that there exists a threshold τ sa ∈ [0, ] (τ la ∈ [0, ]) such that the buyer
prefers the short- (long-) term contract over sourcing from the alternate supplier for
0 ≤ τ ≤ τ sa (0 ≤ τ ≤ τ la) and prefers sourcing from the alternate supplier, otherwise.
It is, however, analytically difficult to assert how increasing τ would influence the
buyer’s preference between a short- and a long-term contract. We focus on a certain
range of α to develop additional analytical insights. In particular, we define the following
assumption on the upper bound of the EE investment effectiveness parameter α.
Assumption 4.1 α ≤ α¯ = min
[√
2β
2µ+ , αˆ(τ)
]
for τ ∈ [0, ], where αˆ(τ) is the unique
positive solution to
3(µ+ τ)αˆ2
4β +
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
1− (µ+ τ)αˆ
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)αˆ2
4β
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1 = 1.
In our numerical instances calibrated based on realistic data in Section 4.4.2, the bench-
mark value of α corresponds to roughly 13% energy savings, consistent with the database
of the Industrial Assessment Centers. This α value is well below the upper bound α¯
defined by Assumption 4.1, which corresponds to nearly 70% energy savings. This
suggests that Assumption 4.1 is not particularly restrictive and holds in most realistic
settings (i.e., when the effectiveness of EE investments is not excessively high).
When Assumption 4.1 is satisfied, the buyer’s expected profit under a long-term
contract decreases in τ faster than under a short-term contract. This is because the
buyer’s profit is less dependent on carbon price under a short-term contract which allows
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her the flexibility to switch to the alternate supplier (who is not subject to τ) in period 2
while a long-term contract ties her to the domestic supplier in both periods. It follows
that there exists τ ls ∈ [0, ] such that the buyer prefers the long- over the short-term
contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ls and prefers the short-term contract, otherwise. Proposition 4.2
uses the three thresholds τ sa, τ la and τ ls to characterize the buyer’s optimal choice of
sourcing options.
Proposition 4.2 Under Assumption 4.1, there exist thresholds τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤  such that
the buyer offers the focal domestic supplier
• a long-term contract if 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1;
• a short-term contract if τ1 < τ ≤ τ2;
• no contract if τ > τ2.
Both thresholds τ1 and τ2 increase in the alternate supplier’s cost ca and are given by
(τ1, τ2) =
(τ
la, τ la), if τ sa ≤ τ ls
(τ ls, τ sa), otherwise.
Proposition 4.2 allows us to compute the expected social welfare W () when the carbon
price is set at the negative externality of energy (τ = ).
W () =

WL() = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + [(µ+)α]24β
]
+ 2s, if  ≤ τ1
WS() =
2p− (µ+ ) + (µ+)2α28β + F (c¯1())(s+ e) + s−
Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + )
(
1− (µ+)α24β
)
, ca
)
− e
, if τ1 <  ≤ τ2
WA() = 2(p− ca − e), if  > τ2.
As follows from Proposition 4.2, the buyer offers a long-term contract for  ≤ τ1 and the
expected social welfareWL() consists of the supply chain profits and the full externality
benefit of domestic manufacturing in both periods 2s. For τ1 <  ≤ τ2, the buyer
offers a short-term contract and will switch to the alternate supplier in period 2 if
c1 > c¯1(). As such, the expected social welfare WS() consists of the supply chain
profits and the partial externality benefit of domestic manufacturing (1 + F (c¯1())) s, as
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well as the negative externality of energy used by the alternate supplier (1− F (c¯1())) e.
Note that in both of the above cases, the negative externality of energy used by the
domestic supplier are always canceled by the revenue obtained through carbon pricing
since τ = . Finally, for  > τ2, the buyer sources entirely from the alternate supplier
and the expected social welfare is comprised of only the supply chain profits and the full
negative externality of energy used by the alternate supplier 2e. Lemma 4.3 establishes
the relationship between WL(), WS() and WA().
Lemma 4.3 WL() ≥WS() ≥WA().
The above results suggest that setting τ =  could achieve the same social welfare level
as in the absence of external jurisdiction competition, but only when  is sufficiently
low ( ≤ τ1) such that the buyer offers the domestic supplier a long-term contract.
When  > τ1, applying τ =  makes the buyer to switch to a short-term contract (when
τ1 <  ≤ τ2), or even worse, sourcing entirely from the alternative supplier (when
 > τ2), leading to social welfare losses. We formalize this intuition in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.3 . Under Assumption 4.1 and in the presence of external jurisdiction
competition, setting the carbon price at the negative externality of energy τ =  achieves
the same social welfare level as in the absence of external jurisdiction competition iff
 ≤ τ1.
4.4.2 Numerical Evaluation of Social Welfare Losses
In the previous section, we have theoretically proven that in the presence of external
jurisdiction competition, setting τ =  may result in social welfare losses. In this section,
we numerically evaluate these losses in realistic settings with data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration and the Industrial Assessment Centers (IAC) Database. We
followed the benchmark values of µˆ, ρˆ, σˆ, cˆa, β and p calibrated in Section 3.6 using the
same data set. The benchmark value of µˆ = $6.5× 105 and the average possible energy
savings of 13% in the sample gave the benchmark value of αˆ = 0.00045. Consistent
with industry reports (e.g., Martin et al. 2014) we set ˆ = $0.975 × 105 (i.e., 15% of
µˆ). Finally, we considered conservative benchmark values for the benefit of domestic
manufacturing and the discounting factor for the negative externality of energy used by
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the alternate supplier by setting sˆ = ˆ and e = 0. Table 4.1 summarizes our numerical
calibration.
Parameter Definition Benchmark Range Increment
µ
Expected energy price (without
carbon pricing) µˆ = $6.5× 10
5 [$4, $9]× 105 $100, 000
σ Energy price volatility σˆ = 20% of µˆ [5%, 30%] of µˆ 5% of µˆ
ρ
Cross-period energy price
correlation ρˆ = 0.75 [0.59, 0.95] 0.09
ca Cost of the alternate supplier cˆa = $7.3125× 105 [$6.5, $10.125]×105 $16, 250
α EE investment efficient parameter αˆ = 4.5× 10−4 (3, 6)× 10−4 0.5× 10−4

Unit negative externality of
energy ˆ = 15% of µˆ [5%, 25%] of µˆ 5% of µˆ
s
Social benefit of domestic
manufacturing sˆ = ˆ same as  same as 
δ
Discounting factor for the
negative externality by the
alternate supplier
δˆ = 0 N/A N/A
Table 4.1: Parameter Settings.
We first examined the applicability of Assumption 4.1 across our calibrated data set.
To that end, we considered 144,900 numerical instances, created by varying parameters
around their respective benchmark values as summarized in Table 4.1. The alternate
supplier’s cost ca is varied in the range [$6.5 × 105, $10.125 × 105] (i.e., from 100% of
the benchmark µˆ = $6.5 × 105 to 112.5% of the highest µ value $9 × 105), consistent
with the comparison of global production costs.15 We observed that Assumption 4.1 is
satisfied in all the considered instances, suggesting that the assumption is reasonable in
realistic settings.
Turning next to the evaluation of potential social welfare losses when setting τ = 
in the presence of external jurisdiction competition, we considered different values of
 ∈ {5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%} of µˆ and ca in the range [100%, 112.5%] of µˆ for each
of these  values while all other parameters are kept at their respective benchmark values
presented in Table 4.1. The potential social welfare losses is defined as ∆W = WL()−
W (). Since both thresholds τ1 and τ2 increase in ca as follows from Proposition 4.2, it
can be shown that there exists a threshold c1a (c2a) such that  ≤ τ1 ( ≤ τ2) if ca ≥ c1a
(ca ≥ c2a) and  > τ1 ( > τ2), otherwise. Furthermore, c1a ≥ c2a as τ1 ≤ τ2. It follows
15http://goo.gl/gG8QYm
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that ∆W can be written as a function of ca as follows.
∆W =

2
[
ca − µ− + (µ+)
2α2
4β + s
]
, if µ ≤ ca < c2a
Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + )
(
1− (µ+)α24β
)
, ca
)
+
3(µ+)2α2
8β − µ− + (1− F (c¯1(ca, )))s
, if c2a ≤ ca < c1a
0, otherwise.
We observe that social welfare losses increase in ca for µ ≤ ca < c2a, then drops at
ca = c2a and continues decreasing for c2a ≤ ca < c1a before dropping to zero for ca ≥ c1a.
For µ ≤ ca < c2a, the buyer sources entirely from the alternate supplier and so a higher
ca increases the buyer’s procurement costs, thus decreases her profit, as well as the
resulting social welfare. For c2a ≤ ca < c1a, the buyer uses a short-term contract and so,
an increase in ca has a two-fold effect on the resulting social welfare. First, a higher
ca increases the buyer’s expected procurement costs in period 2 and so decreases her
expected profit. A more expensive alternate supplier also increases the likelihood that
the buyer stays with the domestic supplier in period 2, increasing the expected social
benefit of domestic manufacturing. Our numerical results suggest that the former effect
dominates the latter and social welfare losses increase in ca when the buyer uses a short-
term contract. For ca ≥ c1a, the buyer uses a long-term contract and there are zero social
welfare losses.

Cost of the Alternate Supplier ca
µ 1.025µ 1.05µ 1.075µ 1.1µ 1.125µ
0.05µ 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%(S) (L) (L) (L) (L) (L)
0.1µ 8.65% 1.92% 2.14% 0% 0% 0%(A) (S) (S) (L) (L) (L)
0.15µ 9.53% 12.27% 15.01% 3.5% 0% 0%(A) (A) (A) (S) (L) (L)
0.2µ 10.47% 13.23% 16% 18.75% 21.52% 0%(A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (L)
0.25µ 11.46% 14.25% 17.03% 19.82% 22.61% 25.39%(A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A)
0.3µ 12.51% 15.33% 18.14% 20.95% 23.77% 26.58%(A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A)
Table 4.2: Percentage of Social Welfare Losses when τ = 
The quantification of ∆W (in percentage of WL()) for representative values of ca
is presented in Table 4.2. At low level of  (i.e., 5% of µˆ), setting τ =  affects the
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competitiveness of the domestic supplier only when the alternate supplier is extremely
competitive, i.e., when ca = µˆ. In this case, setting τ =  makes the buyer to use
a short-term contract, resulting in small losses (0.7%) of social welfare. When the
alternate supplier is 2.5% (or higher) more expensive than the domestic supplier, a 5%
increase in energy costs due to setting τ =  does not affect domestic competitiveness
and the buyer always offers a long-term contract, resulting in no losses of social welfare.
Moderate and high levels of  (i.e., 10% to 30% of µˆ) may induce the buyer to source
entirely from the alternate supplier (when it is cheaper than the threshold c2a), resulting
in significant (almost 30%) losses in social welfare. These results suggest that in the
presence of supply chain interaction and external jurisdiction competition, blindly fixing
carbon price at the negative externality of energy  could lead to significant social welfare
losses, especially when  is high and the alternate supplier is cheap.
4.4.3 Impact of Supplemental Remedy Policies
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of supplemental remedy policies in restoring
the social welfare losses caused by setting τ =  in the presence of external jurisdiction
competition. We focus on the two most common policies that specifically target SMMs,
carbon price relief and EE investment subsidy, starting with the former remedy.
Impact of Carbon Price Relief
Under a carbon price relief, the supplier receives a relief d ≤ , reducing his carbon
price from  to the effective level τe =  − d. We will first derive the social planner’s
optimal relief level and examine whether it can achieve the first-best outcomes. Note
that the social planner’s problem in choosing the optimal carbon price relief d∗ can be
transformed to one in choosing the optimal (effective) carbon price level τ∗e =  − d∗.
Using the results from Proposition 4.2, the social welfare W (τ) for a given carbon price
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τ is given by
WL(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + [(µ+τ)α]24β
]
+ 2s+ (τ − )UL(τ), if 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1
WS(τ) = 2p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+τ)
2α2
8β + F (c¯1(τ))(s+ e) + s− e−
Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+τ)α24β
)
, ca
)
+ (τ − )US(τ)
, if τ1 < τ ≤ τ2
WA(τ) = 2(p− ca − e), if τ2 < τ ≤ ,
where
UL(τ) = 2
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
2β
]
, (4.9)
US(τ) = (1 + F (c¯1(ca, τ)))
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)
(4.10)
are the domestic supplier’s expected energy usage under a long- and a short-term con-
tract, respectively. The following lemma characterizes the behavior of W (τ) at the
thresholds level τ1 and τ2 where the buyer changes her sourcing decision.
Lemma 4.4 WL(τ1) ≥WS(τ1) and WS(τ2) ≥WA(τ2).
Lemma 4.4 suggests that at carbon price levels where the buyer is indifferent between two
sourcing options (i.e., between a long- and short-term contract and between a short-term
contract and sourcing entirely from the alternate supplier), the society is better off with
the option that results in more domestic production. Furthermore, it is straightforward
from its expression that WA(τ) does not depend on τ . This, coupled with the result
from Lemma 4.4 that WS(τ2) > WA(τ2), implies that the social planner needs to
consider only the range [0, τ2] in choosing the welfare maximizing τ∗e . To facilitate
our further discussion, we now define the two components of W (τ), the energy-related
component E(τ) and the non-energy component N(τ). In particular, E(τ) is comprised
of the sum of the buyer’s and the focal supplier’s profits, the revenue obtained through
carbon pricing less the negative externality of energy used by both the domestic and
the alternate suppliers, whereas N(τ) consists of the positive externality generated by
domestic manufacturing. From their definitions, W (τ) = E(τ) +N(τ).
For 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1, the buyer offers a long-term contract and the two components of
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social welfare EL(τ) and NL(τ) are respectively given by
EL(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ )
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
2β
)
− [(µ+ τ)α]
2
4β
]
,
NL(τ) = 2s.
It is straightforward that from the above expressions that a higher τ increases EL(τ)
but does not affect NL(τ). This is because increasing τ makes the supplier to internalize
more negative externality of energy usage while does not change the buyer’s preference
of a long-term contract. And so a higher τ increases social welfare W (τ) in this range
0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1.
For τ1 < τ ≤ τ2, the buyer offers a short-term contract and the two components
ES(τ) and NS(τ) are respectively given by
ES(τ) = 2p− (µ+ )
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)
− (µ+ τ)
2α2
8β −
∞∫
c¯1(τ)
caf(c1)dc1 −
c¯1(τ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + )
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)
f(c1)dc1
NS(τ) = [1 + F (c¯1(τ))] s.
When the buyer uses a short-term contract, a higher τ increases the likelihood that
the buyer switches to the alternate supplier in period 2 and thus, reduces NS(τ). The
higher probability of the buyer switching to the alternate supplier also increases the
expected negative externality of energy used by the alternate supplier, and thus could
reduce ES(τ). On the other hand, a higher τ makes the supplier to internalize more
negative externality of energy and could increase ES(τ).
Although it is difficult to analytically compare the above effects to derive the overall
impact of increasing τ on W (τ) = WS(τ) for τ1 < τ ≤ τ2, we numerically observe
with realistically calibrated data (described in Section 4.4.2) that W (τ) decreases in
this range of τ . Figure 4.3 illustrates the behaviors of E(τ), N(τ) and W (τ) in the
benchmark numerical instance summarized in Table 4.1. Note that in our calibration, we
considered a conservative value e = 0, i.e., the social planner is completely unconcerned
about expected negative externality of energy used by the alternate supplier. A higher
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value of e would only aggravate the negative impact of increasing τ on ES(τ) and thus
further decreases WS(τ).
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Figure 4.3: Impact of carbon price τ on E(τ), N(τ) and W (τ).
Even though the behavior ofW (τ) in the range τ1 < τ ≤ τ2 is not analytically clear,
it is sufficient to infer from our above discussion and Lemma 4.4 that W (τ) increases
for 0 ≤ τ < τ1, drops at τ = τ1 and may increase again for τ1 < τ ≤ τ2. These suggest
the following characteristics of the optimal carbon price level τ∗e . If  ≤ τ1, the buyer
uses a long-term contract and W (τ) increases for the whole range 0 ≤ τ ≤ , thus the
social welfare maximizing carbon price level is τ∗e = . In this case, the optimal carbon
price achieves the first-best social welfare and there is no need for a relief, i.e., d∗ = 0. If
instead,  > τ1, there are two possible outcomes: either τ∗e = τ1, under which the buyer
offers a long-term contract, or τ∗e ∈
(
τ1, τ2
]
under which the buyer offers a short-term
contract. This intuition allows us to characterize the social welfare maximizing carbon
price level τ∗e in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4 Under Assumption 4.1, the social welfare maximizing carbon price
level τ∗e is given by
τ∗e =

, if  ≤ τ1
τ1, if  > τ1 and WL(τ1) ≥WS(τ s)
τ s, if  > τ1 and WL(τ1) < WS(τ s),
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where τ s = arg maxWS(τ) in
(
τ1, τ2
]
.
As ca → ∞, i.e., when the alternate supplier is prohibitively expensive, τ1 → ∞ (as
follows from Proposition 4.2) and Proposition 4.4 condenses to the result established in
Proposition 4.1 when there is no external jurisdiction competition. Furthermore, when
maintaining domestic business is at the utmost importance, i.e., when s→∞, the loss
in NS(τ) dominates the gain in ES(τ) as τ increases. Consequently, WS(τ) decreases in
(τ1, τ2]. This, together with the fact thatWL(τ1) ≥WS(τ1) as follows from Lemma 4.4,
implies that τ∗e = min(τ1, ). That is, the social welfare maximizing carbon price is the
highest possible level under which the buyer still prefers the long-term contract. We
formalize this intuition in Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 Under Assumption 4.1 and when s → ∞, τ∗e = min(τ1, ) under which
the buyer offers the domestic supplier a long-term contract.
As mentioned in our previous discussion, we numerically observed the similar phe-
nomenon thatW (τ) decreases in (τ1, τ2], suggesting that maintaining domestic business
is sufficiently important and τ∗e = min(τ1, ) in realistic settings. This also implies that
the first-best social welfare level in this scenario is the same as in the absence of external
jurisdiction competition and is given byWL(). It follows that when setting τ =  causes
social welfare losses (i.e., when  > τ1), the optimal carbon price relief policy τ∗e = τ1
results in the social welfare WL(τ1) that is strictly lower than the first-best WL(), i.e.,
the social welfare losses are not completely restored by the optimal carbon price relief.
In terms of the supplier’s EE investment, the level achieved under the optimal carbon
price relief policy IL(τ1) is also lower than the first-best level IL(). This is because a
carbon price relief reduces the amount of energy negative externality the supplier has
to internalize. We next investigate the impact of EE investment subsidy.
Impact of EE Investment Subsidy
Under an EE investment subsidy policy, the social planner subsidies a portion γ of the
supplier’s total EE investment costs, where 0 ≤ γ < 1. That is, if the supplier decides
to invest I, his total out-of-pocket costs is only 2(1 − γ)βI. The remaining cost 2γβI
is incurred by the social planner and accounted for in the calculation of social welfare.
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Similar to the above analysis, we will first derive the social planner’s optimal subsidy
policy γ∗ and examine whether it can achieve the first-best outcomes.
Applying the change in the supplier’s EE investment costs to the analysis in Sec-
tion 4.4 allows us to characterize the supplier’s EE investment levels under each of the
buyer’s sourcing options (L, S and A) in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Under a given carbon price τ and an EE investment subsidy policy γ ∈
(0, 1], the supplier’s EE investment levels when the buyer offers a long-, short-term
contract and sources entirely from the alternate supplier are respectively given by
IsL
∗(τ, γ) = min
(
Im,
[ (µ+ τ)α
2(1− γ)β
]2)
,
IsS
∗(τ, γ) = min
(
Im,
[ (µ+ τ)α
4(1− γ)β
]2)
,
IsA
∗(τ, γ) = 0.
To facilitate our analysis, we focus first on the unconstrained special case where Im →∞
(so that both IsS∗(τ, γ) and IsL∗(τ, γ) are always the interior solutions for γ ∈ [0, 1)) and
later discuss the constrained case where the upper bound of EE investments Im is finite.
Using the results from Lemma 4.5 and after some algebra, the buyer’s resulting profits
when offering a long-, a short-term contract and sourcing entirely from the alternate
supplier are respectively given by
pis
∗
1L(τ, γ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+ τ)
2α2
4(1− γ)β
]
,
pis
∗
1S (τ, γ) = 2p− (µ+ τ) +
(µ+ τ)2α2
8(1− γ)β − Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4(1− γ)β
)
, ca
)
,
pis
∗
1A(τ, γ) = 2(p− ca).
It is straightforward from their above expressions that pis∗1A(τ, γ) does not depend on γ
while pis∗1L(τ, γ) and pi
s∗
1S (τ, γ) both increase in γ with the former having a faster increasing
rate. We then define γsa(τ) (γla(τ)) as the threshold such that the buyer prefers sourcing
from the alternate supplier over a short-term (long-term) contract for 0 ≤ γ < γsa(τ)
(0 ≤ γ < γla(τ)) and prefers a short-term (long-term) contract, otherwise. In a similar
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fashion, we let γls(τ) denote the threshold such that the buyer prefers a short- over a
long-term contract for 0 ≤ γ < γls(τ) and prefers a short-term contract, otherwise. The
following proposition uses the notation of γsa(τ), γla(τ) and γls(τ) to characterize the
buyer’s optimal sourcing decision.
Proposition 4.5 For a given carbon price τ , there exist thresholds γ1(τ) ≤ γ2(τ) such
that the buyer optimally offers the focal supplier
• no contract if 0 ≤ γ < γ1(τ);
• a short-term contract if γ1(τ) ≤ γ ≤ γ2(τ);
• a long-term contract if γ ≥ γ2(τ).
The thresholds γ1(τ) and γ2(τ) decrease in ca and are given by
(γ1(τ), γ2(τ)) =
(γ
la(τ), γla(τ)), if γsa(τ) ≥ γls(τ)
(γsa(τ), γls(τ)), otherwise.
A higher subsidy level γ decreases the focal supplier’s EE investment costs and so induces
his higher EE investment. This increases the attractiveness of the focal supplier’s EE
cost savings. Therefore, as γ increases, the buyer switches from offering no contract to
a short-term and then to a long-term contract.
We next characterize the social-welfare maximizing γ∗ under τ = . Using the above
results and after some algebra, the social welfare W s(, γ) is given by
W sL(, γ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + s+ (1−2γ)[(µ+)α]24(1−γ)2β
]
, if γ ≥ γ2
W sS(, γ) = 2p− (µ+ ) + (1−2γ)[(µ+)α]
2
8(1−γ)2β + (1 + F (c¯
s
1(γ)))s
−Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + )
[
1− (µ+)α24(1−γ)β
]
, ca
)
− (1− F (c¯s1(γ)))e
, if γ1 ≤ γ < γ2
W sA(, γ) = 2(p− ca − e), if 0 ≤ γ < γ1,
where we omit the argument  from γi() (i = 1, 2) for notational simplicity and
c¯s1(γ) =
4(1− γ)βca
ρ [4(1− γ)β − (µ+ )α2] −
µ(1− ρ) + 
ρ
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is the threshold of c1 such that when using a short-term contract, the buyer switches to
the alternate supplier in period 2 iff c1 ≤ c¯s1(γ). Similar to Lemma 4.3, it can be proven
that W sL(, γ) > W sS(, γ) > W sA(, γ). This result, together with the fact that W sA(, γ)
does not depend on γ, suggests that the social welfare maximizing γ∗ ∈ [γ1, 1). We now
examine the impact of increasing γ in
[
γ1, 1
)
on W s(, γ).
We first look at the range γ ≥ γ2 in which the buyer optimally uses a long-term
contract. It is straightforward to show that the expected social welfare in this range
W sL(, γ) decreases in γ. This is because a higher EE investment subsidy reduces the
supplier’s EE investment cost, leading to inefficiently over-investments (note that the
supplier’s EE investment in this case IsL∗(, γ) increases in γ and IsL∗(, 0) = IL(), which
is the first-best EE investment level).
We now turn to the range γ1 ≤ γ < γ2 when the buyer optimally uses a short-term
contract. In this range, apart from the aforementioned detrimental impact on social
welfare, a higher γ now also increases the probability that the buyer stays with the
focal domestic in period 2. This increases the expected externality benefit generated
by domestic production as well as decreases the expected negative externality of energy
used by the alternate supplier. Although it is analytically difficult to derive the overall
impact of increasing γ on social welfare in this range of γ,16 the above arguments are
sufficient to characterize the optimal γ∗ in Proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.6 Under τ = , the social welfare maximizing γ∗ is given by
γ∗ =

0, if  ≤ τ1
γ2, if  > τ1 and W sL(, γ2) ≥W sS(, γs)
γs, if  > τ1 and W sL(, γ2) < W sS(, γs),
where γs = arg maxW sS(, γ) in
[
γ1, γ2
)
.
Similar to Corollary 4.1, when maintaining domestic business is at the utmost impor-
tance (i.e., s → ∞), the social planner optimally chooses the lowest subsidy level that
is sufficient to induce the buyer to use a long-term contract (i.e., γ∗ = max(γ2, 0)). We
formalize that intuition in the following corollary.
16With the same data calibrated in Section 4.4.2, we numerically observed that the beneficial impact
dominates and social welfare increases in γ for γ1 ≤ γ < γ2.
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Corollary 4.2 When s → ∞, γ∗ = max(γ2, 0) under which the buyer offers the do-
mestic supplier a long-term contract.
As previously discussed, we observed that maintaining domestic business is sufficiently
important and the result in Corollary 4.2 that γ∗ = max(γ2, 0) holds in realistic settings.
When  ≤ τ1, setting τ =  without any EE investment subsidy (i.e., γ∗ = 0) is already
sufficient to achieve the first-best social welfare. In this case, any extra investment
subsidy for the supplier (further increasing γ) does not change the buyer’s preference
for the long-term contract but increases the inefficient over-investment as well as the
social planner’s subsidy costs. On the other hand, when  > τ1, setting τ =  without
any EE investment subsidy causes the buyer to deviate from the long-term contract,
leading to social welfare losses. In this case, offering investment subsidy (increasing
γ) is necessary to make the domestic supplier more attractive and the social planner
optimally uses the lowest subsidy level that is sufficient to induce the buyer to use the
long-term contract, i.e., γ∗ = γ2. Note that the achieved social welfare W sL(, γ2) is
lower than the first-best level WL() = W sL(, 0), implying that social welfare losses
are not fully restored by EE investment subsidy. This is because a subsidy results in
inefficiently cheap EE investment costs, leading to the supplier’s over-investment.
Recall that our results so far are established in an unconstrained case where Im →∞.
Applying the constraint of a finite Im only lowers the social welfare achieved by the EE
investment subsidy and thus, further enhances our results that the policy cannot fully
recover the social welfare losses caused by setting τ = .
Joint Impact of Carbon Price Relief and EE Investment Subsidy
We have established that neither a carbon price relief nor an EE investment subsidy
can singlehandedly restore the potential social welfare losses caused by setting τ = .
The former remedy leads to the supplier’s under-investment in EE improvements while
the latter causes inefficient over-investment. This suggests that a combination of these
two remedies could balance these effects and restore the first-best social welfare level,
as we assert in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7 Under τ = , the first-best social welfare level WL() can be achieved
by using a combination of a carbon price relief τj and an EE investment subsidy policy
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γj, where γj = −τjµ+ and γj ≥ γ2(τj) with γ1(τ) defined in Proposition 4.5.
As follows from Proposition 4.5, any pair γj and τj satisfying t γj ≥ γ2(τj) entices
the buyer to use a long-term contract. Furthermore, when γj = −τjµ+ the under- and
over-investment issues of carbon price relief and EE investment subsidy are balanced,
ensuing the first-best EE investment level, and thus the first-best social welfare.
Numerical Evaluation of Remedy Effectiveness
Even though neither a carbon price relief nor an EE investment subsidy can single-
handedly restore the potential social welfare losses caused by setting τ = , it remains
important to examine how effective these remedies could be in realistic settings. To
that end, we investigated the percentage of social welfare losses under the optimal rem-
edy policies in the same numerical instances considered in Tables 4.2. The results are
summarized in Tables 4.3 for carbon price relief and 4.4 for EE investment subsidy.

Cost of the Alternate Supplier ca
µ 1.025µ 1.05µ 1.075µ 1.1µ 1.125µ
0.05µ 0.008% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0.1µ 0.045% 0.015% '0% 0% 0% 0%
0.15µ 0.127% 0.066% 0.024% 0.003% 0% 0%
0.2µ 0.243% 0.154% 0.085% 0.036% 0.008% 0%
0.25µ 0.11% 0.078% 0.051% 0.029% 0.014% 0.004%
0.3µ 0.165% 0.124% 0.089% 0.06% 0.036% 0.018%
Table 4.3: Percentage of Social Welfare Losses Under the Optimal Carbon Price Relief
Comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.4 against 4.2 suggests that although the social welfare
losses caused by setting τ =  could not be fully restored, they are significantly allevi-
ated by the two supplemental remedies, especially by carbon price relief under which
the social welfare losses are negligible. The results also suggest that among the two
remedies, carbon price relief is much more effective. It also has a few other advantages
over EE investment subsidy. For example, a price relief policy does not needs direct
expenses whereas a subsidy policy requires the social planner to shoulder a portion of
the investment costs. Furthermore, unlike the optimal carbon price relief policy, the op-
timal subsidy level depends on the externality of energy usage , which is often difficult
to estimate (Borenstein 2012).
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
Cost of the Alternate Supplier ca
µ 1.025µ 1.05µ 1.075µ 1.1µ 1.125µ
0.05µ 0.033% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0.1µ 0.226% 0.064% 0.002% 0% 0% 0%
0.15µ 0.605% 0.299% 0.105% 0.012% 0% 0%
0.2µ 1.176% 0.717% 0.379% 0.154% 0.032% 0%
0.25µ 1.932% 1.318% 0.832% 0.465% 0.211% 0.059%
0.3µ 2.86% 2.095% 1.46% 0.949% 0.556% 0.274%
Table 4.4: Percentage of Social Welfare Losses Under the Optimal Investment Subsidy
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we analyze the impact of a carbon pricing policy and its potential sup-
plementary policies, including carbon price relief and EE investment subsidy, on social
welfare when accounting for supply chain interactions and possible external jurisdiction
competition. We find that when there is no external jurisdiction competition, setting
a carbon price equal to the negative externality of energy is sufficient to induce the
first-best social welfare, consistent with extant literature in Environmental Economics.
The result may, however, no longer hold in the presence of an alternate supplier from
outside the jurisdiction due to the impact of carbon price on the buyer’s sourcing de-
cision. In particular, the buyer optimally uses a long-term contract at low levels but
switches to a short-term contract at moderate levels of carbon price. When the carbon
price is sufficiently high, the buyer abandons the focal supplier and sources entirely from
the alternate supplier. Building on these results, we show that setting a carbon price
at the negative externality of energy can induce the first-best outcomes only when the
negative externality is not too high. When it is high, doing so results in social welfare
losses which cannot be fully restored singlehandedly by either carbon price relief or EE
investment subsidy. The first remedy leads to under-investment in EE improvements
while the second causes potential over-investment. Instead, a balanced combination of
these two remedies is required to achieve the first-best outcomes in EE investment and
social welfare.
Our numerical studies using realistic data calibrated from the Industrial Assessment
Centers database and the Department of Energy website suggest that in the presence
of external jurisdiction competition, blindly setting a carbon price equal to the negative
externality of energy usage without any other supplementary policies could lead to as
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high as 30% social welfare losses. Although neither a carbon price relief nor an EE
investment subsidy can completely restore the first-best outcomes, a carbon price relief
results in negligible losses and is much more effective than an investment subsidy. These
observations suggest that a carbon price set at the negative externality of energy, coupled
with industry-specific relieves, could be sufficient to improve EE in supply chains while
maintaining competitiveness for domestic manufacturers.
We close this chapter with a reflection on how the assumptions used in our models
influenced the results in order to assess the generalizability of our results to different
settings. We focus on the setting where the buyer belongs to the same jurisdiction as
the focal supplier. In other settings where the focal buyer is in another jurisdiction, our
results regarding the buyer’s sourcing and the supplier’s EE investment decisions still
apply as they are maximizing their respective individual profits. There are, however,
changes to the social planner’s decisions since the buyer’s profit is no longer included
in the jurisdictional social welfare. For example, it is straightforward to show that the
optimal carbon price level in the absence of jurisdiction competition will be higher than
the negative externality of energy. This is because the jurisdiction does no longer fully
enjoy the supply chain’s EE cost savings which are extracted by the outside buyer.
Focusing on the setting where the buyer belongs to the same jurisdiction as the focal
supplier enables us to preserve the optimality of setting the carbon price at the negative
externality of energy in the absence of external jurisdiction competition, as established
in the environmental economics literature. This thus allows us to disentangle the impact
of external jurisdiction competition on the effectiveness of carbon pricing. Nevertheless,
we expect the structure of the results when the buyer is in another jurisdiction will still
be similar to our findings since the buyer’s sourcing decision, the main driver of the
results, remains unchanged.
Our assumption that the buyer’s product selling price (p) is exogenous and does not
depend on the carbon price implies that the buyer fully absorbs the increase in her own
operating costs due to carbon pricing without passing it to the end consumers. This
applies when the mature product has a stable demand and a competitive market. It
also allows us to focus on the impact of supply chain interactions on the effectiveness
of carbon pricing without having to include the utilities of end consumers. There are
other settings where the buyer may pass a portion of her operating cost increase onto
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end consumers. This of course increases the buyer’s profit and decreases the utilities of
end consumers, yet does not change the sum of these two terms. As such, we expect
our results remain robust in these settings.
Chapter 5
Impact of Buyer Engagement
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we shift the focus to settings where a buyer is not aware of its supplier’s
EE improvement opportunities. For example, western buyers like Wal-mart or Target
are typically not well informed about the EE improvement potentials of their Chinese
suppliers and need engagement from third-party agencies to learn the information. EE
experts have recently called for the engagement of these third-parties with large buyers
in helping their suppliers realize EE investment opportunities. As we have shown in
Chapters 3 and 4, it can be advantage for some large buyers to offer a long-term con-
tract that provides business security to selected suppliers and encourages longer term
investments in environmental improvements. On the other hand, there are concerns
that knowledge of suppliers’ EE investment opportunities may help the more power-
ful buyers squeeze out any associated cost savings, dampening the suppliers’ incentive
to invest. In this study, we investigate when the third-party’s engagement with the
buyer, i.e., informing the buyer of the supplier’s EE investment opportunities, helps
increase the supplier’s EE investment level and when it decreases this investment. We
also study how the third-party agency’s tactic would affect the supplier’s profitability.
More specifically, we focus on the following research questions.
1. How does a third-party agency engagement with a buyer influence a supplier’s EE
investment level and its resulting profit?
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2. Under what conditions does the third-party agency engagement with the buyer
increase the supplier’s EE investment level?
3. How do volatility and correlation across time or energy prices impact these out-
comes?
To answer these questions, we build on the stylized model developed in Chapter 3 and
incorporate the explicit decision of an external third-party agency about whether to
engage also with the buyer or work only with the supplier with the goal of achieving
the highest supply chain EE investment. If the third-party agency chooses to work
only with the supplier, the buyer is not aware of the supplier’s EE opportunities and
makes contracting decisions accordingly, while the supplier reacts by choosing an EE
improvement level without the buyer’s knowledge. If the third-party chooses to engage
also with the buyer, the buyer decides her contracting strategy with knowledge of the
supplier’s EE opportunities, and the supplier chooses the improvement level accordingly.
When the buyer is engaged, we consider both short- and long-term contracts, similar to
the previous two studies.
5.2 Model Description
Our model builds on the buyer-supplier dyad introduced in Chapter 3, with two im-
portant modifications. In particular, we now consider settings where the buyer is by
herself unaware of the supplier’s EE improvement potentials and can only learn when
the third-party agency chooses to engage with her (beside assisting the supplier). This
allows us to focus on the explicit decision of an external third-party agency to whether
engage also with the buyer or work only with the supplier in order to achieve the high-
est supply chain EE investment. We now briefly recap the supply chain setting before
describing its interaction with the third-party agency in more detail.
We consider a two tiered supply chain consisting of a large powerful buyer with
negotiation power (she) and a capital-constrained supplier (he). The cost-sensitive
buyer needs to fill demand for an item produced by the supplier over a two-period time
horizon, which she sells at market price p. Demand is identical and known in each period
and, without loss of generality, is normalized to one. The supplier’s production cost can
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be divided into a time-dependent energy-related cost component and a non-energy cost
component, which we normalize to zero without loss of generality. We assume the
energy-related cost in each period, ct, t = 1, 2, follows a Normal distribution with mean
µ and standard deviation σ, where µ σ such that the probability of a negative energy
cost is negligible. Let f(·) and F (·) denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of ct, respectively. We
further assume these prices are correlated and the cross-period correlation is captured
through a bivariate Normal distribution with a positive correlation coefficient ρ ≥ 0.
This implies that the conditional expectation of energy cost in period 2 for a realized
cost in period 1 is E[c2|c1 = c˜1] = µ(1− ρ) + ρc˜1. For ease of presentation, we will use
the short-handed notation E[c2|c˜1] for E[c2|c1 = c˜1].
At the beginning of period 1, the supplier receives assistance from an external third-
party agency to identify opportunities to invest in equipment and technology based EE
improvements that reduce his energy usage, and thus, energy-related production costs.
Let I denote this investment decision which is chosen within the interval [0, Im] where Im
reflects the most advanced EE technologies available. This EE investment is made up-
front and funded by a loan since the supplier is capital constrained. The supplier pays
back the loan in equal installments βI in each of the two periods, where β ≥ 12 . Note that
β = 12 corresponds to an interest-free loan. We assume that after assisted by the third-
party agency, the supplier can ex-ante identify the maximum energy saving combination
of improvements for each investment amount I, which is captured by the energy saving
function g(I) which is concave and strictly increasing in I. Furthermore, g(0) = 0
and g(Im) < 1. The supplier’s investment choice I is determined at the beginning
of period 1, but has a long-term impact on the supplier’s cost structure, captured by
both the recurrent installment βI, and the uncertain energy cost savings ctg(I) in each
period t. The supplier’s total costs in each period t are given by ct(1 − g(I)) + βI.
The average energy cost savings are assumed greater than the installment amount, i.e.,
E[ctg(I)] = µg(I) ≥ βI, ∀I ∈ [0, Im]. We also assume µg′(Im) ≤ β < µg′(0), where ′
denotes the first order derivative with respect to I. In our analysis, we will frequently
position results with respect to the two benchmark investment levels
¯
I ≤ I¯ where
¯
I
represents the EE investment level that minimizes the supplier’s expected cost when he
produces only in period 1 and I¯ is the cost-minimizing EE investment level when the
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supplier produces in both periods.
¯
I = arg min{µ(1− g(I)) + 2βI}, (5.1)
I¯ = arg min{[µ(1− g(I)) + βI]}. (5.2)
We assume that all information is common knowledge except for the supplier’s EE
investment opportunity, which may or may not be known to the buyer depending on the
third-party agency’s decision whether to engage with the buyer or not. If unengaged,
the buyer makes her contracting decisions as in the status-quo, business-as-usual case
without being aware of the supplier’s EE investment opportunities. The engaged buyer,
on the other hand, learns about the supplier’s EE investment opportunities as well as
the saving function g(I) from the third-party agency, and so can adjust her contract
parameters, including the price and contract length, in anticipation of the supplier’s
investment decision. The main difference between the engaged and unengaged buyer
lies in their perception of the supplier’s underlying costs, with the latter believing the
supplier’s costs may be higher than actual. It is also important to note that the unen-
gaged buyer’s lack of knowledge is inherent to the third-party agency’s choice and not
due to the supplier actively hiding information. .
c˜1
observed,
production
takes place
Offer
price (w1
if S, w if
L)
Accept or
reject and
choose I
Decide
contract
length
Third-party agency
decides whether to
engage with the buyer
Offer
price (w2
only if S)
Accept or
reject (only
if S)
c˜2
observed,
production
takes place
Buyer
Supplier
t=1 t=2t=0
Figure 5.1: Sequence of events
The timeline of events is summarized in Figure 5.1. In period 0, the third-party
agency chooses to whether engage the buyer or work only with the supplier. The buyer
then makes her contracting decision in period 1. Similar to the previous two studies,
we consider two types of contracts: (a) short-term and (b) long-term contract. Under
a short-term contract, the buyer offers a short-term price w1 in period 1 and maintains
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the flexibility in period 2 to set a different price w2 after observing the energy price
c1. In contrast, under a long-term contract, the buyer commits to buying from the
supplier in both periods at a price w. In the first period, the supplier considers what
level of EE investment he would take on under each scenario (accepting and rejecting)
and accepts the contract as long as his reservation profit is met. Under the short-term
contract, the supplier can also reject the new offered price w2 in period 2. If the price
is rejected, the buyer purchases from an alternative source at a total cost ca which
includes energy and other production related costs of the alternative supply source, as
well as any additional procurement related costs. Similar to our previous two studies,
we assume a deterministic ca where p > ca ≥ µ. In each period, production takes place
after the energy price is observed. Both the buyer and supplier are risk neutral and
act to maximize their expected profits across both periods while the objective of the
third-party agency is to maximize the supplier’s EE investment. Finally, we assume
that when the two options are equal in terms of expected profit, the firms prefer the
more environmental friendly one (i.e. inducing higher EE investment level).
5.3 Impact of the Third-party Agency’s Tactics
We now derive the firms’ optimal decisions and then compare the supplier’s EE invest-
ment levels across the two tactics of the third-party agency. It is straight-forward to
show that an unengaged buyer will believe she is always better off offering a short-term
pricing contract, since she is not aware of the EE investment opportunities and their
potential cost benefits. Consequently, we only consider the short-term contract when
the third-party agency works only with the supplier but examine both contract types
when the third-party agency engages the buyer.
5.3.1 Optimal Decisions When the Buyer is Unengaged
We use superscript U to denote this scenario when the third-party works only with the
supplier and does not engage with the buyer. Since the buyer always offers a short-term
contract in this case, we can decouple her problem and solve it separately for the two
periods. It is straightforward to observe that in period 1, the buyer maximizes her
profits by offering the lowest price that meets the supplier’s perceived reservation profit
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of zero, i.e. wU1
∗ = µ ≤ ca. In period 2, the buyer can choose between the alternative
source and the supplier whose updated expected cost is E[c2|c˜1] for an observed c˜1.
Hence, the buyer maximizes her expected profit by offering wU2
∗ = min(E[c2|c˜1], ca),
knowing the supplier will reject the offer if his reservation profit is not met. We define
c¯U = ca
ρ
− µ(1− ρ)
ρ
, (5.3)
as the realization of c˜1 beyond which the uninformed buyer perceives the alternative
option is cheaper.
We now turn to the decisions of the supplier, who has the opportunity to make an EE
investment in period 1 without the buyer’s knowledge, and so his underlying costs and
reservation profit levels are different than those perceived by the buyer. When choosing
the investment level I, the supplier must consider that he will incur a recurring cost βI
in each period. This implies that, while his expected reservation profit is zero across
the sum of the two periods, it becomes −βI in period 2 since the installment amount
is payable whether or not production takes place. That is, in period 2, the supplier will
accept any price that at least covers his expected production cost, E[c2|c˜1](1 − g(I)).
We define
c¯(I) = ca
ρ(1− g(I)) −
µ(1− ρ)
ρ
(5.4)
as the threshold of c˜1 beyond which the supplier’s expected total cost in period 2 is
higher than the price offered by the buyer, and thus, he rejects it. It is straightforward
to show that c¯(I) ≥ c¯U . In period 1, the supplier’s problem can then be stated as.
piUs
∗ = max
0≤I≤Im
Ec1
[
(wU1
∗ − c˜1(1− g(I))− βI) + piU2s(I)
]
, (5.5)
where the expected profit in period 2 is
piU2s(I) =

E[c2|c˜1]g(I)− βI if c˜1 ≤ c¯U ,
ca − E[c2|c˜1](1− g(I))− βI if c¯U < c ≤ c¯(I),
−βI otherwise.
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Proposition 5.1 describes the structural characteristics of the optimal investment level
IU
∗. Proofs of all technical results are provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 5.1 When the third-party agency works only with the supplier, his optimal
EE investment level IU ∗ is either from the set {¯I, I¯}, or an interior solution to
g′(I)
µ+ c¯(I)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1
− 2β = 0.
It follows that the supplier’s optimal expected profit in this scenario is given by
piUs
∗ = µg(IU ∗) [1 + F (c¯(I))]− 2βIU ∗ +
c¯(I)∫
c¯U
[ca − E[c2|c˜1] f(c˜1)dc˜1. (5.6)
The following two corollaries are immediate from the above result.
Corollary 5.1 IU ∗ increases in ca.
Intuitively, a more expensive alternative source increases the price offered to the supplier
in period 2, which in turn increases the chance that the supplier accepts the offer,
enabling him to invest in more EE improvements. When ca is sufficiently high that
the alternative source is impractical for the buyer, she is guaranteed to stay with the
supplier for both periods and IU ∗ = I¯. On the other hand, when ca is sufficiently low
and
¯
I = 0, the lower boundary solution may emerge as optimal (IU ∗ =
¯
I). In that case,
the probability that the buyer stays with the supplier in period 2 is small, making his
expected cost reduction benefits from EE too low to cover the investment.
Corollary 5.2 piUs
∗
> 0.
Note that when the supplier does not invest in any EE improvements, i.e., I = 0, his
profit is at the zero reservation level since the powerful buyer squeezes all the supply
chain profit. This implies that piUs
∗ reflects the expected EE cost savings the supplier
can fully enjoy when the buyer is unaware of his investment opportunities and makes
pricing decisions as in the status-quo without any EE investments. In the next section,
we examine how the supplier’s EE investment and profitability changes when the third-
party agency engages with the buyer.
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5.3.2 Optimal Decisions When the Buyer is Engaged
We begin the analysis of the engaged buyer scenario with the short-term contract,
denoted by superscript S. Unlike in the previous scenario, the buyer now knows the
supplier’s choice I when making her period 2 pricing decision and anticipation of this
influences her pricing in period 1. Hence, her problem must now be solved by backward
induction. Since the engaged buyer knows the supplier’s actual cost structure, her
optimal price in period 2 given the observed c˜1 is wS2
∗(I) = min (E[c2|c˜1](1− g(I)), ca).
The supplier will accept this offer if c˜1 ≤ c¯(I), where c¯(I) is defined in (5.4).
Taking this behavior in period 2 into account, if accepting wS1 , the supplier chooses
an investment level I to maximize his total expected profit across both periods given
by:
piSs
∗(wS1 ) = max0≤I≤Imax
Ec1
[
wS1 − c˜1(1− g(I))− 2βI
]
. (5.7)
Anticipating this decision, the buyer sets wS1 to maximize her expected profit given by
piSb =
p− w
S
1 + Ec1 (p−min(E[c2|c˜1](1− g(I)), ca)) if piSs ∗(wS1 ) ≥ 0
2(p− ca) otherwise,
(5.8)
where 2(p − ca) is the buyer’s total profit if the supplier rejects the contract offer in
period 1. Proposition 5.2 summarizes the optimal decisions of the two firms.
Proposition 5.2 When the third-party agency engages the buyer and under a short-
term contract, the buyer’s optimal prices are
wS1
∗ = µ(1− g(
¯
I)) + 2β
¯
I,
wS2
∗ =
E[c2|c˜1](1− g(¯I)) if c˜1 ≤ c¯(¯I);ca otherwise .
The supplier’s optimal EE investment level is IS∗ =
¯
I ≤ IU ∗.
Under the short-term contract, the engaged buyer is able to squeeze all the cost reduction
benefits from EE, and so the supplier always earns his reservation profit −βI in period 2,
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regardless of whether the buyer stays or leaves. This induces the supplier to set I as
if he is only producing in the first period (IS∗ =
¯
I), leading to a lower EE investment
level than that would be achieved if the buyer is uninformed (IU ∗). Furthermore, the
buyer’s anticipation of knowing I in period 2 also allows her to set wS1
∗ to squeeze out
all the supplier’s entire EE cost savings, leaving him with his zero reservation profit
across the two periods.
We next analyze whether a long-term contract, denoted by superscript L, can over-
come this investment dilemma. Under the long-term contract, the buyer offers the same
price wL in both periods. For a given wL, the supplier’s problem then becomes.
piLs
∗(wL) = max
0≤I≤Imax
2
[
wL − µ(1− g(I))− βI
]
.
The buyer’s problem is now stated as
max
wL≥0
2(p− wL) (5.9)
s.t. piLs
∗(wL) ≥ 0.
We summarize the optimal decisions in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.3 When the third-party agency engages the buyer and under a short-
term contract, the buyer’s optimal price is wL∗ = µ(1 − g(I¯)) + βI¯, and the supplier’s
optimal EE investment level is IL∗ = I¯ ≥ IU ∗.
It is not surprising that the supplier’s optimal EE investment level increases to I¯ under
the long-term contract since he is now guaranteed production in both periods. However,
his profit remains at the zero reservation level since the engaged buyer is still able to
squeeze out all the EE cost savings. We now analyze which contract the informed buyer
prefers to maximize her expected perspective. In determining her optimal contracting
choice, the informed buyer faces the following tradeoff. The short-term pricing contract
provides flexibility in sourcing from the stable alternative source in period 2 if c˜1 is
relatively high. However, its lack of commitment results in a lower I, and thus lower
cost reduction benefits when staying with the supplier in period 2. With the long-term
pricing contract, the buyer forfeits flexibility for a higher cost reduction benefits resulting
from the higher I. Proposition 5.4 establishes that the buyer’s optimal contracting
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choice depends on the alternative source’s cost, with a unique threshold dividing the
buyer’s preference space.
Proposition 5.4 There exists a unique threshold c¯a such that the buyer prefers the
short-term pricing contract when ca < c¯a, and the long-term pricing contract when
ca ≥ c¯a, where c¯a is either from the set {µ, p} or the unique interior solution of
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
[E[c2|c˜1](1− g(¯I))− ca] f(c˜1)dc˜1 = 2
[
(µg(I¯)− βI¯)− (µg(
¯
I)− β
¯
I)
]
. (5.10)
Our results thus far suggest that the third-party agency’s engagement with the buyer is
always detrimental to the supplier’s profitability since it provides the powerful buyer the
knowledge to squeeze all the EE cost savings. In terms of EE investments, the third-
party agency’s engagement with the buyer could be either detrimental or beneficial,
depending on the relative value of the buyer’s alternative procurement source. That
is, when the cost of the alternative source ca is low, the engaged buyer prefers the
short-term contract, which leads to a lower investment level
¯
I as compared to IU ∗
when the third-party agency works only with the supplier. On the other hand, when
ca is sufficiently high, the engaged buyer encourages the supplier to increase his EE
investment to I¯ via the long-term pricing contract.
Note that IU ∗ increases in ca (as follows from Corollary 5.1) while I¯ does not depend
on ca. This implies that as the buyer’s alternative procurement source becomes more
expensive, the benefit of the third-party agency’s engagement with the buyer on the
supplier’s EE investment, i.e., the difference I¯ − IU ∗, shrinks. This is because when the
alternative procurement source is expensive, the supplier is willing to invest more in EE
improvements to enjoy higher cost savings with the unengaged buyer who is more likely
to stick with him in the second period. This reduces the value of the business security
the engaged buyer offers via the long-term contract.
5.3.3 Impact of Energy Market Characteristics
We next examine how energy market uncertainty (characterized by the volatility σ
and cross-period correlation ρ) influence our results developed in the previous section.
In particular, we study how increasing ρ and σ would influence the engaged buyer’s
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contracting decisions, the supplier’s EE investment IU ∗, IS∗ and IL∗, as well as his
profitability. Proposition 5.5 summarizes our results.
Proposition 5.5 An increase in either energy price volatility (σ) or cross-period cor-
relation (ρ) leads to i) an increase in the contracting choice threshold c¯a of the engaged
buyer, ii) a decrease in IU ∗ for the uninformed buyer setting, iii) no change in IS∗ or
IL
∗ for the informed buyer setting and iv) a decrease in the supplier’s expected profit
piUs
∗ with the unengaged buyer.
It is interesting to note that changes in ρ or σ impact the supplier’s EE investment level
directly when the third-party agency works only with the supplier, but only indirectly
(through its influence on the contract switching threshold) when the third-party agency
engages with the buyer. An increase in ρ or σ decreases the expected cost reduction
benefits from EE in period 2, and thus decreases the supplier’s investment level, as well
as his expected profit, in the former case. On the other hand, when the third-party
agency engages with the buyer, the supplier approaches the EE investment decision
as if he always produces either only in period 1 (with the short-term contract) or in
both periods (with the long-term contract), and so his investment level is not impacted
by changes in ρ and σ. From the engaged buyer’s perspective, since the value of the
alternative source increases in ρ and σ, the region of ca where she prefers the short-term
contract (and thus induces the supplier to choose a lower investment level) expands.
These results suggest an interesting two-fold effect of a higher ρ or σ. Although
a higher ρ or σ reduces the chance that the engaged buyer positively influences her
supplier’s EE investment level (as the contract switching threshold c¯a increases), when
an improvement does occur, its magnitude is larger for higher ρ or σ. This follows
from the fact that increasing ρ or σ has a dampening effect on IU ∗ but no impact on
IL
∗. Furthermore, as a higher ρ or σ decreases the supplier’s expected profit under an
unengaged buyer, it also reduces the detrimental impact of engaging the buyer on the
supplier’s profitability.
5.4 Discussion
In this chapter we focus on settings where a buyer is not aware of the supplier’s EE
improvement opportunities and must rely on third-party agencies’ engagement to learn
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the knowledge. We provide insights into how a third-party agency’s tactic, to either
work directly with a supplier or also engage with its buyer, affects the supplier’s EE
investment decisions and profitability. We also examine the impact of energy market
uncertainty on the directional results.
We find that third-party agency’s engagement with the buyer can have either a
beneficial or detrimental impact on the supplier’s EE investment decision, depending
on the buyer’s alternative sourcing option. In particular, buyer engagement increases
the supplier’s EE investment level when the alternative source is more expensive than a
threshold such that the engaged buyer chooses to offer the supplier a long-term contract.
When the alternate supply source is sufficiently cheap, the engaged buyer offers a short-
term contract, which reduces the supplier’s investment level. We also find that the
potential benefit of engaging the buyer on the supplier’s EE investment is reduced as
the alternate supply source becomes more expensive. Regarding the impact on the
supplier’s profitability, we show that buyer engagement always reduces the supplier’s
profit as the engaged buyer squeezes all the associated EE cost savings. Energy market
uncertainty affects these directional results in the following ways. In particular, an
increase in the volatility or cross period correlation of energy prices reduces the chance
that third-party agency’s engagement with the buyer positively influences the supplier’s
EE investment level. However, when an improvement in EE investment does occur, its
magnitude is larger for higher volatility or cross period correlation of energy prices. A
higher volatility or cross period correlation of energy prices also reduces the detrimental
impact of buyer engagement on the supplier’s profit.
These findings provide important managerial implications for third-party agencies
and EE investment activists in channeling their efforts. Our results suggest that en-
gaging the buyer and providing them with information regarding their suppliers’ EE
improvement opportunities could be an effective and simple way to improve EE in-
vestments in some market settings. However, any policy for engaging the buyer about
potential EE opportunities within their supply base should be tailored by industry with
careful consideration of the competitive landscape. Furthermore, the gain in EE level
under should also be weighted against their associated policy costs. Our analysis as-
sumes that any costs associated with engaging the buyer are incurred externally by the
third-party agency and so do not directly impact buyer or supplier decisions. Future
82
research may consider ways that the buyer could absorb these costs, especially in cases
where EE investments lead to significant increases in buyer profit. This would further
increase the potential societal benefit of engaging the buyer.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The goal of this research is to to develop a better understanding of the challenges faced
by SMMs in making their EE investment decisions. We provide managerial insights for
environmental regulators, large corporations and third-party agencies to make informed
decisions in designing effective regulatory policies and incentive mechanisms for increas-
ing EE investments at SMMs, taking into consideration supply chain interactions with
both their buyers and competing suppliers.
Our results suggest that there is not a “one-size fits all” approach for a buyer to
assist its suppliers in improving EE with assessment assistance and procurement com-
mitment instruments. It is more beneficial, from both the buyer’s and the EE gap
reduction perspectives, to tailor strategies by supplier characteristics, including cost
competitiveness, EE assessment cost and effectiveness of EE investments. In particular,
it is most effective for EE gap reduction when both instruments offered by the buyer.
This is because of their complementary relationship that balances the give-and-take of
power in the supply chain and induces the supplier to increase his EE investment level
and eliminate the EE gap. On the other hand, the addition of third-party assistance
can actually harm EE investment by deterring the buyer from offering her own instru-
ments, especially when the costs of both the assessment and the alternate supplier are
moderate. This implies that it would be more beneficial for third-party organizations to
provide indirect assessment subsidies through large buyers instead of the more common
practice of providing free assessments directly to suppliers.
In terms of regulatory policies, we examine the impact of a carbon pricing policy
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and its potential supplementary policies, including carbon price relief and EE investment
subsidy, on social welfare and SMM’s EE invesments. We find that when there is no
external jurisdiction competition, setting a carbon price equal to the negative externality
of energy is sufficient to induce the first-best social welfare, consistent with extant
literature in Environmental Economics. The result may, however, no longer hold in
the presence of an alternate supplier from outside the jurisdiction due to the impact of
carbon price on the buyer’s sourcing decision. We show that setting a carbon price at the
negative externality of energy can induce the first-best outcomes only when the negative
externality is not too high. When it is high, doing so results in social welfare losses.
Although neither a carbon price relief nor an EE investment subsidy can completely
restore the first-best outcomes, a carbon price relief results in negligible losses and is
more effective than an investment subsidy. These observations suggest that a carbon
price set at the negative externality of energy, coupled with industry-specific relieves,
could be sufficient to improve EE in supply chains while maintaining competitiveness
for domestic manufacturers.
We also examine the role of third-party agencies’ engagement with buyers in set-
tings where buyers are not aware of their suppliers’ EE investment opportunities. We
find that, consistent with the results developed in the first study, third-party agency’s
engagement with the buyer can have either a beneficial or detrimental impact on the
supplier’s EE investment decision, depending on the buyer’s alternative sourcing op-
tion. In particular, buyer engagement increases the supplier’s EE investment level when
the alternative source is more expensive than a threshold such that the engaged buyer
chooses to offer the supplier a long-term contract. When the alternate supply source
is sufficiently cheap, the engaged buyer offers a short-term contract, which reduces the
supplier’s investment level. These findings provide important managerial implications
for third-party agencies and EE investment activists in channeling their efforts. Our
results suggest that engaging the buyer and providing them with information regarding
their suppliers’ EE improvement opportunities could be an effective and simple way to
improve EE investments in some market settings. However, any policy for engaging the
buyer about potential EE opportunities within their supply base should be tailored by
industry with careful consideration of the competitive landscape.
Before closing, it is important to reflect on how the assumptions used in our models
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influenced the results in order to assess the generalizability of our insights to different
settings as well as to other types of supplier improvements with similar characteristics
as EE investments (i.e., improvements that require an initial assessment and one-shot
up front investment, followed by long-term periodic rewards). Our assumption that
investment option I follows a continuum is consistent with the EE investment literature
(e.g., Ryan 2015) and allows for a continuous cost savings function for the EE invest-
ment, facilitating our analysis. However, EE improvement opportunities in practice
often consist of a discrete (rather than continuous) set of investment levels, which could
be represented by a piece-wise linear cost savings function. Incorporating such a func-
tion would remove the possibility of closed-form expressions but directional results could
still be substantiated through numerical analysis. For example, the supplier’s optimal
investment would no longer be uniquely characterized. However, it is easy to show that
EE projects could be ordered so that it is optimal for the supplier to invest up to the
last project before the marginal benefit decreases. Since our results are driven by the
costs of the alternate supplier and/or the carbon price level, we expect our directional
insights would continue to hold under this more complex saving function.
Our assumption that the supplier makes a single investment decision at the begin-
ning of the time horizon is reasonable for suppliers who have to seek external loans.
However, it is less applicable to suppliers who may have access to internal funding for
EE investments. In that case, real option valuation techniques could be integrated into
our model to investigate how the supplier makes cumulative investment decisions across
time periods. Finally, while we assume that the supplier will undertake EE investments
that are financially profitable, several issues may prevent such profit maximizing be-
havior in practice. These include required investment hurdle rates (Ross 1986, Knittel
et al. 2014), competition for budgets with other investment opportunities (Ross 1986,
McLean-Conner 2009), and possible behavioral biases (DeCanio 1993, Knittel et al.
2014). We also do not consider other potential costs of EE improvements, including dis-
ruptions in production processes and learning costs. Buyer-offered incentives, including
those examined in this paper, as well as other possible policies, may be able to counter-
act some of these issues and costs to elevate EE as an investment priority. It would be
interesting to further test the impact of these incentives drawing from empirical data
and/or behavioral experiments.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1 Technical Proofs
The proofs of Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and Propositions 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 are either straightforward
or similar to other demonstrated proofs and so we omit them for brevity.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: The first order derivative with respect to α of the objective
function in (3.7) is given as
∂pi1
∂αs
= 1
αH − αL
[
µ− 2ca + µ
2αs(2αH − 3αs)
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µαs
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
. (A.1)
Note that the third term in (A.1) is concave in αs while the sum 2ca − µ −
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µαs24β
)
, ca
)
is increasing in αs. It follows that ∂pi1∂αs has at most
two real roots. We consider the following two cases.
1. If there are no real roots to ∂pi1∂αs = 0, it is straightforward that
∂pi1
∂αs
< 0, implying
that pi1 is decreasing in αs, ∀αs ∈ [αL, αH ] and the optimal solution is given by
α∗s = αL.
2. If there exists at least one root to ∂pi1∂αs = 0, we let α1 ≤ α2 denote the two possible
roots of ∂pi1∂αs . It is first easy to show that α2 ≤ 2αH3 < αH . We then consider the
following sub-cases:
(a) α2 ≤ αL: ∂pi1∂αs ≤ 0 (i.e., pi1 is decreasing in αs) ∀αs ∈ [αL, αH ] and similar to
above, α∗s = αL.
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(b) α1 ≤ αL < α2: ∂pi1∂αs ≥ 0 for αL ≤ αs ≤ α2 and ∂pi1∂αs < 0 for α2 < αs ≤ αH . It
follows that α∗s = α2.
(c) αL < α1: It follows that for αL ≤ αs < α1 and α2 < αs ≤ αH , ∂pi1∂αs < 0,
implying that pi1 is decreasing in αs. For α1 ≤ αs ≤ α2, pi1 is increasing in
αs since ∂pi1∂αs ≥ 0. The optimal solution α∗s then depends on the comparison
between pi1(αL) and pi1(α2).
The results in Lemma 3.1 then follow by combining these cases.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Recall that the buyer’s optimization problem is given by
pi0 = max
w1(α)
−A+ E0
[
2p− w1(α)− E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− (µα)
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
s.t. E0 [ψ∗1(α)] = E0
[
w1(α)− µ+ (µα)
2
8β
]
≥ ψ∗0b .
After some algebra, the constraint in the above problem can be rewritten as E0 [w1(α)] ≥
ψ∗0b + µ −
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜. Consequently, the buyer’s objective function can then be
rewritten as
pi0 = max
w1(α)
−A+ 2p− E0 [w1(α)]−
αH∫
αL
[
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜
s.t. E0 [w1(α)] ≥ ψ∗0b + µ−
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜
It is straightforward that the objective function, i.e., the buyer’s profit decreases in
E0 [w1(α)] and so it is optimal for the buyer to set w∗1(α) such that the constraint
is binding, i.e., E0 [w1(α)] = ψ∗0b + µ −
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜. Since we do not assume
any specific functional form for w1(α), there might be different solutions that satisfy
the condition, and setting w∗1(α) = ψ∗0b + µ −
(µα)2
8β is one such solution. It is then
straightforward to show that the remaining results in Lemma 3.2 follow.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: To determine whether the buyer should offer AA, we
compare her expected profits with and without the offer. We consider the following two
cases.
Case 1: A ≤ AS(ca): In this case, the buyer’s expected profit if offering AA in
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(3.12) is
pi0 = 2p− µ+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜−
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2 − α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜ ≥ pi
∗
0b ,
where the inequality follows from µ ≤ ca and α∗s ≥ αL. It follows that it is always
optimal for the buyer to offer AA in this range of A.
Case 2: A > AS(ca): The buyer’s expected profit with AA now simplifies to
pi0 = −A+ 2p− µ+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜.
The buyer offers AA only if
pi0 = −A+ 2p− µ+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜
≥ 2p− µ− E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca) ,
which is equivalent to
A ≤ ABa(ca) =
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜+
E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca) .
It is easy to prove that ABa(ca) ≥ AS(ca) and so, combining the two cases suggests that
the buyer offers AA only when A ≤ ABa(ca). From the above expression of ABa(ca), it
is also straightforward that ∂ABa∂ca ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: It is easy to verify that under Assumption 3.1, ∂pi1∂αs < 0,
∀αs ∈ [αL, αH ] and ∂pi1pb∂αp < 0, ∀αp ∈ [αL, αH ]. Thus, as follows from Lemmas 3.1 and
3.3, α∗s = α∗p = αL. The remaining result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: As follows from (3.19), we consider the following five
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cases.
Case 1: A ≤ AS(< ASp): In this range, we have
d = d1 = piBa0 − piBa0p = µ−
αH∫
αL
[
3(µαL)2
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜.
It is straightforward that d1 > 0 for caL ≤ ca < c1a and the buyer optimally chooses
the short-term contract. For ca ≤ c1a ≤ p, d1 ≤ 0 and the buyer optimally offers the
long-term contract. The buyer offers AA with either contract type as follows from
Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
Case 2: AS < A ≤ min(ABa(ca), ASp): In this range,
d = d2 = pib0 − piBa0p = µ−
(µαL)2
2β −A+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜.
Similar to above, d2 > 0 for caL ≤ ca < c2a and the buyer optimally chooses the short-
term contract. Note that while c1a is a constant, c2a is indeed a function in A. It is easy
to show that c1a ≥ c2a and c2a|AS = c1a. In this range of A, the buyer also offers AA with
either contract type as follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
Case 3: min(ABa(ca), ASp) < A ≤ max(ABa(ca), ASp): We consider the following two
sub-cases
If min(ABa(ca), ASp) = ASp: It follows that
d = d3i = pib0 − pib0p = µ−
αH∫
αL
[
3(µα˜)2
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜.
Similar to above, d3i > 0 for caL ≤ ca < c3ia and the buyer optimally chooses the short-
term contract; for ca ≤ c3ia ≤ p, d3i ≤ 0 and the buyer optimally offers the long-term
contract in this range of A. Similar to c1a, c3ia is also a constant. Furthermore, it is easy
to show that c3a ≤ c2a and c2a|ASp = c3ia , and the buyer also offers AA with either contract
type as follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
If min(ABa(ca), ASp) = ABa(ca): It follows that d = d3ii = pic0−piBa0p = µ− (µαL)
2
2β −
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E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca). Again, d3ii > 0 for caL ≤ ca < c3iia and the buyer optimally offers
no instruments; for ca ≤ c3iia ≤ p, d3ii ≤ 0 and the buyer optimally offers both AA and
PC as follows from Proposition 3.4.
Case 4: max(ABa(ca), ASp) < A ≤ ABp: In this range, d = d4 = pic0 − pib0p = µ + A −
αH∫
αL
(µα˜)2
2β f(α˜)dα˜− E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca), and the buyer offers both instruments only if
A ≤ AB2(ca) = ABp − µ+ E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca) ≤ ABp .
It is straightforward to prove that AB2(ca) is increasing in ca and AB2(c3ia ) = ABa(c3ia )
and AB2(c3iia ) = ASp .
Case 5: ABp < A: In this range of A, d = d5 and it is straightforward to show that
d5 > 0 and the buyer optimally offers no instruments.
Combining the above five cases yields the results in Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.6: We demonstrate the proof for the ST contract, the proof
for the LT contract follows similar logic and is thus, omitted. Similar to the proof
of Proposition 3.2, we derive the buyer’s optimal decision of whether to offer AA by
comparing her expected profits with and without the offer.
Recall that when the buyer does not offer her own AA, an assessment is now always
conducted with the third-party assistance. It follows that the buyer’s expected profit
in this case is the same as that derived in Section 3.3.1 when the supplier self-funds the
assessment, i.e., pi∗0b in (3.9) when A ≤ AS(ca), which is given by
2p−
 α
∗
s∫
αL
2caf(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
α∗s
[
µ− (µα
∗
s)2
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜
 .
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On the other hand, her profit when offering AA is
pi03 = 2p− µ+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜− ψ∗0b3 −A
= 2p− µ+
αH∫
αL
[
(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜−
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2 − α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜−A,
as follows from ψ∗0b3 = A
S(ca) =
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(α˜2−α∗s2)
8β f(α˜)dα˜. The buyer thus offers AA iff
pi03 ≥ pi0b3 , or equivalently,
A ≤ ABa3p (ca) =
α∗s∫
αL
[
2ca − µ− E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)
+ (µα˜)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜.
Proof of Proposition 3.7: Under Assumption 3.1, ABa3p (ca) = A
Bp
3p (ca) = 0 and the
buyer never offers her own AA. We then compare her profits with and without offering
PC to derive her optimal strategy. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3.6 that the
buyer’s profit without both PC and AA is given by
pi0b3 = 2p−
α∗s∫
αL
2caf(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
α∗s
[
µ− (µα
∗
s)2
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜
= 2p− µ−
αH∫
αL
[
E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα
2
4β
)
, ca
)
− (µαL)
2
8β
]
f(α˜)dα˜.
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Following similar intuition, the buyer’s profit when offering only PC is
pi0bp3 = 2p−

α∗p∫
αL
2caf(α˜)dα˜+
αH∫
α∗p
[
2µ− (µα
∗
s)2
2β
]
f(α˜)dα˜

= 2p− 2µ+
αH∫
αL
[
2µ− (µαL)
2
2β
]
f(α˜)dα˜.
Note that
pi0b3 − pi0bp3 = µ−
αH∫
αL
[
3(µαL)2
8β + E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜ = d1,
and so the buyer offers PC iff d1 ≤ 0, or equivalently iff ca ≥ c1a, as follows from the
proof of Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.8: The proof follows directly from Propositions 3.5-3.6 and
is thus omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.9: We divide this proof into two parts, starting with results
regarding σ and then continuing with those regarding ρ.
Results regarding σ:
We start with the proof for AB∗(ca). Since the expression of AB
∗(ca) depends on
the ordering between ca and c3a, we consider the following two cases
Case 1: ca < c3a. After some algebra, we have
AB
∗(ca) =
µ2
[
α2H + αHαL + α2L
]
24β −
c0∫
0
[ca − E2[c˜2|c1]] f(c1)dc1 +
αH∫
αL
1
αH − αL
ce1(α˜)∫
0
[
ca − E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα˜
2
4β
)]
f(c1)dc1dα,
where
ce1(α) = 4βca
ρ [4β − µα2] −
µ(1− ρ)
ρ
, (A.2)
c0 = ca − µ(1− ρ)
ρ
. (A.3)
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Taking the derivative of AB∗(ca) with respect to σ yields
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂σ
=
αH∫
αL
1
αH − αL
ce1(α˜)∫
0
(
ca − E2[c˜2|c1]
[
1− µα˜
2
4β
])[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1dα˜.
Define H(α) =
ce1(α)∫
0
(
ca − E2[c˜2|c1]
[
1− µα24β
]) [(
c1−µ
σ
)2 − 1] f(c1)dc1, the deriva-
tive ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂σ can then be expressed as
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂σ
= − 1
σ
 αH∫
αL
1
αH − αL [H(0)−H(α˜)] dα˜
 .
In order to prove the negativity of ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂σ , it suffices to prove (1) H(0) ≥ 0 and (2)
H(α) is decreasing in α (i.e., ∂H(α)∂α ≤ 0).
Proof of (1) H(0) ≥ 0: Let cˇ = µ − σ and cˆ = µ + σ. For c1 ≤ cˇ or c1 ≥ cˆ,(
c1−µ
σ
)2 − 1 ≥ 0; and ( c1−µσ )2 − 1 < 0, otherwise. From its definition in (A.3),
we have c0 ≥ µ. In addition ca − E2[c˜2|c1] < 0 if c1 > c0 and ca − E2[c˜2|c1] ≥ 0,
otherwise. Thus, if c0 ≥ cˆ, we have the following
H(0) ≥
∞∫
0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1])
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1
= σ
∂
[
∞∫
0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1]) f(c1)dc1
]
∂σ
= σ∂ [ca − µ]
∂σ
= 0.
We now consider the case when c0 < cˆ. In this case,
∞∫
c0
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1 =
cˆ∫
c0
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1 +
∞∫
cˆ
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1
Note that for c0 ≤ c1 < cˆ, ca − E2[c˜2|c1] ≥ ca − E2[c˜2|cˆ] and
[(
c1−µ
σ
)2 − 1] ≤ 0.
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Furthermore, for c1 ≥ cˆ, ca−E2[c˜2|c1] ≤ ca−E2[c˜2|cˆ] ≤ 0 and
[(
c1−µ
σ
)2 − 1] ≥ 0.
It follows that
∞∫
c0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1])
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1
≤ ca − E2[c˜2|cˆ]2
∞∫
0
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1 = 0.
Thus, when c0 < cˆ
H(0) ≥
∞∫
0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1])
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1
= σ
∂
[
∞∫
0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1]) f(c1)dc1
]
∂σ
= σ∂ [ca − µ]
∂σ
= 0.
Therefore, H(0) ≥ 0, regardless of the ordering between c1 and cˆ.
Proof of (2) ∂H(α)∂α ≤ 0: . We have
∂H(α)
∂α
= µα2β
ce1(α)∫
0
E2[c˜2|c1]
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1.
Using a similar approach as we did above, it can be proven that ∂H(α)∂α ≤ 0.
It follows from (1) and (2) that ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂σ ≤ 0 for ca < cBa .
Case 2: ca ≥ c3a. After some algebra, we can show that
AB
∗(ca) =
µ2
[
α2H + αHαL + α2L
]
6β + ca − µ−
c0∫
0
[ca − E2[c˜2|c1]] f(c1)dc1.
Hence,
∂AB(ca)
∂σ
= − 1
σ
c0∫
0
(ca − E2[c˜2|c1])
[(
c1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c1)dc1 = − 1
σ
H(0) ≤ 0.
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Combining the two cases suggests that ∂A
B(ca)
∂σ ≤ 0, ∀ca. Applying the Implicit Function
Theorem and the above approach also allows us to prove that cBa increases in σ, and so
we skip the details.
Results regarding ρ:
Similar to the proof for results regarding σ, we demonstrate only the proof for
AB(ca) and that for cBa follows similar logic. We consider two regions of ca that affect
the characterization of AB∗(ca).
Case 1: ca < c3a. We have
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂ρ
= 1
αH − αL
αH∫
αL
 c
e1(α˜)∫
c0
(µ− c1) f(c1)dc1 − µα
2
4β
ce1(α˜)∫
0
(µ− c1) f(c1)dc1
 dα˜.
as follows from ce1(α) ≥ c0 ∀α, where ce1(α) and c0 are respectively given in (A.2)
and (A.3). Since c1 ≥ µ for c0 ≤ c1, we have
ce1(α˜)∫
c0
(µ− c1) f(c1)dc1 < 0, implying
that
ce1(α˜)∫
0
(µ− c1) f(c1)dc1dα˜ =
∞∫
ce1(α˜)
(c1 − µ) f(c1)dc1dα˜ ≥ 0.
It follows that ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂ρ ≤ 0.
Case 2: ca ≥ c3a. We have
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂ρ
= −
c0∫
0
(µ− c1) f(c1)dc1 ≤ 0.
Combining the two cases yields ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂ρ ≤ 0, ∀ca.
Proof of Proposition 3.10: We consider the following two cases.
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Case 1: ca < c3a. We have
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂µ
= µ[α
2
H + αHαL + α2L]
12β −
c0∫
0
[
−(1− ρ) + (ca − E2[c˜2|c1])c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1 +
1
αH − αL
αH∫
αL
ce1(α)∫
0
[
−(1− ρ)
(
1− µα
2
4β
)
+ α
2
4βE2[c˜2|c1]+(
ca − E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα
2
4β
))
c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1dα.
Define J(ca) as
J(ca) =
c0∫
0
[
−(1− ρ) + (ca − E2[c˜2|c1])c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1 −
1
αH − αL
αH∫
αL
ce1(α)∫
0
[
−(1− ρ)
(
1− µα
2
4β
)
+ α
2
4βE2[c˜2|c1]+(
ca − E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− µα
2
4β
))
c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1dα.
Taking the derivative of J(ca) with respect to ca yields
∂J(ca)
∂ca
= 1
αH − αL
 αH∫
αL
[
−1− ρ
ρ
[
f(c0)− f(ce1(α))
]
−
α2
4β [µ(1− ρ) + ρce1(α)]
ρ
[
1− µα24β
] f(ce1(α))− c
e1(α)∫
c0
c1 − µ
σ2
f(c1)dc1
 dα
 .
Since µ ≤ c0 ≤ ce1(α), we have f(c0) ≥ f(ce1(α)) as follows from the Normal distri-
bution of c˜1. Thus, the above derivative is negative, implying that J(ca) decreases
in ca. We now return to the derivative ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂µ , which can be rewritten as
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂µ
= µ[α
2
H + αHαL + α2L]
12β − J(ca).
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Since J(ca) is decreasing in ca, there exists a cˆBaa ∈ [caL , p] such that ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂µ < 0 for
ca < cˆ
Ba
a and
∂AB
∗ (ca)
∂µ ≥ 0, otherwise. It is easy to show that cˆBaa is either from the
set [caL , p] or the unique interior solution of
∂AB
∗ (ca)
∂µ = 0. Combining this result with
the definition of the case confirms that AB∗(ca) decreases in µ for ca < min(cBa , cˆBaa )
and increases, otherwise.
Case 2: ca ≥ c3a. We have
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂µ
= µ[α
2
H + αHαL + α2L]
3β − 1−
c0∫
0
[
−(1− ρ) + (ca − E2[c˜2|c1])c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1.
Define
G(ca) =
c0∫
0
[
−(1− ρ) + (ca − E2[c˜2|c1])c1 − µ
σ2
]
f(c1)dc1.
We can prove that G(ca) decreases in ca, and thus, there exists a cˆBpa such that
∂AB
∗ (ca)
∂µ < 0 if ca < cˆ
Bp
a and ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂µ ≥ 0, otherwise. It follows that cˆ
Bp
a is either
from the set [caL , p] or the unique interior solution of
G(cˆBpa ) =
µ[α2H + αHαL + α2L]
3β − 1,
which is the same as the solution to ∂A
B∗ (ca)
∂µ = 0. Combining this result with the
definition of the case confirms that AB∗(ca) decreases in µ for cBa ≤ ca < max(cBa , cˆBpa )
and increases, otherwise.
Combining the two cases yields the result that AB∗(ca) decreases in µ for ca <
min(c3a, cˆBaa ) and for c3a ≤ ca < max(cBa , cˆBpa ) but increases, otherwise.
Proof of Proposition A.1:
We consider the following two cases:
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Case 1: ca < c3a. We have
∂AB
∗(ca)
∂δ
= ∂A
Ba
δ (ca)
∂δ
= 2(1 + δ)µ
2 [α2H + αHαL + α2L]
24β +
1
αH − αL
αH∫
αL
∞∫
ce1(α˜)
E2[c˜2|c1]2δµα˜
2
4β f(c1)dc1dα˜ ≥ 0
where ABaδ (ca) is given in (A.6).
Case 2: ca ≥ c3a. Following the same approach as in Appendix A.2.2, it can be
proven that in this range of ca,
AB(ca) =
αH∫
αL
µ2α˜2
2β f(α˜)dα˜+ µ− E1 min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca)
and does not depend on δ.
Combining the two cases yields the result that AB∗(ca) increases in δ for ca < c3a but
does not change for ca ≥ c3a.
A.2 Evaluations of Alternate Settings
A.2.1 Correlated Energy Markets
In this section, we discuss how our model would change when the cost of the alternate
supplier c˜at is stochastic and possibly correlated with the supplier’s energy cost c˜t in
each period t. This is reflective of settings where the focal and alternate suppliers both
operate in volatile energy markets with prices aligning with international trends. To
capture this, we assume that the energy costs for both suppliers have two stochastic
components in each period : (1) a common component representing economic factors
that influence both energy markets (e.g. global oil price), denoted by o˜t, and (2) a private
component representing the idiosyncrasies of each market (e.g. demand patterns, impact
of environmental regulatory controls and the level of market deregulation), denoted by
c˜t for the supplier, and c˜at for the competing source. We also assume o˜t, c˜t and c˜at are
mutually independent. Similar to the supplier’s cost model, we assume c˜at follows a
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Normal distribution with mean µa and standard deviation σa, where µa  σa such that
the probability of a negative energy cost is negligible. We further assume c˜a1 and c˜a2
are correlated and the cross-period correlation is captured through a bivariate Normal
distribution with positive correlation coefficient ρa > 0. The distribution of o˜t (t = 1, 2)
is modelled in a similar fashion with mean µo, standard deviation σo and cross-period
correlation coefficient ρo. Although these changes obviously lead to minor modifications
in the characterization of our results (i.e., the results demonstrated in Figures 3.3 and
3.4 are now characterized in the space (µa, A) instead of (ca, A)), it can be proven that
the structural nature remains intact.
A.2.2 When The Buyer Does Not Update EE Information in Period 2
In this section, we discuss how our results would directionally change if the buyer is not
able to observe α as well as the supplier’s investment I in period 2 without offering AA.
This change only affects the analysis of the short-term contract since the buyer does
not make any further decision in period 2 under the long-term contract.
For illustrative purpose, we focus on the baseline scenario. Similar to our main anal-
ysis, we formulate the firms’ problems starting in period 2 with the supplier’s decision
to accept or reject the buyer’s offered price, w2. For an observed energy cost c1, the sup-
plier’s profit as a function of w2 is ψ2(w2|c1) = w2−E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I(α))−βI. Recall
that the supplier’s reservation profit is−βI(α) in period 2 after committing to the invest-
ment level I(α) in period 1. Therefore he will accept w2 if w2 ≥ E2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I(α)).
The buyer’s profit in period 2 is then given by
pi2(w2, α) =
p− w2, if w2 ≥ E2[c˜2|c1](1− α
√
I(α))
p− ca, otherwise.
Unlike in our main analysis in Section 3.3.1 where the buyer sets w∗2 = min(E2[c˜2|c1](1−
α
√
(α)), ca) and squeezes all the EE benefits, the buyer now chooses w∗2 that maximizes
pi∗2 = maxw2 Eα˜′ [pi2(w2|α˜
′)]. If the supplier accepts w1, the buyer is able to gain some
insights into the distribution of α even though its exact value remains the supplier’s
private knowledge. This is because the buyer knows the supplier will accept w1 only
when α is sufficiently high. And so we use α˜′ to denote this “new” random variable with
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the updated distribution. Since the buyer no longer squeezes out all the EE benefits,
the supplier receives some information rent in period 2, implying that his profit ψ2(w∗2)
is now higher than the payable loan installment −βI the buyer leaves him in the main
analysis. It follows that if accepting the offered price w1 in period 1, the supplier chooses
I to maximize ψ∗1 = max0≤I≤Im
w1 − µ(1− α
√
I(α))− βI + ψ2(w∗2).
Similar to the formulation of the game in our main analysis, the supplier accepts w1
if ψ∗1 ≥ 0 and the buyer chooses w1 to solve pi∗1 = maxw1 E0[pi1(w1|α˜)], where
pi1(w1, α) =
p− w1 + pi
∗
2, if w1 ≥ µ(1− α
√
I(α)) + βI − ψ2(w∗2)
2(p− ca), otherwise.
In this case, it is difficult to characterize the firms’ optimal strategies in equilibrium
due to the information asymmetry in both periods. Note that the supplier’s investment
decision I(α) depends on his expected profit ψ2(w∗2) in period 2 which varies accordingly
to the buyer’s offer price w∗2. However, the supplier’s response function I(α) is necessary
(but not known to the buyer) to characterize w∗2. This interdependence, entangled with
the information asymmetry in period 2, makes it even difficult to numerically evaluate
the firms’ strategies in equilibrium. This issue did not exist in our main analysis since the
buyer always leaves the supplier his reservation profit ψ2(w∗2) = −βI in period 2 and so
she anticipates that the supplier’s investment function is always I(α) = Ie1(α) =
[
µα
4β
]2
.
While we cannot characterize the firms’ optimal strategies directly, we expect that
our important insight on the potential detrimental impact of third-party AA would
remain. Recall that the key driver of this insight is that third-party AA increases
the supplier’s required compensation for accepting the buyer’s AA. This consequently
reduces the buyer’s incentive to offer her own instruments. In this new setting where
the buyer does not find out the exact value of α in period 2, adding third-party AA still
has the same impact of increasing the supplier’s expected profit (since he can always
perform an assessment for free). And so we conjecture that adding third-party AA may
still lead to the supplier’s lower EE investment.
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A.2.3 Impact of Supplier’s Outside Option
In this section, we investigate how our results would directionally change when the
supplier has access to other customers who are willing to purchase his product in the
event that the buyer switches to the alternate supplier. In particular, we assume that
the supplier has access to substitute demand sources of collective quantity δ per period,
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, reflecting the fact that the product is mature with stable demand
and it is not easy for the supplier to fill the same level of demand if rejecting the offer
from the large focal buyer. With fixed capacity, the supplier can only serve the buyer
(demand=1) at her offered price(s) or the substitute demand δ at a unit price pδt in each
period t. To highlight the potential competitive advantage of EE investments for the
supplier, we assume pδt = E2[c˜t], representative of settings where the substitute buyers
are unaware of the supplier’s EE opportunities or from a local competitive market.
The addition of δ implies that the supplier’s reservation profit across the planning
horizon now becomes
r0 =
(Eα [r1(α)]−A)
+ , without third-party support
Eα [r1(α)] , with third-party support
(A.4)
where r1(α) = (δµα)
2
2β captures the supplier’s potential EE cost savings when fulfilling
his substitute demand (with an EE investment of
[
δµα
2β
]2
) in both periods. We show
that our structural results (i.e., the partitioning of the (ca, A) space that characterizes
the buyer’s optimal strategies in Propositions 3.5 and 3.7) remain robust with these
modifications although the boundary characterizations change. For illustrative purpose,
here we demonstrate the re-analysis in the baseline scenario to derive the supplier’s self-
assessment threshold. Similar to Section 3.3.1, we first explore what happen when the
supplier performs an assessment by backward induction, starting in period 2 with the
supplier’s decision to accept or reject the buyer’s offered price w2. For an observed
energy cost c1, the supplier’s profit as a function of w2 is
ψ2(w2|c1) = w2 − E2[c˜2|c1](1− α
√
I)− βI.
While the supplier’s expected reservation profit in period 2 is −βI in the main model,
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it becomes δE2[c˜2|c1](1 − α
√
I) − βI where δE2[c˜2|c1](1 − α
√
I) captures the expected
profit from rejecting w2 to serve the alternate demand δ. Applying this change implies
that the buyer’s optimal price is now w∗2δ(c1, α) = min(E2[c˜2|c1](1 − (1 − δ)α
√
I), ca).
This leaves the supplier with his reservation profit δE2[c˜2|c1](1−α
√
I)− βI in period 2
and changes his optimization problem after accepting w1 as follows.
ψ∗1δ(w1, α) = maxI w1 − (1 + δ)µ(1− α
√
I)− 2βI.
Subsequently, the supplier’s optimal EE investment is now Ie1δ (α) =
[
µ(1+δ)2α
4β
]2
and his
expected profit if accepting the buyer’s offered price w1 in period 1 is given by
ψ∗1δ(w1, α) = w1 − µ+
(µ(1 + δ)α)2
8β .
Note that here the supplier accepts w1 only if ψ∗1δ(w1, α) ≥
(δµα)2
2β =
(2δµα)2
8β , which
captures his expected profit when rejecting the buyer’s offered w1 and serving the outside
demand option in both periods. Subsequently, this leads to the supplier’s self-assessment
threshold becoming
ASδ (ca) =
αH∫
α∗s
µ2(1 + δ)2(α˜2 − α∗sδ2)
8β +
(2δµα∗s)2
8β f(α˜)dα˜+
α∗s∫
αL
(δµα)2
2β f(α˜)dα˜. (A.5)
where α∗sδ is the optimal EE effectiveness threshold chosen by the buyer in a similar
fashion as α∗s characterized in Lemma 3.1. Note that the first integral in (A.5) is higher
than
αH∫
α∗s
(2δµα)2
8β f(α˜)dα˜ as follows from the supplier’s participation constraint. It follows
that ASδ (ca) has the same structure as its counterpart AS(ca) in the main model which
consists of the supplier’s reservation profit ( (δµα)
2
2β in this case), plus the information
rent provided by the buyer.
Subsequently, it is easy to prove that the buyer’s assessment threshold under no PC
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is given by
ABaδ (ca) =
αH∫
αL
[
(1 + δ)2(µα˜)2
8β − E1 min
(
E2[c˜2|c1]
(
1− (1− δ
2)µα˜2
4β
)
, ca
)]
f(α˜)dα˜+
E1 [min (E2[c˜2|c1], ca)] ,
where ABaδ (ca) > ASδ (ca).
Applying a similar approach to the analyses for other scenarios shows that the
resulting solution structure is similar to that shown in the main paper. Proposition A.1
then highlights the impact of increasing δ on the buyer assessment threshold in the
absence of third-party assistance (i.e. AB∗(ca) in Figure 3.3).
Proposition A.1 The buyer’s assessment threshold AB∗(ca) increases in the supplier’s
substitute demand δ when ca < c3a and does not depend on δ when ca ≥ c3a.
A higher δ provides the supplier more business security in period 2 under a short-term
contract. This increases his EE investment level, leading to higher cost savings and
making AA more attractive to the buyer. This effect is not active under PC since the
supplier never uses the substitute demand in period 2. It follows that the buyer’s AA
A is increasing in δ but only when she uses a short-term contract, i.e., when ca < c3a.
It is difficult to analytically derive the impact of increasing δ on the buyer’s com-
mitment threshold cBa (A) and so we resort to numerical analysis for insights. Using
the same numerical instances as in Section 3.6, we observed that for a given A, cBa (A)
increases as δ increases. This suggests that the buyer is less inclined to offer PC to a
more independent supplier who can benefit from his EE investments outside the business
relationship with the buyer.
These results shed new light on the traditional hold-up problem which typically
arises in the context of capacity investments when a buyer has more negotiation power
and uses that power to extract value from its supplier’s investment (?). In a capacity
investment problem, the supplier invests in capacity needs specific to a buyer and so does
not benefit from this investment in terms of substitute demand. This, together with the
fact that the buyer extracts value from the investment, dampens the supplier’s incentive
to invest, leading to an investment level lower than the channel’s optimum. We find
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that in the context of EE investments, the supplier’s potential independence reduces
the severity of the hold-up problem even when there are no external instruments (i.e.,
the EE gap is decreased from
[
µα
2β
]2
to (1− δ2)
[
µα
2β
]2
). Assessment assistance offered by
either the buyer or a third-party organization helps reduce the EE gap further but PC is
still needed to completely eliminate the hold-up problem, consistent with findings in the
hold-up problem literature. We also find that the supplier’s independence interestingly
increases the buyer’s incentive to offer AA but also deters the buyer from extending PC.
Furthermore, the addition of third-party assistance can actually aggravate the hold-up
problem since it deters the buyer from offering her own instruments.
We close this section with a discussion on the relaxation of some of our assumptions.
First, we assume that the supplier serves the outside demand option at a price equal to
the expected energy cost, i.e., pδt = E2[c˜t]. This assumption implies that the supplier
is able to earn the entire cost savings from EE improvements (if any) when serving the
outside substitute demand. Of course, there may be other settings where the supplier has
to share a portion of the EE cost savings with their outside buyers. This would obviously
reduce the impact of the supplier’s independence from the focal buyer. Nevertheless, we
expect that the qualitative nature of our above results would still hold in such settings.
This is because their key driver is the fact that the supplier is able to benefit from
EE investments even without the focal buyer’s business, which remains true in these
settings.
Second, to maintain our focus on the impact of the (focal) buyer-offered instruments
and how they interact with the third-party assessment assistance, we assume that the
size of the supplier’s outside demand option is independent from his EE investment.
There are also other ways that EE investments could increase the supplier’s competi-
tiveness. For example, the supplier’s EE investments could change (i.e., increase) his
outside demand volume. Capturing this would require many other careful considera-
tions beyond the current model, e.g. the power dynamics between the supplier and
the other (outside) buyer, the other buyer’s level of awareness/information about the
supplier’s EE opportunities and its intention (or the lack thereof) to assist the supplier’s
EE investments. The complexity and richness of this setting makes it a challenging, yet
interesting and potentially fruitful, direction for future research.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 4
The proofs of Lemmas 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 4.5 are straightforward and thus, omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Expanding the expression of U∗L(τ), the social welfare
WL(τ) given in (4.3) can be rewritten as
WL(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + (µ+ )(µ+ τ)α
2
2β −
(µ+ τ)2α2
4β
]
.
The first order derivative is given by
∂WL(τ)
∂τ
= α
2(− τ)
β
.
It follows that the optimal carbon price level is τ∗ =  and the remaining results follow.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: In this proof, we first establish that both pi∗1L(τ) and
pi∗1S (τ) decrease in τ with the former having a faster decreasing rate. Recall from (4.6)
that
pi∗1L(τ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+ τ)
2α2
4β
]
,
and so its first order derivative is given by
∂pi∗1L(τ)
∂τ
= 2
[
−1 + (µ+ τ)α
2
2β
]
< 0,
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for τ ∈ [0, ] as follows from our assumptions that Im ≥ (µ+)
2α2
4β2 and α
√
Im < 1. Note
that it is straightforward to show that pi∗1L(0) > pi
∗
1A(0) = 2(p − ca) as follows from
our assumption that ca ≥ µ, there exists a unique positive τaL such that pi∗1L(τaL) =
pi∗1A(τ
aL) = 2(p − ca). We then define τ la = min(τaL , ) and it follows that pi∗1L(τ) ≥
pi∗1A(τ) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ la and pi∗1L(τ) < pi∗1A(τ) for τ la < τ ≤ .
Turning now to pi∗1S (τ), which is given in (4.8) as
pi∗1S (τ) = 2p− (µ+ τ) +
(µ+ τ)2α2
8β − Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)
, ca
)
.
The first order derivative is given by
∂pi∗1S (τ)
∂τ
= −1 + (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)α2
4β
]
f(c1)dc1,
It is straightforward to prove that
c¯1(τ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ) f(c1)dc1 <
c¯1(τ)∫
0
(µ+ τ) f(c1)dc1,
and so it follows that
∂pi∗1S (τ)
∂τ
≤ −1 + (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
2β
]
f(c1)dc1 < 0,
as follows from the similar logic for
∂pi∗1L (τ)
∂τ . Similar to before, since pi∗1S (τ) decreases
in τ and it is straightforward to show that pi∗1S (0) > pi
∗
1A(0) = 2(p− ca) as follows from
our assumption that ca ≥ µ, there exists a unique positive τaS such that pi∗1S (τaS ) =
pi∗1A(τ
aS ). We then define τ sa = min(τaS , ) and it follows that pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) for
0 ≤ τ ≤ τ sa and pi∗1S (τ) < pi∗1A(τ) for τ sa < τ ≤ .
We now prove
∂pi∗1L (τ)
∂τ −
∂pi∗1S (τ)
∂τ < 0, which implies that pi∗1L(τ) decreases faster than
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pi∗1S (τ). From their above expressions,
∂pi∗1L(τ)
∂τ
− ∂pi
∗
1S (τ)
∂τ
= −1 + 3(µ+ τ)α
2
4β +
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)α2
4β
]
f(c1)dc1.
Let
G(α) = 3(µ+ τ)α
2
4β +
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)α2
4β
]
f(c1)dc1,
we next prove G(α) increases in α. We have
∂G(α)
∂α
= 3(µ+ τ)α2β −
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[(µ+ τ)α
2β +
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)α
2β
]
f(c1)dc1 +
∂c¯1(τ)
∂α
[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c¯1(τ)] + τ)α2
4β
]
f(c¯1(τ)).
It is straightforward that ∂c¯1(τ)∂α > 0. Furthermore, note that E[c˜2|c¯1(τ)] ≤ 2µ and so[
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β −
(E[c˜2|c¯1(τ)] + τ)α2
4β
]
≥ 1− (3µ+ 2τ)α
2
4β ≥ 0,
as follows from τ ≤  and Assumption 4.1 that α ≤
√
2β
2µ+ . Furthermore, it is easy
to show that 3(µ+τ)α2β −
c¯1(τ)∫
0
[
(µ+τ)α
2β +
(E[c˜2|c1]+τ)α
2β
]
f(c1)dc1 > 0, and so ∂G(α)∂α > 0,
implying that G(α) increases in α. It follows that
∂pi∗1L(τ)
∂τ
− ∂pi
∗
1S (τ)
∂τ
= −1 +G(α) < 0,
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when Assumption 4.1 is met. We define
τ ls =

0, if pi∗1L(0) ≤ pi∗1S (0)
, if pi∗1L() ≥ pi∗1S ()
τ l, otherwise,
where τ l captures the unique positive solution to pi∗1L(τ) = pi
∗
1S (τ). It follows that
pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ls and pi∗1L(τ) < pi∗1S (τ) for τ ls < τ ≤ .
We now compare the three thresholds τ sa, τ la and τ ls to characterize the buyer’s
optimal sourcing decision. We consider the following cases.
1. τ sa ≤ τ ls : In this case, we first prove that τ sa ≤ τ la ≤ τ ls by contradiction.
Assume first that τ la < τ sa and so for τ la < τ ≤ τ sa, we have the following
relationships i) pi∗1L(τ) < pi
∗
1A(τ) as follows from the definition of τ
la, ii) pi∗1A(τ) ≤
pi∗1S (τ) from the definition of τ
sa. These two points imply that pi∗1L(τ) < pi
∗
1S (τ)
for τ la < τ ≤ τ sa(≤ τ ls), which contradicts with the definition of τ ls where τ ≤ τ ls
implies that pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ). It follows that τ la < τ sa cannot hold. Following
similar approach, it can be proven that τ la > τ ls cannot hold, either. And so, we
have τ sa ≤ τ la ≤ τ ls. It follows that there are the following four ranges of τ :
(a) For 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ sa(≤ τ ls), pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) and the buyer optimally
uses a long-term contract in this range of τ .
(b) For τ sa < τ ≤ τ la, pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) and the buyer optimally uses a
long-term contract in this range of τ .
(c) For τ la < τ ≤ τ ls, pi∗1A(τ) ≥ pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) and the buyer optimally sources
entirely from the alternate supplier in this range of τ .
(d) For (τ sa ≤)τ ls < τ , pi∗1A(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1L(τ) and the buyer optimally
sources entirely from the alternate supplier in this range of τ .
In summary, in this case, the buyer uses a long-term contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ la and
sources entirely from the alternate supplier, otherwise.
2. τ ls < τ sa : Similar to the above case, we can also prove that in this case τ ls ≤
τ la ≤ τ sa, and we consider the following four ranges of τ :
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(a) For 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ls(≤ τ sa), pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) and the buyer optimally
uses a long-term contract in this range of τ .
(b) For τ ls < τ ≤ τ la, pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1L(τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) and the buyer optimally uses a
short-term contract in this range of τ .
(c) For τ la < τ ≤ τ sa, pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1A(τ) ≥ pi∗1L(τ) and the buyer optimally uses a
short-term contract in this range of τ .
(d) For (τ ls ≤)τ sa < τ , pi∗1A(τ) ≥ pi∗1S (τ) ≥ pi∗1L(τ) and the buyer optimally
sources entirely from the alternate supplier in this range of τ .
In summary, in this case, the buyer uses a long-term contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ls, uses
a short-term contract for τ ls < τ ≤ τ sa and sources entirely from the alternate
supplier, otherwise.
Combining the two above cases yields the results regarding the buyer’s sourcing decision
in Proposition 4.2.
We now prove that all the three thresholds τ sa, τ la and τ ls increase in ca and our
proof for the Proposition is complete. We focus on the proof for τ la as the other two
proofs follow a similar logic. Recall that τ la = min(τaL , ) where τaL captures the unique
positive solution to pi∗1L(τ
aL) = pi∗1A(τ
aL) = 2(p−ca). Let ∆pila(τ, ca) = pi∗1L(τ)−2p+2ca,
and it follows that ∆pila(τaL , ca) = 0. Applying Implicit Function Theorem, we have
∂τaL
∂ca
= −∂∆pila(τ, ca)/∂ca
∂∆pila(τ, ca)/∂τ
.
It is straightforward that ∂∆pila(τ,ca)∂ca > 0 while
∂∆pila(τ,ca)
∂τ =
∂pi∗1L (τ)
∂τ < 0 and
∂τaL
∂ca
> 0,
i.e., τaL , and thus τ la = min(τaL , ), increase in ca.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: The proposition follows immediately from Lemma 4.3
and thus the proof is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: We demonstrate the proof for the first resultWL(τ1) ≥WS(τ1).
The proof for the second result WS(τ2) ≥ WA(τ2) follows a similar logic and thus
omitted.
First recall that τ1 is the threshold such that the buyer prefers the long- over the
short-term contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1 and prefers the short-term contract, otherwise. It
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follows from its definition that pi∗1L(τ
1) ≥ pi∗1S (τ1). Applying this relationship and after
some algebra, we achieve
WL(τ1)−WS(τ1) ≥ (1− F (c¯1(τ1)))(s+ e) + (τ1 − )
[
UL(τ1)− US(τ1)
]
.
It is straightforward to show that 0 < UL(τ1) − US(τ1) < 1 − F (c¯1(τ1)) and thus it
follows that
WL(τ1)−WS(τ1) ≥ (1− F (c¯1(τ1)))(s+ e) + (τ1 − )
[
UL(τ1)− US(τ1)
]
≥ (1− F (c¯1(τ1)))(s+ e − ) + τ1
[
UL(τ1)− US(τ1)
]
≥ 0.
The proof is then completed.
Proof of Proposition 4.4: Recall that social welfare W (τ) is given as
W (τ) =

WL(τ), if 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1
WS(τ), if τ1 < τ ≤ τ2
WA(τ), otherwise,
,
Since WS(τ2) > WA(τ2) = 2(p− ca) and WA(τ) does not depend on τ , we only need to
consider [0, τ1] in choosing the optimal τ∗e . We now consider the following two cases.
1. If  ≤ τ1: In this case, the buyer always offers a long-term contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 
and the optimal carbon price level is τ∗e =  as follows from Proposition 4.1.
2. If  > τ1: In this case, the buyer offers a long-term contract for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1 and
social welfare W (τ) = WL(τ) increases in τ in this range. We now examine social
welfareW (τ) = WS(τ) when the buyer offers a short-term contract for τ1 < τ ≤ .
After some algebra,
∂WS(τ)
∂τ
= (− τ)α
2
4β +
c¯1(τ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + )α2
4β f(c1)dc1 +
∂c¯1(τ)
∂τ
[
s+ (τ − )
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4β
)]
. (B.1)
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From the above expression, it is difficult to analytically establish the behavior of
WS(τ) with respect to τ . However, the following insights can be inferred. We first
define τ s = arg maxWS(τ) for τ ∈ (τ1,min(τ2, )). Since W (τ) = WL(τ) increases
in τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1, the social welfare maximizing carbon price level τ∗e is then
given by
τ∗e =
τ
1, if WL(τ1) ≥WS(τ s)
τ s, otherwise.
Combining the two cases yield
τ∗e =

, if  ≤ τ1
τ1, if  > τ1 and WL(τ1) ≥WS(τ s)
τ s, otherwise.
Proof of Corollary 4.1: To prove the corollary, it suffices to prove that as s → ∞,
∂WS(τ)
∂τ < 0 and so social welfare increases increases in τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ min(τ1, ) and
decreases for min(τ1, ) < τ ≤ . Recall that ∂WS(τ)∂τ is given in (B.1), we now examine
∂c¯1(τ)
∂τ . After some algebra,
∂c¯1(τ)
∂τ
= 1
ρ
 caα24β
1− (µ+τ)α24β
− 1
 .
It follows from our assumption ca ≤ 2µ that
caα
2
4β +
(µ+ τ)α2
4β ≤
(3µ+ τ)α2
4β ≤
(3µ+ )α2
4β <
(2µ+ )α2
2β ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 4.1. It follows that ∂c¯1(τ)∂τ < 0 and
∂WS(τ)
∂τ < 0 as s→∞.
Proof of Proposition 4.5: Recall that the buyer’s profits under each sourcing options
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are given by
pis
∗
1L(τ, γ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τ) + (µ+ τ)
2α2
4(1− γ)β
]
,
pis
∗
1S (τ, γ) = 2p− (µ+ τ) +
(µ+ τ)2α2
8(1− γ)β − Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ)
(
1− (µ+ τ)α
2
4(1− γ)β
)
, ca
)
,
pis
∗
1A(τ, γ) = 2(p− ca).
Note that pis∗1A(τ, γ) does not depend on γ. We first prove that both pi
s∗
1L(τ, γ) and
pis
∗
1S (τ, γ) decrease in γ with the former having a faster rate.
We have
∂pis
∗
1L(τ, γ)
∂γ
= (µ+ τ)
2α2
2(1− γ)2β > 0,
∂pis
∗
1S (τ, γ)
∂γ
= (µ+ τ)
2α2
8(1− γ)2β +
c¯s1(τ,γ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ) (µ+ τ)α2
4(1− γ)2β f(c1)dc1 > 0,
where
c¯s1(τ, γ) =
4(1− γ)βca
ρ [4(1− γ)β − (µ+ τ)α2] −
µ(1− ρ) + τ
ρ
It follows that
∂pis
∗
1L(τ, γ)
∂γ
− ∂pi
s∗
1S (τ, γ)
∂γ
= 3(µ+ τ)
2α2
8(1− γ)2β −
c¯s1(τ,γ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + τ) (µ+ τ)α2
4(1− γ)2β f(c1)dc1
= (µ+ τ)α
2
8(1− γ)2β
 ∞∫
0
3 (E[c˜2|c1] + τ) f(c1)dc1−
c¯s1(τ,γ)∫
0
2 (E[c˜2|c1] + τ) f(c1)dc1
 < 0.
The remaining proof follows the same logic as the Proof of Proposition 4.2 and thus,
omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 4.6: Under τ = , social welfare W s(, γ) which is given by
W sL(, γ) = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + s+ (1−2γ)[(µ+)α]24(1−γ)2β
]
, if γ ≥ γ2
W sS(, γ) = 2p− (µ+ ) + (1−2γ)[(µ+)α]
2
8(1−γ)2β + (1 + F (c¯
s
1(γ)))s
−Ec1 min
(
(E[c˜2|c1] + )
[
1− (µ+)α24(1−γ)β
]
, ca
)
− (1− F (c¯s1(γ)))e
, if γ1 ≤ γ < γ2
W sA(, γ) = 2(p− ca − e), if 0 ≤ γ < γ1,
Since W sA(, γ) does not depend on γ, it follows that γ∗ ∈
[
γ1, 1
)
. We now examine the
impact of increasing γ in
[
γ1, 1
)
on W s(, γ). We have
∂W sL(, γ)
∂γ
= − [(µ+ )α]
2 γ
(1− γ)3β < 0,
∂W sS(, γ)
∂γ
= − [(µ+ )α]
2 γ
4(1− γ)3β +
c¯s1(γ)∫
0
(E[c˜2|c1] + ) (µ+ )α2
4(1− γ)2β f(c1)dc1 +
∂c¯s1(γ)
∂γ
(s+ e)f(c¯s1(, γ)).
It follows that W sL(, γ) decreases in γ but the behavior of W sS(, γ) is not trivial. We
can, however, apply the same approach as in the Proof of Proposition 4.4 to establish
the results in Proposition 4.5.
Proof of Corollary 4.2: Similar to the Proof of Corollary 4.1, it is straightforward
to show that ∂c¯
s
1(γ)
∂γ > 0 and as s → ∞,
∂W sS(,γ)
∂γ > 0 and the result of Corollary 4.2
follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.7: Under the effective carbon price τj and a subsidy γj ≥
γ2(τj), the buyer offers a long-term contract as follows from Proposition 4.5 and so the
resulting social welfare level is given by
W sL(τj , γj) = 2
[
p− (µ+ τj) + (µ+ τj)
2α2
4(1− γj)β + (τj − )
(
1− (µ+ τj)α
2
2(1− γj)β
)
+ s
]
−
γj [(µ+ τj)α]2
2(1− γj)2β .
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After some algebra, W sL(τj , γj) can be rewritten as follows
W sL(τj , γj) = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + (µ+ )(µ+ τj)α
2
2(1− γj)β + s−
[(µ+ τj)α]2
4(1− γj)2β
]
.
Applying the relationship γj = −τjµ+ to the above expression, we have
W sL(τj , γj) = 2
[
p− (µ+ ) + (µ+ )
2α2
4β + s
]
= WL().
This concludes the proof.
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
In this section, φ(.) and Φ(.) denote the standard normal probability density function
and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable, respec-
tively. We use the following relationships defined for the standard normal random
variable: ∂φ(z)∂z = −zφ(z),
∫ v
−∞ zφ(z)dz = −φ(v).
Proof of Proposition 5.1: The supplier’s expected profit in period 1 for a given EE
investment level I is given by
piUs = wU1
∗ − µ(1− g(I))− βI +
c¯U∫
0
[E[c2|c˜1]g(I)− βI] f(c˜1)dc˜1
+
c¯(I)∫
c¯U
[ca − E[c2|c˜1](1− g(I))− βI] f(c˜1)dc˜1 −
∞∫
c¯(I)
βIf(c˜1)dc˜1.
The first order derivative with respect to I is then
∂piUs
∂I
= g′(I)
µ+ c¯(I)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1
− 2β ≥ g′(I)µ− 2β.
Hence, it follows from the concavity of g(·) and the definition of
¯
I that for 0 ≤ I ≤
¯
I:
∂piUs
∂I
≥ g′(
¯
I)µ− 2β ≥ 0.
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We also have
c¯(I)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1 ≤
∞∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1 = µ.
It follows that:
g′(I)
µ+ c¯(I)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1
− 2β ≤ 2(µg′(I)− β),
Since g(·) is concave, for I¯ ≤ I ≤ Im, we have ∂pi
U
s
∂I ≤ (µg′(I¯)− β)2 = 0.
Combining the above arguments, we show that ∂pi
U
s
∂I ≥ 0 and piUs is increasing in
I for 0 ≤ I ≤
¯
I; ∂pi
U
s
∂I ≤ 0 and piUs is decreasing in I for I¯ ≤ I ≤ Im. It follows
from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists an optimal EE investment level
¯
I ≤ IU ∗ ≤ I¯ such that ∂piUs∂I
∣∣∣
I=IU∗
= 0.
Proofs of Corollary 5.1: From their definitions, it is straightforward to show that
∂
¯
I
∂ca
= ∂I¯∂ca = 0. Thus, we focus on the interior value of I
U ∗ that solves
∂piUs
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣
I=IU∗
= 0.
Following Implicit Function Theorem and the fact that IU ∗ maximizes piUs , it is easy to
establish that ∂IU
∗
∂ca
has the same sign as ∂
2piUs
∂I∂ca
∣∣∣
I=IU∗
, which is given by ∂
2piUs
∂I∂ca
∣∣∣
I=IU∗
=
g′(IU ∗) ca
ρ(1−g(IU∗))2 f(c¯(I
U ∗)) ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary5.2: The corollary follows immediately from the optimality of
piUs
∗ and piUs (0) = 0.
Proofs of Propositions 5.2-5.3: These proofs are straightforward and hence omitted
for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 5.4: We first write the proof for ρ = 0. In this case, we have
E[c2|c˜1](1− g(¯I)) = µ(1− g(¯I)) < ca.
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Thus, the buyer always offers E[c2|c˜1](1−g(¯I)) in period 2 under the short-term contract.
Her optimal profits under the short- and long-term contracts are given as
piSb
∗ = 2(p− µ(1− g(
¯
I))− β
¯
I),
piLb
∗ = 2(p− µ(1− g(I¯))− βI¯).
From these expressions, it is straightforward to show that piSb
∗ ≤ piLb ∗. Thus, the buyer
always prefers the long-term contract for ca ≥ µ = c¯a. We next obtain the threshold
value c¯a for ρ > 0. To this end, we show that piSb
∗ is strictly decreasing in ca. We have
∂piSb
∗
∂ca
= −
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
f(c˜1) dc˜1 < 0. Since piLb
∗ does not depend on ca, there exists a unique cˇa
such that piSb
∗(cˇa) = piLb
∗. Since µ ≤ ca < p, we have c¯a = min(max(µ, cˇa), p). Thus,
if ca < c¯a, it implies that piSb
∗
> piLb
∗ and the buyer prefers the short-term contract;
otherwise, the buyer prefers the long-term contract.
Proof of Proposition 5.5:
Proof of part i. Note that when IU ∗ lies on the boundary , the proof is straight-
forward. Hence, we focus only on the interior solution case, i.e. IU ∗ = I˜, which satisfies
g′(I˜)
µ+ c¯(I˜)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1
− 2β = 0.
Let J (I˜) denote the left hand side. Applying Implicit Function Theorem,
∂I˜
∂ρ
= − ∂J /∂ρ
∂J /∂I˜ ,
∂I˜
∂σ
= −∂J /∂σ
∂J /∂I˜ .
Since I˜ is a maximizer, ∂J
∂I˜
≤ 0. Thus, ∂I˜∂ρ and ∂I˜∂σ have the same signs as ∂J∂ρ and
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∂J
∂σ , respectively. We have
∂J
∂ρ
= g′(I˜)
( c¯(I˜)∫
0
(c˜1 − µ)f(c˜1)dc˜1 − ca − µ(1− g(I˜))
ρ2(1− g(I˜)) E[c2|c¯(I˜)]f(c¯(I˜))
)
≤ g′(I˜)
( ∞∫
0
(c˜1 − µ)f(c˜1)dc˜1 − ca − µ(1− g(I˜))
ρ2(1− g(I˜)) E[c2|c¯(I˜)]f(c¯(I˜))
)
= −g′(I˜)ca − µ(1− g(I˜))
ρ2(1− g(I˜)) E[c2|c¯(I˜)]f(c¯(I˜)) ≤ 0,
where the first inequality follows from c¯(I˜) ≥ µ. It follows that ∂I˜∂ρ ≤ 0. For the impact
of σ, we have
∂J
∂σ
= g
′(I˜)
σ
c¯(I˜)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1
= g
′(I˜)
σ
µ∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1 +
g′(I˜)
σ
c¯(I˜)∫
µ
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1. (C.1)
Let cˇ = µ−σ and cˆ = µ+σ. For c˜1 ≤ cˇ or c˜1 ≥ cˆ,
(
c˜1−µ
σ
)2−1 ≥ 0; and ( c˜1−µσ )2−1 < 0,
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otherwise. Furthermore, note that E[c2|c˜1] is increasing in c˜1. Hence,
µ∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1 =
cˇ∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤E[c2|cˇ]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
f(c˜1)dc˜1 +
µ∫
cˇ
E[c2|c˜1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥E[c2|cˇ]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
f(c˜1)dc˜1
≤ E[c2|cˇ]
µ∫
0
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1
= E[c2|cˇ]2
∞∫
0
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1 = 0.
If c¯(I˜) ≤ cˆ, it is straightforward that
c¯(I˜)∫
µ
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1−µ
σ
)2 − 1] f(c˜1)dc˜1 ≤ 0. It follows
from the above observations that the right hand side in (C.1) is negative and thus,
∂J
∂σ ≤ 0. We next prove the result when c¯(I˜) > cˆ. We have
∂J
∂σ
= g
′(I˜)
σ
c¯(I˜)∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1
≤ g
′(I˜)
σ
∞∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]
[(
c˜1 − µ
σ
)2
− 1
]
f(c˜1)dc˜1
= g′(I˜)
∂
∞∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1
∂σ
= 0.
The second inequality follows from the fact that
(
c˜1−µ
σ
)2 − 1 ≥ 0 for c˜1 ≥ c¯(I˜) > cˆ
and the last equality follows as
∞∫
0
E[c2|c˜1]f(c˜1)dc˜1 = µ, regardless of σ value. Thus,
∂J
∂σ ≤ 0, and ∂I˜∂σ ≤ 0.
Proof of part ii. The impact of ρ and σ immediately follow from the definitions
of
¯
I and I¯, hence we avoid the details.
Proof of part iii. Note that when c¯a is on the boundary (i.e. in the set {µ, p}),
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its derivatives with respect to both ρ and σ are zero. Thus, it is sufficient to focus on
the case when c¯a is the interior solution cˇa of
(1+)(µg(
¯
I)− β
¯
I) +
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
[E[c2|c˜1](1− g(¯I))− cˇa] f(c˜1) dc˜1 = (1+)(µg(I¯)− βI¯).
We first define
H(cˇa) = (1+)(µg(¯I)− β¯I)− (1+)(µg(I¯)− βI¯) +
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
[E[c2|c˜1](1− g(¯I))− cˇa] f(c˜1) dc˜1.
Since H(cˇa) = 0, by applying Implicit Function Theorem, we have:
∂cˇa
∂ρ
= − ∂H/∂ρ
∂H/∂cˇa ,
∂cˇa
∂σ
= − ∂H/∂σ
∂H/∂cˇa .
Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.4, we have ∂H∂cˇa = −
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
f(c˜1) dc˜1 < 0. It follows
that ∂cˇa∂ρ and
∂cˇa
∂σ have the same signs of
∂H
∂ρ and
∂H
∂σ , respectively. We next prove the
signs of ∂H∂ρ and
∂H
∂σ . We have
∂H
∂ρ
= (1− g(
¯
I))
∞∫
c¯(
¯
I)
[(c˜1 − µ)] f(c˜1) dc˜1 ≥ 0,
where the inequality is due to c¯(
¯
I) ≥ µ. Hence, ∂cˇa∂ρ ≥ 0. In a similar fashion as in the
proof of part i., we can also prove ∂H∂σ ≥ 0, which leads to ∂c¯a∂σ ≥ 0. Thus, the proof
completes.
